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The investigation can be seen as an inductive, empirical 
and more theory building study within the field of auton-
omy. First, it highlights the mapping of territorial autono-
mies in the world. Second, it shows how “good practice” 
of fuzzy-set QCA should be used within comparative 
research with not so small N. 
The study answers the questions of what conditions that 
explain the occurrence of territorial autonomy and what 
kind of different degrees of autonomy that exist within 
the group of territorial autonomies as such. These ques-
tions are answered through a stepwise application of using 
fuzzy-set QCA as the methodological technique. First, 
an application of necessary conditions is conducted only 
with the set of territorial autonomies in hand. Second, an 
elaboration of sufficient conditions is outlined with both 
the set of territorial autonomies and a set of non-autono-
mous entities as a control group.
Results show that there are two paths leading to the estab-
lishment of territorial autonomy. One path is the combina-
tion of ethnic distinctiveness and small population size and 
the other path is the combination of historical strategic 
importance and geographical distance. The underlying 
necessary condition for both paths is democracy. Without 
a democratic environment it would be harder for a territo-
rial autonomy to see the light.
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1 Introduction 
 
Autonomy is a disputed matter in social science literature, as there is no universal 
definition of the concept. In social sciences, it is customary to talk about personal, 
cultural, functional, administrative and territorial or legislative forms of autonomy.  
 
In a recent article, Michael Tkacik (2008) distinguishes between these different forms 
by modeling scope and depth of autonomy as it moves according to a spectrum from 
one form of autonomy to another.1  
 
On the lowest level in Tkacik’s figure,2 we encounter personal autonomy with very 
few numbers of issues controlled by locals and a low level of depth of control. 
Personal autonomy often refers to the guarantee of certain individual rights, such as 
civil liberties and civil rights. Sometimes personal autonomy also refers to minority 
rights. On the second level, we encounter cultural autonomy, which refers to specific 
rights based on membership of a particular group. Cultural autonomy is often related 
to minority issues and indigenous rights. The Sami people in Finland, for example, 
would illustrate this kind of autonomy. The third level of autonomy is functional 
autonomy, which spans over one area of subject matter or over a few areas that are 
not otherwise connected such as education, the church or language. The Swedish-
speaking minority in Finland could be classified into this kind of category. As we 
move up towards administrative autonomy, the phenomenon becomes more blurred. 
Administrative autonomy could mean a territorial base with a greater control over 
local issues, by means of which a region acquires regulatory powers or more limited 
legislative powers. Corsica is a good example of this kind of model. In organization 
theory, administrative autonomy refers to institutions or various organizations and 
their scope of competencies and functions. At the highest level, we find legislative 
autonomy, which most often also refers to territorial autonomy. The legislative 
autonomies are those with major powers and more in-depth control over their internal 
affairs. Regions belonging to this category are, for instance, the Åland Islands, the 
                                                 
1 Michael Tkacik (2008). ’Characteristics of Forms of Autonomy’, International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, 2008, pp. 369-401. 
2 Michael Tkacik (2008), op.cit., see figure 1, p. 372. 
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Faroe Islands, and the Isle of Man. There are grey zones between all these 
categories, but it helps somewhat to organize and define what we mean by autonomy 
in different contexts. In this study, the main focus is on territorial autonomies. 
 
The theoretical framework in this investigation rests specifically on one major 
concept and that is autonomy. The research interest lies in territorial forms of 
autonomy, so the focus will be on territorial arrangements when discussing the 
concept of autonomy. Furthermore, the interest is mainly placed on interstate 
relationships, relationships between the state/central level and the highest regional 
level of government within states. The overall research problem will be to explain 
why special territorial autonomous arrangements occur and to what degree they have 
autonomy. It is, to my knowledge, the first time an investigation tries to combine 
territorial autonomy as to both kind and degree at the same time.  
 
There are authors arguing that autonomy and federalism are different arrangements.3 
This is also my point of departure. Some other authors do claim that territorial 
autonomy includes confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy and cantonization.4 
In this investigation I will follow the perspective that autonomy and federalism should 
be seen as different phenomena. 
 
As the focus is on territorially unique arrangements in the world, federal constituent 
states have been excluded from the investigation and other regional arrangements are 
used only as control mechanisms. This means that separate analyses have been made, 
the first with the special autonomy arrangements and then in combination with the 
other regional arrangements. The concept of autonomy could be seen as an 
overarching concept, while territorial autonomy is seen more as a subordinate concept 
to autonomy as a whole.  
 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Ruth Lapidoth (2001). ‘Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements’, 
C.A.P. Working Paper, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München <http://www.cap.uni-
muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf> 
4 Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000). ‘Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role 
of Territorial Autonomy’, p. 260 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): Identity and Territorial Autonomy in 
Plural Societies. London: Frank Cass Publishers.  
2
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Within the broad understanding of autonomy, even the concept of territorial 
autonomy might be challenged by those in the discourse who think that territorial 
autonomy implies the granting of exclusive legislative powers to a decision-making 
body of a territorially circumscribed entity. In opposition to this way of thinking, 
others have the opinion that an entity, which is territorially defined and furnished with 
some decision-making powers, could also be described as a territorial autonomy.5 The 
former understanding is related to hard core opinions within autonomy, while the 
latter points in a direction that raises the possibility of the existence of other forms of 
autonomy. Researchers often make a distinction between territorial autonomy and 
non-territorial forms of autonomy. Another distinction which is very commonly made 
concerns the different perspectives on territorial autonomy and federalism. Some 
notes about why federalism is excluded in the investigation are considered in this 
particular study. 
 
Some authors argue, as will be shown, that territorial autonomy and federalism are 
concepts that are virtually linked, while others argue that they should be seen as 
totally different from each other. Authors with the view that these concepts are 
interconnected with each other, have the perspective that federalism includes 
territorial autonomy as a form of federacy or quasi-federal arrangement.6 Different 
approaches give different answers. Whatever approach is used, the lack of larger 
empirical comparative studies is still an issue in the field. This investigation will try to 
explore some of the gaps in the field which are related to autonomy. My point of 
departure will be a qualitative comparative approach. The phenomenon is analyzed 
through the perspectives of both degree and kind at the same time. 
  
                                                 
5 André Légaré and Markku Suksi (2008). ‘Rethinking the Forms of Autonomy at the Dawn of the 21st 
Century’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, 2008, pp. 143-144. 
6 Ronald L. Watts and Daniel J. Elazar refer to federacies and associated states as labels for these 
territories. See, e.g. Ronald L. Watts (2005). ’Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships’, pp. 235-237 
in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds.): Theories of Federalism – A Reader. New York and 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, and Daniel J. Elazar (1987): Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, pp. 55-57. 
3
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Federalism as a theory has been excluded in the analysis for a number of reasons. 
First of all, federalism is a similarly vague concept as autonomy.7 There is no 
coherent theory on federalism. Federalism has many similarities with autonomy and is 
often associated with it, but in this investigation only territorial autonomies have been 
included. Second, to take federal constituent states into account would broaden the 
dissertation beyond a reasonable scope. As Elazar notes, the federal states in the 
world are divided into over 350 constituent or federated states.8 Third, the various 
models of federalism are also complicated. Some federal systems are more 
symmetrical than others. In the perfectly symmetrical federal system, each unit is 
equal according to territorial and demographic size and has similar social, economic 
and political characteristics. This system is related to the idea that each unit would 
exercise similar power nationally. In an asymmetrical federation, units would be 
unique, differing from other units and the federal system at large.9 The majority of the 
federal states in the world lie in between these two extremes. As Michael Burgess 
(2006) argues, asymmetrical forms can be seen in every federal system at various 
degrees. The asymmetry then lies in the social cleavages between the different 
constituent states, the contrasts between center-periphery and urban-rural relations, 
the socio-economic conditions where regional disparities are large and in the 
demographic structure within the federal states.10 At the regional level asymmetrical 
forms come into play. 
 
Therefore the question could be asked as to what is the purpose of the investigation. 
The investigation can be seen as a contribution to the debate concerning how states 
organize their territory in various ways. States that have approved territorial autonomy 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Michael Burgess (2006). Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. London and New 
York, Routledge, pp. 25-49 for a more thorough discussion on how to define federalism; Burgess gives 
an outline of the definitions of federalism throughout history. 
8 Daniel J. Elazar (1996). ‘From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift’, International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 426. 
9 Ronan Paddison (1983). The Fragmented State. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., p. 
116. See also Charles D. Tarlton (1965). ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A 
Theoretical Speculation’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Nov. 1965), pp. 861-874. 
10 Michael Burgess (2006). op.cit., pp. 209-225. See also Alfred Stepan (2001). ‘Toward a New 
Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian 
Federalism’, pp. 320-323 in Alfred Stepan (ed.): Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Stepan divides symmetrical and asymmetrical forms into three ideal types, which he 
calls “coming together”, “holding together”, and “putting together” variants.  
4
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within their state borders might have used a very flexible mechanism. Governments 
have been pressured to decentralize by political, ethnic, religious and cultural groups 
seeking greater autonomy in decision-making procedures and these groups have even 
called for stronger control over natural resources.11 The development of some 
decentralization in the world is, in fact, clearly indicated when examining certain 
statistics. By the early 1990s, almost all countries with a population of more than five 
million had undertaken some form of decentralization. At the end of the 1990s, about 
95 percent of the countries with democratic systems had sub-national units of 
administration or government.12 In this investigation, several of the various forms of 
decentralization will be highlighted while studying the phenomenon of territorial 
autonomy and non-autonomous regions. The definition of the concept of territorial 
autonomy is further elaborated on in section 2.3. 
 
1.1  Purpose of the Study and Research Problem 
 
The purpose of the study is to outline and explore the special autonomous 
arrangements in the world, i.e. territorial autonomies, and at the same time provide the 
reader with an exploration into qualitative comparative strategies throughout the 
investigation. The major purpose is to describe and analyze which factors constitute 
special autonomous arrangements and which factors explain the various degrees of 
autonomy within this particular group. The secondary purpose is to use a rather new 
method called fuzzy-set to be able to outline necessary and/or sufficient conditions for 
territorial autonomy. The combinatorial effects of the possible explanatory factors are 
in focus in this study and it is assumed that different paths lead to the outcome in 
question. The ambition here is not to try to establish a complete list of territorial 
autonomies in the world, but rather to investigate as many cases as possible. A 
sufficient number of cases should provide an adequate amount of information with 
which to be able to generalize an outcome.  
 
                                                 
11 G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (2007). ‘From Government Decentralization to 
Decentralized Governance’, p. 4 in G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.): Decentralizing 
Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
12 G. Shabbir Cheema and Demmis A. Rondelli (2007), op.cit., p. 8. 
5
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1.2  Research Design 
 
The starting point in this investigation is to select on the dependent variable in order 
to map the cases of interest, i.e. the special autonomous arrangements in the world. 
The technique for selecting on the dependent variable is described in more depth in 
chapter 3. I have selected this point of departure since there are no studies (to my 
knowledge), which have mapped all possible special autonomous arrangements in the 
world. Some lists are to be found on the internet13, but as noted previously my 
ambition is not to include the total population. A large sample group is sufficient for 
this study. There are some studies conducted in this area, but a number of authors 
have limited themselves to island regions or taken a sample group into account.14 The 
latter procedure is also my intention. The design follows the feature presented in the 
following section. 
 
In the first part of the study, the special autonomous arrangements in the world will be 
derived from constitutions and other relevant sources. The special autonomous 
regions could be seen as asymmetrical regions, which do not fit into the general 
pattern within the state, as regards the distribution of power, decentralization or 
federal systems. They might be considered as deviant cases in this context. The next 
step in the investigation is to map all potential explanatory factors (independent 
variables) that can be found in the literature in relation to autonomous arrangements 
as such. These factors will then be tested as to whether they are necessary for the 
outcome. In the first section the degree of autonomy is of interest between the cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_autonomous_areas_by_country.  However, the list 
includes federal constituent states as well. 
14 See e.g. Pär M. Olausson (2007). Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that 
Determine Island Autonomy. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press and Hurst Hannum (1996). 
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accomodation of Conflicting Rights. Revised 
Edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvanian Press. 
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Figure 1: The First Step in the Research Design 
 
 
 
To overcome the problems of bias, when selecting on the dependent variable, a 
control group with non-autonomous regions has been considered. The group of non-
autonomous regions are a group of arrangements other than the special ones. These 
regions might have limited powers and scope of competencies or lack the degree of 
autonomy which is called for. These regions can be seen as dissimilar (or negative) 
cases. These regions are used to be able to outline the sufficient conditions in the 
study.  
 
The problem with the whole design, besides the fact that I start by selecting on the 
dependent variable, is that autonomy could be considered to lie in the middle of a 
continuum ranging from non-autonomy to sovereignty. As has been described by 
Sorens (2004), the continuum between centralism and independence could be seen as 
a six-graded scale, where 0 indicates full centralism within the state and 6 indicates 
full independence, and at the midpoint we would have federalism.15 According to this 
view, my entities would be somewhere between 2 and 4 on this kind of scale. The best 
solution would be to have cases from the whole continuum, but the limitation of a 
dissertation makes this impossible. Autonomy, as a concept, is also very vague in this 
field of research, so this means that I had to try to isolate the cases of territorial 
autonomy at first glance and hopefully in this respect be able to outline the contrasting 
cases of non-autonomy in the next step in the investigation. The solution, in my 
opinion, was to take a control group into account, which adjusts the design to follow a 
more appropriate direction: 
 
 
                                                 
15 Jason Sorens (2004). ’Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy’, Electoral Studies 23, Figure 1, p. 
730. 
Potential Explanatory 
Factors 
Special Autonomous 
Arrangements 
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Figure 2: Second Step in the Research Design 
 
 
 
The design is not perfect, but more sophisticated than the first section. One can argue, 
that the range of variation has been truncated, since I do not include sovereign 
countries. The interest of previous research has been to explain why special 
autonomous arrangements occur within countries, therefore I considered that the 
problem would be of another nature, when moving from a sub-national level to a 
macro-level. Having entities on two different levels of analysis is not an option in this 
context, since the main interest rests on the sub-national level and interstate relations 
between the central level and the regional level within states. Territorial autonomy 
can be seen as a specific mechanism which governments use for different purposes. 
The unique arrangements of autonomy are of particular interest in this inquiry.   
 
The choice of external factors will be made openly and transparently, and here I 
follow an idea based on Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser,16 which involves 
listing all possible independent variables at first-hand and then reducing them second-
hand. The outcome being that only all the relevant variables are considered. Other 
ways to reduce variables are with statistical analyses. One method would be to use 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (1994). ‘Conditions of Democracy in Interwar 
Europe. A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses’, Comparative Politics, Volume 26, Number 3 (April 
1994), pp. 253-279, Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser (1994). ‘Comparing political systems: 
Establishing similarities and dissimilarities’, European Journal of Political Research 26, pp. 193-219 
and Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser (1996). ‘Conditions of Authoritarianism, Fascism, and 
Democracy in Interwar Europe. Systematic Matching and Contrasting of Cases for “Small N” 
Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 423-468. 
Potential 
Explanatory Factors 
Special Autonomous 
Arrangements 
Other Regions 
(non-autonomous) 
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factor analysis or discriminant analysis.17 In factor analysis, it is possible to combine 
possible independent variables which are conceptually related. A selection of 
candidate independent variables is made to identify underlying dimensions that link 
these variables.18 In discriminant analysis, variables are grouped according to the 
same outcome. It is possible to find deviant cases with this particular technique.19 In 
this investigation, calibration with fuzzy-set scores was used as the ultimate method 
of transforming variables to set membership according to qualitative anchors or 
qualitative groupings.20 
 
De Meur and Berg-Schlosser have used pairwise comparisons according to a most 
similar systems design with different outcomes and a most different systems design 
with the same outcome. In my design one possible approach might have been to use a 
most different systems design with the same outcome, since I only consider territorial 
autonomies at first-hand. The authors mentioned have only used dichotomized 
variables according to the Boolean approach. In my investigation, a fuzzy scale is 
used to maintain the variations as much as possible. Boolean procedures are only used 
where it might be appropriate.  
 
The methodological procedures are further elaborated in the methodology section of 
this dissertation (see chapter 5).  
 
The study is divided into seven major parts. Subsequent to the introductory chapter, 
the second chapter describes and explores the concept of autonomy from different 
perspectives and provides the principal definition of territorial autonomy used in the 
investigation. The third chapter discusses how the mapping of the cases was 
undertaken and how the cases were operationalized according to the degree of 
                                                 
17 Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (2002). ’Reduction of Complexity’, pp. 270-272 in Dirk 
Berg-Schlosser & Jeremy Mitchell (eds.): Authoritarianism and Democracy in Europe 1919-39: 
Comparative Analyses. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
18 B. Guy Peters (1998). Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
pp. 70-71. 
19 Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (2002), op.cit., p. 271. 
20 For a more in-depth description of how to calibrate fuzzy-sets see Charles C. Ragin (2008). ‘Fuzzy 
Sets: Calibration versus Measurement’, pp. 174-198 in David Collier, Henry Brady, and Janet Box-
Steffensmeier (eds.): Methodology Volume of Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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autonomy. The fourth chapter explores the possible explanatory factors that are 
assumed to lead to the occurrence of territorial autonomy and the various degrees of 
territorial autonomy. In the fifth chapter, the first analysis is taken into account with a 
description of the methodological technique used in the study. The sixth chapter 
describes the selection of the control group consisting of non-autonomous regions and 
their characteristics. The seventh chapter takes into account the second analysis, and 
the last chapter concludes with a summary of the whole study. 
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2 The Dependent Variable 
 
2.1 The Concept of Autonomy 
 
The concept of autonomy is derived from Greek; ‘auto’ meaning ‘oneself’ and 
‘nomos’ meaning ‘laws’ or ‘rules’.21 Autonomy is therefore to rule over oneself 
according to one’s own laws or rules. The concept of autonomy is used in a wide 
range of disciplines and can have different meanings depending on the circumstances. 
 
The terms ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-government’ are often used synonymously. Self-
government could be said to constitute a special condition between, on the one hand, a 
geographically distinct territory and its political institutions, and on the other hand, 
the territory in question’s external relations. Municipal or local government specifies 
the extent to which the doctrine regarding local self-determination is consistent with 
the nation-state’s representative democracy.22 According to the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government (1985/1991), local self-government is the establishment of 
locally elected assemblies with meaningful powers, lucid territorial boundaries, and 
financial autonomy in the form of local taxes and duties.23 Local self-government is 
based on the state’s willingness to devolve power to a lower level, which means that 
the central level, at any point in time, could withdraw the power of the municipalities. 
The Council of Europe, on the other hand, supports the right to self-
determination/self-government as a means to protect national minorities and, in this 
way, tries to reduce the ethnic tensions that otherwise could emerge and be 
dispersed.24 
 
                                                 
21 Yoram Dinstein (1981). ‘Autonomy’, p. 291 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): Models of Autonomy. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
22 Jon Pierre (1994). Den lokala staten – Den kommunala självstyrelsens förutsättningar och 
restriktioner. Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell, p. 10. 
23 Markku Suksi (1995). Frames of Autonomy and the Åland Islands. Meddelanden från Ekomisk-
statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, Rättsvetenskapliga institutionen, Ser. A:433. Åbo: 
Åbo Akademi, p. 13. 
24 Gunnar Jansson (2000). ‘Introductory Speech: Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism within 
the Council of Europe’ in Seminar on Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism. Stockholm: 
Regeringskansliet,UD, p. 10. 
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The concept of autonomy in a wider perspective is considered to be the granting of 
internal self-government to a region or a group of people that is acknowledged as a 
partial sovereignty in relation to the national government. This autonomy could 
include, in such a case, both actual and formal sovereignty in the political decision-
making process.25 This means that it is possible for the autonomy to act in its own 
name without any external influences. In national public law, autonomy can refer to 
autonomy for universities, cities, municipalities, and churches. This kind of autonomy 
is always in relation to the state, and describes the state’s limitations and autonomy 
determination, and the regulation of specific affairs in certain institutions.26 Because 
of political and economic factors, autonomy could be granted to a specific territory. 
This territory would then be a part of a greater political and judicial entity, but the 
autonomy granted would confer the political freedom to regulate certain specific 
internal affairs without influence from the central government. The granting of 
autonomy allows the population of a territory to directly control important affairs of 
special interest, while the central government retains power over the territory as such, 
and exercises authority over areas of common interest for both entities.27 Autonomies 
are simply self-governing territories due to their characteristics, which have acquired 
a certain position in their relationship with a federal or unitary state.28  
 
Autonomy could also be seen as a new State paradigm, where the principle of 
autonomy replaces the modern principle of sovereignty in the distribution and 
organization of power. Autonomy is here seen as a principle of integration and 
organization of a political community.29 
 
                                                 
25 Svante E. Cornell (2002). ‘Autonomy as a Source of Conflict – Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical 
Perspective’, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 2002, p. 249. 
26 Rudolf Bernhardt (1981). ‘Federalism and Autonomy’, p.26 in Y. Dinstein (ed.): Models of 
Autonomy, op.cit. 
27 Louis B. Sohn (1981). ‘Models of Autonomy within the United Nations Framework’, p. 5 in Y. 
Dinstein (ed.), op.cit. 
28 Markku Suksi (1996). ‘Aspekter på autonomi’ in Minorities and Conflicts – Minoriteter och 
konflikter. Meddelanden från Ålands högskola, nr. 9. Mariehamn: Ålands högskola, pp. 93-95. 
29 Carlos Eduardo Pacheo Amaral (1997). ‘Autonomy and the State of the Autonomies: Autonomy and 
Subsidiarity as Techniques for Conflict Management and State Building’. Paper presented at the XVII 
World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Korea, August 1997. 
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Autonomy from a narrower perspective is considered to be the protection of 
minorities and their self-determination. This is the approach by which the concept is 
used in modern international law.30 If we use this narrow definition, we enter a jungle 
of conventions, charters and other international agreements that deal with human 
rights issues, minority rights issues and indigenous people’s rights and so forth. The 
common characteristic in all forms of autonomy is that they are granted through 
international agreements or through interstate agreements or other public legislation 
within a state.31 
 
Within the European Union there are minimum criteria for regionalization and regions 
are required to have the highest possible institutional status within the national legal 
system. They are also required to have their own institutions, which are 
democratically elected, and be able to organize their power through these institutions. 
It is also mandatory that their economic development and cultural and linguistic 
traditions are promoted and managed. The regions should also enjoy economic 
freedom and have sufficient resources. Between state and region there should be 
mechanisms for the distribution of power, which gives the opportunity for the regions 
to compensate for any unequal distributions of tax revenues, and above all, 
compensate imbalances between the regions. Furthermore, the regions should have 
the opportunity to participate actively in trans-border cooperation, especially at the 
interregional level, and the regions should also be given the opportunity to supervise 
their own interests through the member states and through the Union’s different 
bodies.32 
 
Autonomy becomes an instrument for the democratizing reform of the state in so far 
as it entails a vertical distribution of power amongst various communities in which the 
state organizes itself. Autonomy can be understood as a response to the problems and 
demands of social, economic, cultural, and political challenges within states.33  
 
                                                 
30 Rudolf Bernhardt (1981), op.cit., p. 26. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Markku Suksi (1995), op.cit., pp. 14-15. 
33 Carlos E.A. Amaral (1997), op.cit. 
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The most common characteristics for all forms of territorial autonomies are 
distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis and some form of control over 
generic autonomy provisions. Usually, territorial forms of autonomy possess a locally 
elected assembly with some independent legislative authority. These territories have 
the right to take charge of all executive and administrative functions, which are 
provided by central state institutions except in the areas of foreign and defense policy 
or within the broad framework of economic and monetary policy. There is often a 
constitutional definition of the status of autonomy and specific rights concerning the 
overall control over generic autonomy provisions.34  
 
These features may vary, however, between different territorial autonomies. Some 
regions may have full legislative rights while others possess only regulatory powers. 
Distribution of power may be clearly outlined within some territories, while this 
characteristic may not be as clearly outlined within all territorial autonomies. Full 
control over internal functions related to the region in question is always an attribute 
available. These functions may, however, be shared with central state institutions in 
some areas while the autonomous region has extensive rights even beyond the state 
level in other areas. The regional legislatures’ competencies are often defined in the 
constituent document either in the constitution of the country or in the statute/act 
regulating the territorial autonomy as such. There is not always an independent 
judiciary with full responsibility for interpreting regional laws. Instead, there may be a 
joint dispute-settling body or other mechanisms established to solve disputes between 
the autonomous and the central governments. The control over generic autonomy 
provisions may also vary between various territorial autonomies. Some regions may 
have the ultimate right of control, while other regions have a consensual relationship 
with the central level or some form of referendum mechanisms available. 
 
An autonomous region should enjoy effective control over matters primarily of 
local/regional concern within the overall framework of the fundamental norms of the 
                                                 
34 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 467-468; Guyala Csurgai (2002). ‘Geopolitical Aspects of the 
Minority Question in Central and South Eastern Europe’, p. 67 in Kinga Gál (ed): Minority 
Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books; Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005). ‘Self-
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state. Autonomy is not equivalent to independence and autonomous governments 
should not expect to be immune from the influence of central governments. At the 
same time, however, the state must show flexibility to enable the autonomous region 
to exercise real power.35 Territorial autonomy can be seen as a compromise between 
divided societies in a country. The existing examples of territorial autonomies are 
often a result of long negotiations and are sometimes even enforced by international 
agreements.36    
 
2.2 Different Autonomy Regimes 
 
Territorial autonomy is referred to by some authors as an arrangement where the 
population is granted special rights to run its own affairs in certain areas.37 
Autonomous regions which possess some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness have been 
granted separate powers of internal administration without being detached from the 
state of which they are part.38 The establishment of a regime of autonomy requires a 
division of powers between the central authorities and the autonomous entity. The 
powers of the autonomy are usually related to matters of education, culture, language, 
environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, social and 
health issues and other services such as access to governmental civil service and 
representative local structures.39 There is, however, a great diversity between the 
degrees of autonomy and the extent of the powers transferred to the autonomous 
entities. The powers can range from very limited to larger powers and even up to a 
high concentration of major powers in the above areas.40 Should territorial autonomies 
then be seen as quasi-federal arrangements? Some authors, such as Elazar, seem to 
                                                                                                                                            
determination and autonomy – A conceptual introduction’, p. 14 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff 
(eds.): Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution. London and New York: Routledge. 
35 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 468. 
36 Balázs Vizi (2002). ‘Minority Groups and Autonomy from an International Political Perspective’, p. 
49 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe, op.cit. 
37 Ruth Lapidoth (2001). ‘Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements’, C.A.P.  Working 
Paper, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München. <www.cap.uni-
muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf> 
38 Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980). ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 74, Issue 4 (October 1980), p. 858. 
39 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. and Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 458. 
40 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
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suggest that territorial autonomies could be seen as such arrangements.41 The 
variations in concepts used in this particular area are quite confusing and there is no 
explicit way to derive a common understanding of what territorial autonomy really 
stands for. This is why authors have to use their own definitions. 
 
Most authors make distinctions between personal, administrative, functional, cultural 
and territorial forms of autonomy. These distinctions are, however, quite blurred. 
Non-territorial autonomy is referred to as personal, cultural, administrative and 
functional autonomy. Personal and cultural autonomy are closely linked to each other 
and refer to minority rights or indigenous rights. Administrative and functional 
autonomy are more associated with various institutions and their functions and 
powers, but can also be based on territorial grounds. These forms of autonomy are 
closely related to the discussion concerning multi-level governance.  
 
Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue on the subject of two types of governance which 
contrast with each other. Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with 
power sharing between a limited number of governments and which operates solely 
on a few levels. It is the fundamental relationship between the central government and 
a tier of non-intersecting sub-national governments. Membership is usually on a 
territorial basis. The jurisdictions frequently adopt the structure of an elected 
legislature, an executive, and a court system. Type II governance is an alternative 
form of multi-level governance in which the number of jurisdictions is vast rather 
than limited and operate on numerous territorial scales. This structure is more task-
specific and therefore more flexible. Independent jurisdictions fulfill distinct 
functions. Type II governance is organized across a large number of levels where the 
borders interact between the different layers of governments.42   
  
The broad spectrum of territorial autonomy can be divided into federalism, federation, 
associated states, confederation, home-rule government and other special forms of 
                                                 
41 Daniel J. Elazar (1987). Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama 
Press, pp. 49, 54-57. 
42 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003). ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
Level Governance’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, May 2003, pp. 233-243. 
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autonomy. Elazar lists various forms of federal systems such as union, 
consociation, federation, federacy, condominium, confederation, league and inter-
jurisdictional functional authorities. A union is clearly bounded according to 
territorial lines and its units retain municipal powers only while sharing power 
concentrated in the central government. A consociation is more of a non-territorial 
form of government, where constituent units share powers with the central 
government. A federation has strong self-government and constituent units are linked 
within a strong but limited government. Federacy is a form of asymmetrical 
relationship between two self-government units, where the larger unit has specific 
powers within the smaller unit in exchange for specific privileges. A condominium is 
a joint rule or control by two units over a third or over some common territory or 
enterprise. A confederation has strong self-governing constituent entities permanently 
linked by the loose, limited purpose of a common government. A league has loose but 
permanent linkages for limited purposes without a common government, but has 
established some joint body or secretariat. Inter-jurisdictional functional authorities 
are joint or common entities organized by the constituent units to undertake special 
tasks.43  
  
Autonomy can also be interpreted as an overall framework and mode of participation 
in public decision-making, which can exist within a variety of political structures, 
from federalism to consociation, devolution or decentralization.44 Devolution occurs 
when power is voluntarily transferred from the central government to the regional 
government. There are two fundamental models of legislative devolution, i.e. the 
retaining model and the transferring model. The retaining model exists when all 
powers are devolved to the new body apart from the powers retained centrally (see, 
for example, associated states like the Cook Islands). This implies that the regional 
parliament can do everything which is not specifically prohibited. The transferring 
model clarifies the specifics of what the devolved parliament is permitted to do (see, 
                                                 
43 Daniel J. Elazar (1996). ‘From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift’, International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, Table 1, p. 424. 
44 Kinga Gál (2002). ‘Minority Governance on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century’, p. 3 in 
Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
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for example, the Faroe Islands and Greenland).45 Decentralization is often 
described as the delegation of powers from the central level to the lower levels within 
the state. It can also occur within empires when the former imperial unity is replaced 
by a voluntary association or confederation of semi-sovereign or fully sovereign 
territorial entities takes place. The evolution of the British Empire through the British 
Commonwealth of Nations to a very loose consociation of fully sovereign countries is 
a good example of this process.46          
 
Control over territory is essential for the creation of the normal organs of local or 
regional government and may also be important in terms of economic viability or 
development.47 The territory can be seen as a primary guarantor of two fundamental 
human needs: identity and security.48 The identifying character may be seen by a 
group of people as a “homeland” where ancestors have lived for centuries. The 
security to have a place to live could be seen as a guarantor for threatened groups in a 
country. Where minority groups are dispersed throughout the state, there may be a 
need to have a defined territory in which these community members can feel secure. 
 
The various autonomy regimes undertaken in this study will be the special/unique 
autonomy arrangements, which occur as asymmetrical features, as distinguished from 
the normal distribution of regions within the states and the control group of other 
regions with less or no autonomy. 
 
In the next section, a more in-depth discussion about the definition of territorial 
autonomy will take place, followed by a summary with reference to the major concept 
described at the end of this chapter. The definition of territorial autonomy will 
function as a primary principle when selecting the cases of interest.  
 
 
                                                 
45 Douglas Chalmers (2002). ‘Scotland Year Zero – From Words to Action’ pp. 138-139 in Kinga Gál 
(ed.): Minority Governance in Europe, op.cit. 
46 Ivo D. Duchacek (1986). The Territorial Dimension of Politics. Within, Among, and Across Nations. 
Boulder and London: Westview Press, Inc., p. 62. 
47 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 463. 
48 Ibid, p. 464. 
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2.3 Definition of Territorial Autonomy 
 
Territorial autonomy can be defined as an institutional arrangement that delimits a 
regionally-based, self-administering entity or entities within a state as having explicit 
policy-making responsibilities in one or more political, economic or cultural 
spheres.49 
 
Autonomy in a political and legal context refers to the power of social institutions to 
regulate their affairs by enacting legal rules. A part of the state is authorized to govern 
itself in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a state 
of its own.50 
 
Territorial autonomy can also be seen as an arrangement aimed at granting the 
population of a sub-state unit a means by which it can express its distinct identity and 
run its own affairs in certain spheres.51 Pär Olausson uses a definition of territorial 
autonomy as a defined geographical territory that, in relation to the majority of other 
sub-national territories, enjoys a special status including some legislative powers, 
within the state, but does not constitute a federal unit, or an independent state.52 
 
Autonomy can further be defined as the granting of internal self-government to a 
region or a group of persons, which can be determined by the degree of actual as well 
as formal independence enjoyed by the autonomous entity in its political decision-
making process.53 Another definition derives from Kjell-Åke Nordquist for whom 
autonomy means an interstate territory, which has a jurisdictional base where the 
autonomous entity has a more extensive self-government than any other region within 
a state.54  
 
                                                 
49 Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000), op.cit., p. 259. 
50 Svante E. Cornell (2002). ’Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical 
Perspective’, World Politics, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 248-249. 
51 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
52 Pär M. Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 25. 
53 Svante E. Cornell, op.cit., p. 249. 
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A territorial autonomy is, according to my perception, a geographically defined 
area which differs from other sub-regions (like municipalities, federal states, etc.) in a 
specific country and has received special status with legislative and/or regulatory 
(administrative) powers. My definition is somewhat similar to the definitions 
mentioned by Olausson and Nordquist. The territory needs a jurisdictional base in the 
form of being enshrined in the constitution or it should have an autonomy act of its 
own in order to be regarded as having special status. The region should also possess 
extensive self-government in specific matters accepted by the central government or 
in collaboration with the central government of the state. Regulatory powers mean 
that the region has some kind of power to initiate legislation or furnish laws or rules 
which have to do with the region. Although the territory does not possess full 
legislative power, there should, however, be political institutions established in the 
region. Political institutions refer here to the legislative/regulatory powers and 
administrative powers. The regions are not obliged to have their own judiciary since 
this feature is often lacking in these regions. Territorial autonomies are often directly 
under the national judiciary. The territory should further function as a stable entity 
where no disputed matters are under consideration.   
 
2.4 Summary 
 
To summarize, it can be stated that autonomy has a number of dimensions. These 
dimensions include the following: the legal position and whether this is defined 
constitutionally or through ordinary legislation; the political competences according 
to the sub-national level; the degree of participation in national policy-making; the 
possibility of engaging in activities beyond the frontiers of the national territory; the 
degree of control over other sub-national levels; and finally, the degree of financial 
autonomy from, or dependence on, the national government.55 
 
                                                                                                                                            
54 Kjell-Åke Nordquist (2001). ‘Åland i ett jämförande internationellt perspektiv’ in Harry Jansson and 
Johannes Salminen (red.): Den andra Ålandsfrågan – Autonomi eller självständighet?, Julius 
Sundbloms Minnesstiftelse. Mariehamn: Ålands Tidnings Tryckeri AB, p. 96. 
55 John Loughlin (2000). ‘Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe’, Regional 
and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 25. 
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Autonomy stretches over a wide range of disciplines, and is related to self-
government, protection of minorities and the relationships between the different levels 
of government. These perspectives on autonomy are vital as a theoretical framework 
in this study. The assumption is that there are some general characteristics that have to 
be fulfilled in order for territorial autonomies to occur. 
 
Table 1 below illustrates the theoretical summary of the concept of territorial 
autonomy. 
 
Table 1: The Major Concept in the Study 
 
CHARACTERISTICS TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY 
Distribution of Power Yes, can vary between strong or weak 
Functions Varies from limited up to high concentration of 
powers 
Constitutional Basis Yes, the region is enshrined in the constitution 
and/or in ordinary legislation 
Control over the 
Generic Autonomy 
Provisions 
Varies from full control to consistency and/or 
referendum possibilities 
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3 Selecting the Cases 
 
The point of departure in this investigation is the outlining of the main territorial 
autonomies in the world. A complete list will not be available, since territorial 
autonomy as a concept is a living and not a static phenomenon. It would be 
impossible to consider all territorial autonomies, because of the different definitions 
used and the fact that some territories might change their status over time. Different 
definitions lead to various populations and my own definition has functioned as the 
guiding principle, but it is not possible to guarantee that all entities fulfilling my 
criteria have been mapped, since it is hard to survey all autonomy arrangements in the 
world. In the first section, I therefore explain the logic behind selecting on the 
dependent variable, and in the following section map the cases. The regions are 
described by common characteristics such as distribution of power, functions, 
constitutional basis, and control over the initial generic autonomy provisions; these 
features being regarded as the common conditions for territorial autonomies. 
Subsequently, possible explanatory factors will be included to identify the similarities 
and differences between the cases in chapter 4. The research problem will be to 
answer which kind of factors lead to territorial autonomy and to analyze how the 
degree of autonomy differs between the cases. The control group is included in the 
following phase in order to investigate which factors constitute territorial autonomy 
proper and which constitute the degree of autonomy proper. Such a control group 
consists of non-autonomous regions.  
 
In the first phase of the analysis, all potential explanatory factors are taken into 
account, and tested against the initial autonomous arrangements (special autonomy) in 
the territory, to see which factors are necessary. A second analysis then follows, 
including the non-autonomous regions, in order to test the sufficiency combinations of 
factors which constitute a proper territorial autonomy. After this analysis, it is 
possible to outline which paths lead to territorial autonomy. 
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3.1.1 Selecting on the Dependent Variable 
 
The point of departure is to explain the logic behind qualitative strategies, and how 
the techniques are used in this study. In qualitative research, and especially when 
dealing with small-N, we often encounter problems with selection bias in some form. 
The section discusses the selection on the dependent variable first from a more 
general view, and then my own empirical work illustrates how I overcame such 
problems. This discussion has been inspired by reading the influential work of King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994).56 The authors argue that in every study undertaken 
qualitative researchers should always include a section concerning foreseeable bias, 
and how the researcher has overcome such biases. 
 
The literature on selection bias has emerged from areas related to quantitative 
methods in which a given set of cases is analyzed with the aim of providing insights 
into what is often a relatively well-defined larger population. In this context, the 
central challenge is to provide good estimates of the features of the population in 
question.57 In qualitative research in international and comparative studies, the 
definition of population framework is more frequently ambiguous or a matter of 
dispute. The challenge is to address the disputes about selection bias before these 
issues can be resolved.58 
 
Qualitative researchers often start without well-developed and readily testable 
hypotheses, and therefore methodological tools for developing testable hypotheses are 
of great value to comparative scholars who seek to move from research topics to 
specific propositions.59 The benefit to scholars who pursue qualitative research is that 
they tend to have less inaccurate, partial, or misleading measurements. The reason 
behind this is the case-oriented nature of qualitative design. By learning a great deal 
about the cases, qualitative researchers avoid errors that may be common in some 
                                                 
56 See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (eds.) (1994). Designing Social Inquiry. 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
57 David Collier and James Mahoney (1996). ’Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative 
Research’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 66. 
58 Ibid, pp. 66-67. 
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large-N studies.60 The attainment or the isolation of answers to the questions 
scholars pose is often logically precluded by their method of selecting cases. The 
question of how determinants are related to one another in the process that leads to a 
certain phenomenon is as important as which factors are the original determinants.61 
 
Qualitative research often starts by selecting cases where the outcome of interest 
occurs (often called ‘positive cases’). This is obviously of particular interest, when the 
researcher is aiming at obtaining explanations for specific outcomes.62 This approach 
is also categorized as ‘selecting on the dependent variable’. 
 
The decision as to which observations or cases to select has a crucial effect on the 
outcome, and on the degree to which it can produce accurate and reliable results. 
King, Keohane and Verba argue that the selection of observations should allow for the 
possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable.63 Naturally, this 
should be quite obvious to the researcher, but, however, in some cases it is not done. 
 
Sometimes scholars adopt the strategy of deliberately selecting on the dependent 
variable. This strategy aims at achieving more insight into the phenomenon under 
investigation and its specific causes. It could also be used to explore insights into 
previous theories, conceptualizations, measurement procedures, and empirical 
studies.64 The investigator begins by listing all cases with the same outcome and then 
works in reverse in order to explore and understand the factors that preceded the 
reported events.65 
 
                                                                                                                                            
59 James Mahoney (2007). ’Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics’, Comparative Political 
Studies, Volume 40, Number 2 (February 2007), p. 124. 
60 Ibid, p. 128. 
61 Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982). ‘Case Selection, Conceptualizations and Basic Logic in 
the Study of War’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 4 (November 1982), pp. 834-
835. 
62 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2006). ’A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research’, Political Analysis, Volume 14, p.239, 10.1093/pan/mpj017. 
63 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (eds.) (1994), op.cit., pp. 128-129. 
64 David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), op.cit., p. 72. 
65 Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982), op.cit., p. 836. 
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If selecting on the dependent variable is considered, it is necessary to be aware of 
the bias and seek to correct for it. In some instances, the research design allows 
variation on the dependent variable, but that variation could be truncated. This means 
limiting ourselves to less than the full range of variation on the dependent variable, 
and therefore only taking part of the real world into account in our investigation.66 
Some analysts restrict their cases where the outcomes have a narrow range of 
variation, by focusing on cases that all have high or low scores on the particular 
outcome, whatever it might be. The goal of this approach is to look as closely as 
possible at actual instances of the outcome being studied.67 The problem of 
underestimating the effect of the main explanatory variable will then occur. By 
contrast, if we select on the explanatory variable, then for any given value of that 
variable, the dependent variable could assume any value.68 
 
In comparative studies, it is often common to use selection on the dependent variable 
to find the necessary conditions for a given outcome, or to eliminate some 
hypothesized necessary conditions. This technique is what J.S. Mill called ‘the 
method of agreement’. All cases agree on the dependent variable, and it could be used 
as a first step in causal analysis.69 A second reason for having one value on the 
dependent variable is related to counterfactuals as a means of testing hypotheses 
within the framework of small-N analysis. Scholars can employ counterfactual 
analysis by introducing variance in their studies when they have isolated cases of 
similar outcomes.70 The Boolean approach could be seen as a technique dealing with 
counterfactuals. The aim in such research is to identify necessary causes and 
combinations of factors that are sufficient for outcomes.71 Instead of focusing on the 
net effects of causal conditions, case-oriented explanations emphasize their combined 
                                                 
66 G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), op.cit., p. 130. 
67 David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), op.cit., p. 57. 
68 Ibid, p. 62. 
69 David Collier (1995). ’Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of 
Selection Bias’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (June 1995), p. 464 and James 
Mahoney (2007), op.cit., p. 134. 
70 David Collier (1995), op.cit., p. 464. 
71 James Mahoney (2007), op.cit., p. 135. 
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effects.72 More recently, Ragin (2000) has introduced fuzzy sets as a means for 
continuously coding variables according to the degree to which they correspond to 
qualitative categories of interest. Fuzzy-set is appropriate for analysis of necessary 
and sufficient causation, including probabilistic assumptions where different degrees 
of necessary or sufficient causation are considered.73 Counterfactual analysis is 
employed whenever a researcher makes a causal inference based on the analysis of 
naturally occurring social data in which limited diversity is the norm.74 
 
One strategy used for analyzing necessary and sufficient causes is probabilistic 
fashion. According to this method, it is possible to evaluate causes that are necessary 
or sufficient by means of a quantitative benchmark, e.g. necessary or sufficient 90 
percent of the time. Another probabilistic strategy is to measure variables 
continuously rather than dichotomously. In this context, causation can be considered 
necessary or sufficient if all cases are consistent with its interpretation when variables 
are adjusted to allow for a small amount of measurement error. A final procedure is to 
focus on statistical levels of significance with deterministic or probabilistic 
coefficients.75 
 
3.1.2 Coping with Selecting on the Dependent Variable 
 
One formula for overcoming selection bias used in this study, is to include a section 
which carefully explains the assignment and selection processes. This discussion 
includes the rules used, and an examination of all foreseeable hidden bias and the 
preventative measures taken.76 It is essential to identify the specific contrasts on a 
variable, in the view of the researcher, that make it an interesting outcome to explain. 
                                                 
72 Charles C. Ragin and John Sonnett (2005). ‘Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, 
Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis’, p. 180 in Sabine Kropp und Michael Minkenberg 
(eds.): Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.  
73 James Mahoney (2007), op.cit., p. 136, see also Charles C. Ragin (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
74 Charles C. Ragin and John Sonnett (2005), op.cit., p. 185. 
75 James Mahoney (2004). ’Comparative-Historical Methodology’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 
30 (August 2004), pp. 84-85, see also Bear F. Braumoeller and Gary Goertz (2000). ‘The Methodology 
of Necessary Conditions’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 
844-858 for a more thorough discussion regarding necessary conditions. 
76 G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), op.cit., p. 199. 
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This diversity might help the researcher to define a framework of comparisons for 
evaluating the explanations. One way to do this exploration is to include 
negative/opposite cases or to broaden the scope of comparable cases through 
increasing the N.77 In my study, this bias is not really an issue since I am dealing with 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and have a dependent variable which is graded 
according to variations between the cases. This investigation is not focused on linear 
relationships. 
 
Researchers who are interested in particular a X/Y relationship must avoid an 
exclusive focus on cases in which X is present. They should also include control 
groups in which X does not occur and the same could be argued about Y. Both the 
existence of Y and the non-existence of Y should be investigated.78 This is exactly my 
point of departure.  
 
In this study I commence by mapping most of the territorial autonomies in the world. 
The mapping of the cases is derived from the constitutions and other relevant legal 
documents where territorial autonomies are mentioned as special autonomous regions 
within the states. In order to be able to test for both necessity and sufficiency, I then 
move on to include a control group with opposite cases, of the so called non-
autonomous regions. This selection of entities is further developed in chapter 6. 
 
The logic behind the study can be illustrated by a Venn-diagram and this is also the 
logic behind the fuzzy-set thinking as such. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), op.cit., p.67. 
78 Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982), op.cit., p. 840. 
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Figure 3: Venn-Diagram Illustrating the Logic in the Investigation 
 
 
 
The entire rectangle indicates the universe of autonomy, i.e. all forms of autonomy in 
general. Circle A illustrates the sub-set of territorial autonomies (according to my 
definition) and circle B illustrates the sub-set of non-territorial forms of autonomy. 
Outside the circles, we would find federal constituent states, municipalities, and 
regions with no special status and so forth. Both forms of autonomy are intersecting 
with each other at some point, since there might be features that are common for all 
forms of autonomy, theoretically speaking. What I have done is to take the sub-set of 
territorial autonomies out of its context, and therefore the interest lies in explaining 
the variations within this particular sub-set, using an initial impression. In the next 
part of the investigation, cases which are found outside the circles are included, and 
these entities are then the non-autonomous regions (regions with possibilities to 
develop into territorial autonomy). This is done in order to unravel which factors lead 
to territorial autonomy proper. 
 
3.2 Mapping the Cases of Interest 
 
A previous investigation done by the author has identified 48 territorial autonomies in 
the world.79 I have further developed this mapping, since new arrangements may have 
appeared and also included the Spanish regions of interest in the study. In this 
previous research, I considered that Spain was evolving into federalism, but since this 
                                                 
79 See Maria Ackrén (2005). Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de 
självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut. 
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kind of federalism is only possible from a bottom-up perspective, (i.e. the regions 
themselves must bargain with the national level to be recognized as special regions) 
the regions that are diverse from other regions in the Spanish context will be included. 
In the Spanish context, these regions are the six historical regions which are believed 
to have bargained a better position for themselves when the constitution was 
implemented than the other regions. The total number of territorial autonomies has 
therefore increased. To map the entities, I use a truth table with the conditions that I 
believe must be fulfilled for the cases in question. These are as mentioned above: 
distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis, and control over the generic 
autonomy provisions.  
 
Distribution of power is one of the prerequisites when it comes to the administration 
of states as well as regions. In an article by Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich80, it 
is argued that the minimum criteria for a fully autonomous territory include a clear 
division of powers between legislative, executive and judiciary powers. My 
definition, however, excludes the judiciary power. The powers between legislative 
and executive should be clearly divided between the national/central power and the 
autonomous territory in question. Other factors of importance are the functions 
delegated to the autonomous sub-units. Territorial autonomies run their own affairs in 
certain spheres without external influence.81 Another common characteristic is that 
autonomous regions are granted through international agreements or through 
interstate agreements or other public legislation within a state.82 There is always some 
kind of constitutional basis in the form of a mention of the autonomous region in the 
constitution or by establishing a special autonomy act. Control over the general 
autonomy provisions could be essential for the autonomy. Who has the ultimate 
power of control? How easy is it to amend autonomy constitutions, acts or statutes? 
This could be relevant for the autonomies’ survival. The power of control refers to the 
                                                 
80 See Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980). ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 74, Issue 4 (October 1980), pp. 858-889. 
81 See e.g. Ruth Lapidoth (2001). ’Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements’, C.A.P. 
Working Paper, <www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf> 
82 Bernhardt, Rudolf (1981). ‘Federalism and Autonomy’ pp. 23-28 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): Models of 
Autonomy. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
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generic autonomy provisions and not to the competencies used by courts or similar 
institutions. 
 
Distribution of power will simply be dichotomized according to strong or weak for 
the autonomy in question. Strong, in this study, implies that there is a clear 
distribution of power between different levels. A weaker form of distribution indicates 
that there might be an absence of one or two levels. The attribute of functions will be 
outlined as internal matters, shared functions or even external functions. There might 
also be autonomies that include two elements of the three elements, i.e. they have 
both internal and shared functions at the same time, or internal and external functions. 
The constitutional basis is indicated, as mentioned, in the national constitution or by a 
separate act. Here both elements could be available as well. The control over the 
generic autonomy provisions will be indicated according to who has the ultimate 
power to change the autonomy act, statute, or constitution. There are possibilities that 
this function is made by consent in some way with the autonomy’s representative(s). 
Table 2 below shows the overview of this mapping. 
 
Table 2: Territorial Autonomies in the World 
 
Autonomy Distribution of 
Power 
Functions Constitutional Basis Control over the 
Generic Autonomy 
Provisions 
Åland Islands 
(Finland)  
Strong Internal and 
external 
National Constitution 2000 
and Act on the Autonomy of 
Åland Islands 1991 
Consistent decision of the 
Parliament of Finland and 
the Åland Parliament 
American Samoa (US) Strong Internal Own Constitution 1967 The Governor and a 
Constitutional Convention 
American Virgin 
Islands (US) 
Strong Internal Virgin Islands Code 1954 Secretary of the Interior 
and the Congress of USA 
Andalusia (Spain) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own constitution 1982 
An assembly of the 
Provincial Councils and 
Members of Congress and 
Senators sent to Cortes 
Generales 
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Anguilla (UK) Strong Internal Anguilla Constitution Order 
1982 
Her Majesty the Queen 
and Her Privy Council 
Aruba (NL) Strong Internal Own Constitution 1986 Act of Parliament in the 
Netherlands in consent 
with the Aruba Parliament 
Azores (Portugal) Strong Internal National Constitution 1976 
and own statute 1976 
The Assembly of the 
Republic 
Balearic Islands 
(Spain) 
Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own constitution 1983 
See Andalusia 
Basque Country 
(Spain) 
Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own constitution 1979 
See Andalusia 
Bermuda (UK) Strong Internal Bermuda Constitution Order 
1968 
The Legislature of 
Bermuda together with 
the Governor 
Bougainville (Papua 
New Guinea) 
Strong Internal National Constitution 1975 
and own constitution  
The Bougainville 
Executive to the Minister 
responsible for 
Bougainville matters 
British Virgin Islands 
(UK) 
Strong Internal Own Constitution 1967 and 
British Overseas Territory 
Act 2002 
Her Majesty the Queen 
and the Governor of the 
Islands 
Canary Islands (Spain) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own constitution 1982 
See Andalusia 
Catalonia (Spain) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own constitution 2006 
See Andalusia 
Cayman Islands (UK) Strong Internal and 
external 
Own Constitution 1972 See British Virgin Islands 
Cook Islands (NZ) Strong Internal and 
external 
Own Constitution 1965 The Parliament of the 
Islands with two-thirds 
majority 
Corsica (France) Weak Internal Special Statute 1991 The French Parliament in 
consent with the 
population on Corsica 
Crimea (Ukraine) Weak Internal National Constitution 1996 Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine 
Falkland Islands (UK) Strong Internal Own Constitution 1985 Her Majesty through a 
Secretary of State 
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Faroe Islands (DK) Strong Internal and 
external 
Own Constitution 1948 Referendum on the 
Islands or by the National 
Government 
French Polynesia 
(France) 
Strong Internal National Constitution 1958 
and own Law 1984 
Referendum or by the 
President of France 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia 
(Italy) 
Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1948 
and own constitution 1963 
The Regional Council 
approved twice by its 
members or referendum 
Gagauzia (Moldova) Strong Internal and 
external 
National Constitution and 
Autonomy Statute 
Three-fifths majority is 
required in the Moldovan 
Parliament 
Galicia (Spain) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1978 
and own statute 1981 
See Andalusia 
Gibraltar (UK) Strong Internal Own Constitution 2006 Her Majesty the Queen of 
UK 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
(Tajikistan) 
Weak Internal National Constitution 1994 General referendum with 
two-thirds majority 
Greenland (DK) Strong Internal and 
external 
Own Constitution 1979 See Faroe Islands 
Guam (US) Strong Internal Organic Act 1950 The Congress of USA 
Guernsey (UK) Strong Internal and 
external 
The Reform (Amendment) 
Law 1972 and common 
law/statutory law 
Guernsey itself 
Hong Kong (China) Strong Internal and 
external 
The Basic Law 1990 National People’s 
Congress of China and the 
Legislative Council of 
Hong Kong 
Isle of Man (UK) Strong Internal and 
external 
The Isle of Man Act 1961 
and common law/statutory 
law 
Her Majesty the Queen of 
UK or the Lieutenant 
Governor 
Jeju Island (South 
Korea) 
Weak Internal The Special Act on the Jeju 
Special Self-Governing 
Province 2006 
The National Parliament 
of South Korea 
Jersey (UK) Strong Internal and 
external 
Common Law and statutory 
law 
See Isle of Man 
Karakalpakstan 
(Uzbekistan) 
Strong Internal National Constitution 1992 
and own constitution 
Referendum and the Oliy 
Majlis of Uzbekistan 
Kosovo (Serbia)* Strong Internal National Constitution 2006 Kosovo is in a state- 
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and international 
agreements 
building process 
Macau (China) Strong  Internal and 
external 
The Basic Law 1993 See Hong Kong 
Madeira (Portugal) Strong  Internal National Constitution 1976 
and own statute 
See Azores 
Mayotte (France) Weak Internal National Constitution 1958 Referendum or by the 
President of France 
Mindanao 
(Philippines) 
Strong Internal National Constitution 1986 
and Republic Act No. 9054 
The Congress of the 
Philippines with two-
thirds majority in both 
houses 
Montserrat (UK) Strong Internal The Monsterrat Constitution 
Order 1989 
Her Majesty the Queen 
and a Secretary of State 
Nakhichevan 
(Azerbaijan) 
Weak Internal National Constitution 1995 Referendum  
Netherlands’ Antilles 
(NL) 
Strong Internal Statute 1954 See Aruba 
New Caledonia 
(France) 
Strong Internal and 
external 
National Constitution 1954 
and 1998 Nouméa Accord 
See Mayotte 
Niue (NZ) Strong Internal and 
external 
Constitution Act 1974 The Niue Assembly with 
two-thirds majority 
Norfolk Island 
(Australia) 
Strong Internal Norfolk Island Act 1979 The act of the Senate and 
House of Representatives 
of Australia 
North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
Weak Internal National Constitution and 
Autonomy Statute 
By request of the 
Regional Assembly 
according to the National 
Constitution’s procedure 
Northern Ireland (UK) Weak Internal Northern Ireland Act 1998 Referendum or the 
Secretary of State 
Northern Mariana 
Islands (US) 
Strong Internal Own Constitution 1978 By constitutional 
convention, legislative 
initiative or popular 
initiative 
Oecussi Ambeno (East 
Timor) 
Weak Internal National Constitution 2002 The National Parliament 
of East Timor 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) Weak Internal Local Government The Governor in New 
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Ordinance 1964 Zealand 
Puerto Rico (US) Strong Internal and 
external 
Own Constitution 1952 The Legislative Assembly 
of Puerto Rico with two-
thirds majority in each 
house 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) Weak Internal Regional Assembly Act 
2001 and National 
Constitution 
The National Assembly of 
Mauritius 
Sardinia (Italy) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1948 
and own constitution 1948 
See Friulia-Venezia 
Giulia 
Scotland (UK) Strong Internal and 
shared 
Scotland Act 1998 Scottish Parliament, Her 
Majesty the Queen and 
the House of Commons in 
London 
Sicily (Italy) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1948 
and own constitution 1948 
See Friulia– Venezia 
Giulia 
South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
Weak Internal National Constitution and 
Autonomy Statute 
See North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
St Helena and 
Dependencies (UK) 
Strong Internal Own Constitution 1988 Her Majesty the Queen 
and the Governor 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) 
Strong Internal National Constitution 1958 See Mayotte 
Tokelau (NZ) Strong Internal Tokelau Act 1948 The Governor-General 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
(Italy) 
Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1948 
and own constitution 1972 
See Friulia-Venezia 
Giulia 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands (UK) 
Strong Internal and 
external 
Turks and Caicos 
Constitutional Order 1998 
The Governor and the 
Legislative Council of the 
Islands 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) Strong Internal and 
shared 
National Constitution 1948 
and own constitution  
See Friulia-Venezia 
Giulia 
Wales (UK) Weak Internal Government of Wales Act 
1998 
The Secretary of State 
Wallis and Futuna 
(France) 
Weak Internal National Constitution 1958 See Mayotte 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) Strong Internal National Constitution 1977 The Revolutionary 
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and its own constitution 
1984 
Government of Zanzibar 
in accordance with the 
Constitution of Tanzania 
Sources: Maria Ackrén (2005). Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de 
självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut. CIA – The World Factbook 2007 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, 
Constitution Finder <http://confinder.richmond.edu> and various web-pages like encyclopedias and 
government pages. Pär M. Olausson (2007). Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that 
Determine Island Autonomy, p. 58. 
*Kosovo declared itself independent on February 17, 2008, but since the new state is not yet 
internationally recognized by all states in the world and the EU is helping to reconstruct the 
institutions, Kosovo will be regarded as a special region. The region is currently in a state-building 
process and cannot be seen as a fully-fledged sovereign state. 
 
The table shows the first mapping and descriptions of the autonomous regions in the 
world. There are currently 65 territorial autonomies in different parts of the world 
distributed among 25 countries. Most of these regions are islands (44 in total), and the 
rest of the 21 territories are land-locked areas. The characteristics chosen demonstrate 
quite a similar pattern. Of the territorial autonomies, 51 have a strong distribution of 
power, and it might be questioned as to whether the autonomies that have a weak 
distribution of power really are territorial autonomies proper. I have nevertheless 
included these areas, since they are considered special regions from a national point of 
view. However, they might be considered as administrative autonomies from a more 
general position.  
 
Thirty-eight autonomies only share internal functions, i.e. they have been granted 
powers to handle internal matters that are important to the regions in question. Twelve 
regions have both internal and shared functions. This means that they have been 
granted powers to take over matters of specific importance for the regions in question, 
and at the same time, they share a number of the functions with the national level in a 
particular form of consensus relationship.  Fifteen autonomies have internal and 
external functions. Internal functions, once again, refers to internal matters specific to 
the territories in question, and external functions means that the regions might have 
the right to be members of international organizations as nations in their own right or 
have the ability to reach international or bilateral agreements of their own. Thirty-
three territorial autonomies are regulated by their constitutions or statutes. Twenty-
five autonomies are regulated both through national constitutions and their own 
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constitutions or statutes. Only seven autonomies are regulated through the national 
constitutions alone. The control over the generic autonomy provisions varies between 
the regions. 
 
Most autonomous regions (24) have the possibility to amend their constitutions in 
consent with their respective National Parliament. Either there is a combination of 
referendum in the regions together with an ultimate decision by the Central 
Government or, the Legislative Assembly/Parliament in the regions has to make a 
decision and then send it to the National Parliament for approval. The Regional 
Parliament has the ultimate power to amend its own constitution in eleven cases.  
 
Eight of the former British colonies are ruled by the Queen of the United Kingdom 
and Her Privy Council or the Secretary of State. In fourteen of the cases, the National 
Parliament has the ultimate power to change the status of the regions. In five of the 
regions, the appointed Governor, together with another institution (at a regional level) 
or the Governor himself has the right to amend the constitutions of the regions. The 
last two cases, that of the American Virgin Islands and Guam are ruled directly under 
the Congress of the USA and the Secretary of the Interior. Kosovo is, currently, a 
disputed territory and its status is in process of changing. Kosovo will be under EU 
surveillance for many years to come, but is chosen here according to its status before 
February 17th, 2008. During the time of writing this thesis Kosovo has declared itself 
independent, but it is unclear if the region will succeed in becoming a sovereign state 
or if it will continue as an autonomous region. 
 
Another feature, which has an influence, is that most regions are constituted as 
belonging to European countries and former colonial powers; this applies to 49 of the 
territorial autonomies. Only 16 regions belong to Asian or African countries or those 
countries newly emerged from the former Soviet Union. 
 
To receive more information about the regions’ political systems and details about the 
territorial autonomies, see the appendix. In the appendix, background information is 
36
  
37
37
outlined about the different characteristics. The following is a description of how 
the variable degree of autonomy was operationalized. 
 
3.3 Degree of Autonomy 
 
To be able to operationalize the degree of autonomy, I established indicator scores 
illustrating the variations between the cases. The indicator score is composed of the 
different characteristics mentioned previously and includes tax abilities, which are not 
mentioned in the table. Tax abilities are included as a dimension of the economic 
sphere of the territorial autonomies, but are not seen as a characteristic for territorial 
autonomy as such.83 There are five features and the total score one region can receive 
is five and the scores are translated into fuzzy scores. To get the fuzzy score for each 
region, a calibration is made using the fuzzy technique software program, fs/QCA.84 
Fuzzy-sets are designed to handle degree-vagueness. In this context, fuzzy set theory 
defines a degree of membership between qualitatively different states of autonomy.85 
The degree of set membership ranges from 0.0 (full exclusion from a set) to 1.0 (full 
inclusion). The calibration technique within the fs/QCA program uses the direct 
method of calibration. This means it focuses on three different anchors: the threshold 
for full membership, the threshold for full non-membership, and the cross-over point. 
The standard formula behind the calibration is the following: degree of membership = 
exp(log odds)/(1+exp(log odds)), where exp represents the exponentiation of log odds 
to simple odds.86 In the program it is a simple matter to run the calibrate function by 
                                                 
83 Devolved units have often less fiscal autonomy, particularly with regard to taxation. See e.g. Robert 
Agranoff (2004). ‘Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations’, Regional and Federal 
Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 28. 
84 The fs/QCA Software Program is developed by Charles C. Ragin, Kriss A. Drass and Sean Davey 
and can be freely downloaded at: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>. For 
guidelines how to use the program see Charles C. Ragin (2008). User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis. Tucson, Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona and see also 
Charles C. Ragin (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy-Sets and Beyond. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
85 Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006). Fuzzy Set Theory – Applications in the Social Sciences. 
Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 147. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 6-
7. 
86 Charles C. Ragin (2008). ‘Fuzzy Sets: Calibration versus Measurement’, pp. 174-198 in D. Collier, 
H. Brady, and J. Box-Steffensmeier (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: 
Oxford University. The article discusses the calibration technique in more detail and provides some 
examples. 
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selecting the compute dialogue box and name the target fuzzy set and then click 
calibrate (x,n1,n2,n3) in the Functions menu.87    
 
The indicators for territorial autonomy are: 1) distribution of power, 2) functions, 3) 
constitutional basis, 4) control over the generic autonomy provisions, and 5) tax 
abilities.  
 
1) The distribution of power can be divided into lawmaking abilities and 
regulatory abilities. Having lawmaking powers is given one point and 
regulatory powers zero points. This means that all regions, which have 
own lawmaking powers, are favored with points, and those regions without 
lawmaking powers receive no points according to this feature.  
2) Functions can be divided into three categories: internal functions, internal 
combined with shared functions, and internal combined with external 
functions. This final category receives the highest score, i.e. one point, 
internal combined with shared functions receives a half-point, and internal 
functions receives only a zero. 
3) The constitutional basis can be divided into strong and weak. Strong is 
related to the fact that where the region is both mentioned in the national 
constitution and has its own statute/constitution/act, it receives one point. 
If only mentioned in the constitution, it receives zero. If the region only 
has its own constitution/statute or act, it receives a half of a point. The 
mentioning in the national constitution or the territory’s own 
statute/constitution/act should refer to the specific status within the 
country.  
4) The control over the generic autonomy provisions can be divided into 
three values. One point indicates that the region, by itself, has the 
possibility to amend its own constitution/statute or act. A half-point 
indicates the combination of having a consensus between the region’s 
government and the national government. The score of zero indicates that 
                                                 
87 See Charles Ragin (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 104-105 where the steps in the program are outlined. 
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it is only the national level that has the power to amend autonomy 
constitutions/statutes or acts.  
5) Tax abilities are divided into two values, a score of one indicates that the 
region possesses important tax abilities and a score of zero indicates that 
the region lacks or has negligible rights to this ability.  
 
All the scores are presented in the table 3 which follows. The first column shows the 
total scores of points based on the indicators and the second column indicates the 
fuzzy scores. In this context, the fuzzy scores are the membership scores in the subset 
of territorial autonomy.88  
 
The threshold for membership, in this case, is illustrated by the indicator score of 4.5 
(fuzzy set of ≥0.95), the cross-over point is 2.5 (fuzzy set of 0.5) and the full 
exclusion of the set is 0 (fuzzy set of ≤0.05). The score of 4.5 is the highest score any 
territorial autonomy can reach. In theoretical terms, the highest possible score is 5, but 
the empirical world shows us that 4.5 is the maximum in this context. Full autonomy 
would be indicated by 5, but according to my harsh criteria, no region is fully 
autonomous. The cross-over point indicates the middle between the minimum and 
maximum value. Obviously the value 0 indicates the full exclusion of the set. 
 
Table 3: Territorial Autonomies according to Different Scores 
 
Autonomy Indicator Score Fuzzy Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) 3.5 0.82 
American Samoa (US) 3 0.68 
American Virgin Islands (US) 2.5 0.50 
Andalusia (Spain) 4 0.90 
Anguilla (UK) 2.5 0.50 
Aruba (NL) 3 0.68 
Azores (Portugal) 3 0.68 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 4 0.90 
                                                 
88 See e.g. Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006), op.cit.; Charles C. Ragin (2008). ’Fuzzy Sets: 
Calibration versus Measurement’ op.cit., for more information on the calibration technique within 
fuzzy-sets. 
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Basque Country (Spain) 4 0.90 
Bermuda (UK) 3.5 0.82 
Bougainville (PNG) 3 0.68 
British Virgin Islands (UK) 2.5 0.50 
Canary Islands (Spain) 4 0.90 
Catalonia (Spain) 4 0.90 
Cayman Islands (UK) 3.5 0.82 
Cook Islands (NZ) 4.5 0.95 
Corsica (France) 1 0.14 
Crimea (Ukraine) 1 0.14 
Falkland Islands (UK) 2.5 0.50 
Faroe Islands (DK) 4 0.90 
French Polynesia (France) 3.5 0.82 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) 4.5 0.95 
Gagauzia (Moldova) 4 0.90 
Galicia (Spain) 4 0.90 
Gibraltar (UK) 2.5 0.50 
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 0 0.05 
Greenland (DK) 4 0.90 
Guam (US) 1.5 0.23 
Guernsey (UK) 4.5 0.95 
Hong Kong (China) 4 0.90 
Isle of Man (UK) 4 0.90 
Jeju Island (South Korea) 1.5 0.23 
Jersey (UK) 4 0.90 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) 2 0.35 
Kosovo (Serbia) 2.5 0.50 
Macau (China) 4 0.90 
Madeira (Portugal) 3 0.68 
Mayotte (France) 0.5 0.08 
Mindanao (Philippines) 1 0.14 
Montserrat (UK) 2.5 0.50 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) 0 0.05 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 3 0.68 
New Caledonia (France) 4.5 0.95 
Niue (NZ) 4.5 0.95 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 2.5 0.50 
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North Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
1 0.14 
Northern Ireland (UK) 1 0.14 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) 3.5 0.82 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) 1 0.14 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) 1.5 0.23 
Puerto Rico (US) 4.5 0.95 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 2 0.35 
Sardinia (Italy) 4.5 0.95 
Scotland (UK) 3.5 0.82 
Sicily (Italy) 4.5 0.95 
South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
1 0.14 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) 3 0.68 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) 2.5 0.50 
Tokelau (NZ) 3 0.68 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 4.5 0.95 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 4 0.90 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 4.5 0.95 
Wales (UK) 0.5 0.08 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 1.5 0.23 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 3.5 0.82 
 
The table shows that there are a number of variations between the cases. Looking at 
the indicator scores, it can be seen that two regions score zero for degree of 
autonomy. These regions are Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan and Nakhichevan in 
Azerbaijan. These regions are cases that are theoretically possible within the set of 
territorial autonomies, but due to the categorizations and computation of the scores for 
autonomy, their result is zero. Other weak autonomies are Mayotte and Wales. Strong 
autonomies are found in Europe and even in America, Asia and the South Pacific, in 
connection with regions functioning as commonwealth regions or associated states. 
The fuzzy scores show the same pattern.  
 
Membership scores of 0.95 are given to the following regions: Cook Islands, Friulia-
Venezia Giulia, Guernsey, New Caledonia, Niue, Puerto Rico, Sardinia, Sicily, 
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Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta. The five special autonomous regions in 
Italy89 seem to have the highest degree of autonomy in Europe, along with the British 
island of Guernsey. The regions belonging to New Zealand, the Cook Islands and 
Niue, show a similar pattern. Even a French region, New Caledonia, reaches the 
highest score, as does the US Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Most regions exceed 
the cross-over point of 0.5, which is indicative of a realistic view of the world. There 
are many regions, which reach a fuzzy score of 0.90, and as mentioned previously 
these regions with the lowest degree of autonomy are: Gorno-Badakhshan, 
Nakhichevan, Mayotte and Wales. The scores of these regions indicate that they are 
almost fully outside of the set of territorial autonomy. The fuzzy scores are due to the 
calibration being outside the total scale of 0.0 to 1.0. The reality is, of course, that no 
territorial autonomy reaches the highest possible score of autonomy (i.e. 5). With 
different anchors, it would be possible to receive different fuzzy scores, but the 
thresholds used in this context are based on common sense. 
 
There are also regions which call themselves autonomous, but in reality they do not 
function as special regions. It might be useful to mention these regions, since it is a 
common misconception that they are fully- fledged autonomies. The next section will 
deal with these non-autonomous regions. 
 
3.4 Dubious Cases 
 
When mapping the territorial autonomies, I have encountered some regions, which 
call themselves autonomies or initially seem to be regions with special status. Upon 
further investigation however, they were found to lack the special status required. The 
regions might be disputed matters within their own states or lacking in the political 
institutions crucial to their functioning as territorial autonomies. Other problems 
related to these regions might be that the definition of autonomy used within their 
countries might be somewhat different to that which I use in the context of this study. 
                                                 
89 Italy has adopted a new constitution in 2001, which has equalized the system between the regions. 
The five special regions are selected here are due to the historical position of these regions. It is hard, at 
this point in time, to draw any conclusions concerning the new constitution and how this has affected 
the other 15 regions.  
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The dubious cases might also be situated within countries which are currently in a 
process of state-building. It can therefore be hard to actually declare them as 
autonomous regions as such as it might not be clear which kind of system these states 
have at the sub-national level. The regions might also be victims of ongoing conflicts 
where no solution is at hand. These regions will be excluded from the list of territorial 
autonomies. 
 
In China there are, for instance, five so-called Autonomous Regions. The Government 
has set up these regions where the non-Han population predominates. Although some 
important concessions have been made to the non-Han population, no meaningful 
autonomy exists.90 The regions possessing the label of Autonomous Regions are Inner 
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Tibet and Ningxia. The decision to establish an 
autonomous area is made by the State Council on the recommendation of lower-level 
state organs after relevant consultations, including discussions with the minority 
concerned. There are no hard criteria and no minority can claim autonomy as such. 
The system in China denies true autonomy of choice and the organs of self-
government are bound by the key principles of the Chinese state system, i.e. ruled by 
the Communist Party.91   
 
The island of Rotuma, is a dependency belonging to Fiji. The Island functions as a 
district and therefore only has a local government. This means that Rotuma follows 
the same system as other districts on the mainland of Fiji.92 
 
In Georgia, there are two so-called Autonomous Republics: Abkhazia and Ajaria, but 
these territories are disputed matters. Abkhazia has been striving for independence 
since the collapse of the USSR, but the independence declared in 1994 has never been 
recognized by the international community. The fragile peace is maintained by UN 
military observers and CIS peacekeepers. UN efforts to mediate have not had any 
                                                 
90 Autonomous Regions of China <www.paulnoll.com/China/Provinces/autonomous-regions.html>, 
accessed from the Internet 21 May 2007. 
91 Yash Ghai (2000). ‘Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnicity and Economic Diversity’ 
pp. 77-98 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
92 Laws of Fiji, Rotuma Act, Chapter 122 <www.paclii.org/fj/legis/consol_act/ra103/>, accessed from 
Internet 21 May 2007. 
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results to date.93 Ajaria has been spared from major violence and ethnic unrest since 
Georgia became independent, but nevertheless, problems have not been entirely 
resolved. The assembly in Ajaria has been approved to control powers over local 
affairs, but the head of the government (who is appointed by the Georgian president) 
has the right to dissolve the assembly and government and overrule local authorities 
on issues where the constitution of Georgia is contravened.94 Ethno-regional divisions 
continue to be Georgia’s most serious obstacle to state building. These divisions make 
it extremely difficult to establish the institutions necessary to stabilize the state and 
make it capable of supporting institutional and economic reforms. 
 
Greece has one autonomous region, Mount Athos, a Greek-Orthodox community 
consisting of male monks who have jurisdiction over their territory.95 This area cannot 
be considered a territorial autonomy as mentioned above because of its particular 
characteristic as a religious community; instead, Mount Athos can be considered as a 
functional autonomy. 
 
The Aceh region in Indonesia has been in conflict for over 30 years. Some 
improvements have been made by the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The 
best proof of progress made in restoring peace and stability is the fact that the first-
ever direct, local elections were held in Aceh on December 11th, 2006. The EU will 
continue to support peace in Aceh, supervising implementation of the Memorandum 
of Understanding signed August 15th, 2005 by the Government of Indonesia and the 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM).96 Since this region is currently under a ‘nation-
building’ process, it is excluded from the list. 
 
                                                 
93 BBC News, Regions and territories: Abkhazia 
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>, accessed from Internet 22 May 
2007. 
94 BBC News, Regions and territories: Ajaria 
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>, accessed from Internet 22 May 
2007. For more details about the background to the conflicts related to the Autonomous Republics of 
Abkhazia and Ajaria, see Monica Duffy Toft (2001). ‘Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-
Building, and the Failed Transition in Georgia’, pp. 123-142 in Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, Autumn 2001. 
95 See Markku Suksi (2005). Ålands konstitution, note 57, p. 18. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag. 
96 EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh <www.consilium.europa.eu/aceh>, accessed from Internet 22 May 
2007. 
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São Tomé and Príncipe are made up of seven municipal districts, six on São Tomé 
and one encompassing the Autonomous Region of Príncipe. Every district functions 
in a similar way. Each district has a governing council that has some autonomous 
decision-making power.97 The autonomy in the region of Príncipe has increased since 
1995, and Príncipe now acts as a region and as a district simultaneously. There is a 
regional parliament with seven members and a regional government consisting of five 
members.98 There is no unique arrangement available at the regional level. 
 
The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in Serbia functions as a cultural autonomy. 
There is considerable protection offered to the Hungarian minority in the region, but 
the province has not yet developed into a fully- fledged territorial autonomy. The 
Agreement on Self-Government, in the province, constitutes a peculiar form of 
autonomy where there is a combination of Hungarian personal autonomy, Hungarian 
territorial autonomy and the autonomy of Vojvodina. The Agreement has provisions 
for the future status of Vojvodina, its powers, procedures, and composition of organs. 
The Agreement is primarily a political document of the Hungarian political parties. It 
is a one-sided draft proposal articulating the claims of the Hungarian minority and not 
a final autonomy arrangement resulting from negotiations between the representatives 
of the Hungarians and the Serb-dominated state.99 
 
These territories just mentioned, are simply a few examples of places labeled 
autonomies, and they illustrate the variations available when it comes to calling an 
area autonomous. These regions might be seen as potential candidates for territorial 
autonomy or even outright independence in the future. Since many of the regions are 
victims of ongoing conflicts, their status is very unstable and they cannot be analyzed 
according to my criteria, which I have created for the set of territorial autonomies. 
After this exploration, the potential explanatory factors are highlighted. First, there is 
a theoretical discussion and then evidence from the empirical world is evaluated. 
                                                 
97 Georg Thomas Kurian (ed.) (2007). Encyclopedia of the World’s Nations and Cultures, Volume III. 
New York: Facts on File, p. 2038. 
98 Dag Anckar (2008). ’Decentraliserade litenheter. En kartläggning och en förklaring.’ Conference 
Paper for the XV Nordic Congress in Political Science in Tromsø, Norway, 6-9 August 2008. 
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4 The Independent Variables 
 
Some reflections are now made on external factors, which might be considered 
explanatory in constituting both the form of territorial autonomy and the various 
degrees of autonomy. These factors have been derived from the literature regarding 
autonomy issues. The most common features are included, and it must be admitted 
that some external factors have a strong relation to theoretical statements while others 
have a weaker position in the literature.  
 
In the overall literature on the subject of autonomy, it is impossible to exclude 
completely the federal perspectives, since some explanatory factors might be the same 
for federal systems as for territorial autonomies as such. In the literature, we 
encountered both top-down models and bottom-up models for autonomy and their 
possible explanatory factors. Top-down models refer to federal and other territorial 
forms of autonomy, while bottom-up models refer to administrative and non-
territorial forms of autonomy. 
 
Top-down models of autonomy are used specifically for federal or other power-
sharing arrangements, where regions exercise a high degree of self-government within 
an existing state structure. The desire to maintain self-government in this type of 
model is satisfied through the decentralization of the power from central authorities to 
autonomous regions. Federal systems often work according to a predestined structure 
between the national level and the federal units in question. The federal systems 
depart from the perspective that the federal units are equally equipped with certain 
functions and competencies. It is then the prerogative of the constituent states to deal 
with their functions and competencies in a manner of their own choosing. 
Consequently, some asymmetrical federal systems might arise. Stepan, for example, 
describes three various ideal types: “coming-together”, “holding-together” and 
                                                                                                                                            
99 Tamás Korhecz (2002). ‘Chances for Ethnic Autonomy in Vojvodina: Analysis of the Latest 
Autonomy Proposal of Hungarian Political Parties in Vojvodina’, pp. 273-297 in Kinga Gál (ed.): 
Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
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“putting-together”.100 The coming-together variant is based on the classic 
federalism with the USA as the prime example. The system is characterized by a 
symmetrical division of powers between the national level and the federal states. The 
holding-together variant is more an asymmetrical version of federalism, where the 
constituent parts are held together by some specific matter, such as language, culture 
or tradition. India would be a good example in this case. The putting-together variant 
is then a form of shaky federalism, where the state has forced the entities to form a 
federal constituency. For this model variant, the former Soviet Union is a prime 
example. Federalism becomes an organization principle.  
 
Bottom-up models of autonomy are used when separatist groups or other groups 
(ethnic, linguistic and cultural) are striving for a future with sovereignty or 
independence as their goal, and where self-government is here seen as the first step in 
the process towards sovereignty, which is the ultimate goal. Insurrections or revolts 
and violence are the principal factors which lead to bottom-up models of autonomy.101 
Bottom-up models were common when former colonies seceded from their 
metropolitan states. Today Corsica could be seen as a more modern example of this 
kind of model. 
 
Other bottom-up strategies are evident when internal struggles or international 
revolutions or wars take place. For example, the autonomy of the Åland Islands has 
emerged from the sequence of events after Finnish independence and the First World 
War, while the autonomy of the Faroe Islands was a consequence of the Second 
World War. In Spain, the autonomies emerged in the context of the republican 
revolutions and of the second restoration of the Monarchy, along with the fall of 
Franco and the transition to democracy. In Italy, the autonomies were established in 
the framework of the restoration of the Italian state after fascism and the Second 
World War. Finally, in Portugal the autonomies were acknowledged to be the 
                                                 
100 Alfred Stepan (2001). ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and 
Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism’, pp. 320-323 in Alfred Stepan (ed.): Arguing Comparative 
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
101 David Newman and Ghazi Falah (1997). ‘Bridging the gap: Palestinian and Israeli discourses on 
autonomy and statehood’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Royal Geographic 
Society, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 112-113. 
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outcome of the revolution of 1974, which put an end to that country’s dictatorial 
regime and marked the transition to democracy.102  
 
Geographical remoteness could also be a factor that needs taking into consideration. 
The past relationships between the center and periphery may determine the status of 
the autonomy. The autonomous region may have been a colony; it may have been an 
independent but weaker state; it may have been transferred from one state to the other; 
it may have been one of several semi-independent units that merged into a unitary 
state; or it may have been detached from a state and become internationalized.103 
 
Some authors believe that territorial autonomy is a defined area where minorities are 
compactly settled and therefore have demands for self-rule. Regional autonomy 
occurs when a region is created as a homeland for an ethnic group or when a minority 
group constitutes a large majority of the population of an autonomous state structure 
and perceives it as its own.104 
 
Control over natural resources varies greatly between autonomous arrangements. 
Those entities that enjoy greater autonomy tend to control their own natural resources, 
but control over some natural resources may be exercised by the central 
government.105 Nevertheless, natural resources may be an obstacle in several cases of 
autonomy. Different solutions may be adopted for above-ground resources, and 
underground minerals.106 Many disputes over natural resources may lead to demands 
for autonomy.107 
 
In the literature, there was also evidence that no autonomy has so far has succeeded in 
a hostile environment. It is generally agreed that autonomous regimes should be 
endowed with democratic institutions. The prospects for success are greater when 
                                                 
102 Carlos E. P. Amaral (1997), op.cit. 
103 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
104 Svante E. Cornell (2002). ‘Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical 
Perspective’, World Politics, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 245-246. 
105 Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980), op.cit., pp. 879-880. 
106 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
107 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 465. 
48
  
49
49
both the central government and the autonomous authorities are based on 
democratic regimes.108 
 
External factors can be divided into state related factors, regional specific factors and 
factors which affect the relationship between the regional and state or national level. 
The state related factor has to do with the mother country in question. One potential 
state related factor is the choice of regime made by the state, whether the state is a 
democracy or an authoritarian state or somewhere in between. This could have an 
impact on how well countries cope with territorial autonomies and how these regions 
develop their autonomy status. It is argued by many authors that autonomy emerges 
only in democratic environments.109  
 
Regional specific factors are those factors directly related to the autonomous region as 
such. These include the historical strategic importance, geographical distance from the 
center, the possession of natural resources and the existence of regional 
movements/parties and/or separatist movements. Some questions related to these 
factors include whether or not the autonomy has been an outpost for supervision of 
military activities or for security reasons. How far do the regions lie in relation to the 
center? Geographical distances might have an impact on how the states have 
organized themselves, and it might also lead to special treatment for regions situated 
on the periphery. It can be hard to administrate a country which is greatly dispersed. 
Do the regions possess important natural resources of some kind, which could secure 
their position and cause them to have a certain relationship towards the state? What 
effect does the existence of movements/parties or separatist groups have as regards a 
voice for more autonomy? 
 
The potential explanations affecting the relationship between the state and the region 
include factors such as ethnic distinctiveness, size, and economic viability in the form 
of GDP/capita. Autonomy can be seen as an instrument for approval for ethnic or 
                                                 
108 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
109 See e.g. Yash Ghai (ed.) (2000). Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.) (2000). Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London: 
Frank Cass Publishers. 
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other groups to maintain their distinct identity and exercise direct control over 
issues that are of special interest to them, while allowing the greater entity to have the 
powers over common interests. There is no uniform application of the terms for 
various arrangements of autonomy.110 Many authors believe that federalism, 
decentralization, regionalism and non-territorial forms of autonomy occur because of 
ethnic diversity.111 This is why ethnic distinctiveness will be included as a main 
indicator explaining territorial autonomies. Size according to population is another 
feature that might be important for autonomy. Larger territories might be in a better 
position to bargain for special status than smaller regions. The economic situation 
might also be of importance. Rich regions with a high degree of GDP/capita might 
find it easier than poorer ones to reach autonomy. 
 
A note concerning the time perspective should also be mentioned as it is important to 
go back in time to look at the conditions before the regions claimed autonomy. This is 
very problematic, since these regions have achieved their autonomy in different time 
periods during the process of development. Some regions have emerged as the result 
of the First and Second World Wars, others have been objects in short-lived conflicts, 
and yet other regions might have been the result of decentralization or devolution 
processes within the countries. Additionally, the regions should then have to be placed 
into their different historical contexts. Another problem with elapsing time is that 
some autonomous regions might have been less autonomous or even independent 
during a particular historical period, while others have ceased to exist. Taking into 
account these consideration and fluctuations in development is problematic. It then 
becomes important to measure autonomy at different times and divide the regions 
according to this perception. Thus the regions are seen from the perspective of present 
day. I will also, in this investigation, test all explanatory factors according to the 
existing situation, so the entities are on an equal footing in this sense. The historical 
                                                 
110 Yash Ghai (2000). ’Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis’, pp. 1-26 in Yash Ghai 
(ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
111 See e.g. William H. Riker (1996). ‘European Federalism. The Lessons of Past Experience’, pp. 9-24 
in J.J. Hesse and V. Wright (eds.): Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of 
Federal Political Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Robert Agranoff (1996). ‘Federal 
Evolution in Spain’, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 385-401; Svante E. 
Cornell (2002). ‘Autonomy as a Source of Conflict – Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective’, 
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dimension is included, this aspect emerges when discussing the historical strategic 
importance. All other possible explanations are derived from the present situation. 
 
First, there is a theoretical discussion about every explanatory factor and then the 
operationalization of each factor is included in every section dealing with each 
indicator. A final section deals with the first analysis according to fuzzy-set as a set-
up explaining the necessary conditions for the territorial autonomies. This analysis 
will illustrate how well each indicator fits according to the entities in question. 
 
4.1 The State Related Factor: Democracy versus Authoritarianism 
 
Democracy as a concept is derived from the Greek – demos, meaning the people, and 
kratos, meaning authority.112 One of the primary arguments for representative 
democracy and used in the defense of it, is that it is the best system for governing a 
complex society with different and pluralistic interests. As Ghai argues, it is evident 
that of all autonomy arrangements in liberal societies, communist states and 
developing countries, the most successful examples are found in liberal 
democracies.113 Liberal democracies have long traditions of the rule of law, and 
therefore pluralism is valued and there is respect for cultural, ethnic and religious 
differences. The law functions as a guarantor for the relations between the center and 
the regions and defines the powers of respective governments.114 In the Jacobin 
democracy, where every person enjoys equality, ethnic autonomy would be 
unnecessary, for instance, since most ethnically specific needs can be fulfilled under 
existing conditions, because the state permits or facilitates such fulfillment.115 The 
criteria for determining an ethnic or religious minority’s entitlement to autonomy is 
then seen through the political and socioeconomic context of the country as a whole. 
The role of territorial autonomy is a disputed matter, but the argument in its favor is 
                                                                                                                                            
in World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 2002, pp. 245-276; Daniel J. Elazar (1996). ‘From Statism to 
Federalism – A Paradigm Shift’, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 417-429. 
112 R.J. Jackson and D. Jackson (1993). Contemporary Government and Politics – Democracy and 
Authoritarianism. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, p. 69. 
113 Y. Ghai (2000) op.cit., p. 16. 
114 Ibid. 
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that it maintains the external borders of the state, thus preserving its sovereignty, 
and may even help to give expression to institutional pluralism.116 
 
Authoritarianism is used to depict regimes which contrast with democracy by being 
more based on the obedience of citizens rather than on their consent. It is considered 
to be a very old form of government because of its association with tyrants, despots, 
monarchs, sultans and czars. These states are often on the extreme right or the 
extreme left of the political spectrum.117   
 
Democracy involves specific rights and freedoms for the inhabitants of the country. 
This is specifically important in territorial autonomies since there are often minority 
groups present. Democratic principles underlie the mechanism allowing participation 
by minority groups in a country at the various levels of governance. In some 
countries, this takes the form of quota systems within the electoral systems or in 
others, different mechanisms may be established to secure minorities’ participation 
within political systems. By granting a territorial unit autonomy, a compromise 
between conflicts of different interests is established as a means of securing territorial 
integrity.  
 
Successful autonomy solutions are often based on constitutional consensus. The 
establishment of an autonomy regime is followed by negotiations with representatives 
between the central and the sub-national level. Formal acts of approval are enshrined 
in the representative bodies and the national parliament. The institutions of self-
governance should be representative of those on whose behalf the autonomy is 
initially adopted.118 
 
                                                                                                                                            
115 William Safran (2000). ’Spatial and Functional Dimension of Autonomy: Cross-national and 
Theoretical Perspectives’, p. 19 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): Identity and Territorial Autonomy in 
Plural Societies. London: Frank Cass Publishers.  
116 Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000). ‘Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role 
of Territorial Autonomy’, p. 254 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.), op.cit. 
117 R.J. Jackson and D. Jackson (1993), op.cit., p. 72. 
118 Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (2005). ‘Recent trends in autonomy and state construction’, pp. 265-
267 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
52
  
53
53
As mentioned previously, it has been argued by many authors that autonomy 
arrangements are established in democratic environments, but the truth of this 
statement could be called into question. Is it possible that autonomy might also occur 
in authoritarian regimes and to what degree would this be possible, if this were the 
case? The reasoning is, naturally, that democratic regimes might be more flexible in 
their solutions dealing with different arrangements and have a sense of respect for 
differences within the countries. An authoritarian regime might oppress inhabitants to 
obey certain rules and there might not be much scope for diverse interests.  
 
In this context, democracy is used as a feature of civil liberties and political rights. 
These dimensions include both the feature of elections and the feature of various 
freedoms according to human rights. There is extensive literature in this context. 
Carsten Anckar (2008), for instance, divides the different definitions of democracy 
surveyed into three categories.119 The first category is made up of authors who 
advocate a minimal definition of democracy, which only includes electoral dimension. 
A second category consists of authors who include both the electoral and civil rights 
dimension. A third group of authors incorporates democratic output into their 
definitions.120 I follow the second category in this matter and proceed from a 
definition of democracy where attention is paid to both civil liberties and political 
rights. I found this important since territorial autonomies need to have a functional 
political system where people could exercise meaningful power and freely express 
alternative views. An important source dealing with these measures of democratic 
quality is without doubt Freedom House’s annually conducted survey on political 
rights and civil liberties. This source is widely used by different researchers, and 
therefore has become a standard asset when conducting research.  
 
Operationalization of Democracy 
 
In the context of this study, the democracy status is derived from the Freedom House 
index. Freedom in the World, the publication of Freedom House, is the standard-
                                                 
119 Carsten Anckar (2008). ‘Size, Islandness, and Democracy: A Global Comparison’, International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 437-438. 
120 Ibid. 
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setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties. 
Published annually since 1972, the survey ratings and narrative reports on 193 
countries and 15 related and disputed territories are used by various actors and 
researchers.121 In this study, the rating position that has been used for the different 
countries is according to the latest rating of the territorial autonomies. The ratings 
used in this context are the ratings for the political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). 
Some ratings, where they are available are separate ratings for the territorial 
autonomies in question. As mentioned in chapter 3, territorial autonomies occur in 25 
countries. The fuzzy score are derived from the sum of each rating according to the 
calibration technique used in the fs/QCA program. In the first column of the table, the 
countries’ name is stated, with the second column showing the ratings according to 
Freedom House of both political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) and the third 
column showing the sum of the rating’s scores and the last column presents the fuzzy 
score according to the calibration technique. 
 
Table 4: Democracy Ratings 
 
Country Freedom House 
PR               CL 
Sum Fuzzy Score 
Australia 1 1 2 0.99 
Azerbaijan 6 5 11 0.08 
China* 
Hong Kong 
Macau 
7 
5 
6 
6 
2 
4 
13 
7 
10 
0.03 
0.50 
0.14 
Denmark 1 1 2 0.99 
East Timor 3 4 7 0.50 
Finland 1 1 2 0.99 
France* 
Wallis and Futuna 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
6 
0.99 
0.73 
Italy 1 1 2 0.99 
Mauritius* 
Rodrigues 
1 
3 
2 
3 
3 
6 
0.98 
0.73 
                                                 
121 See <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006>The methodology of Freedom 
House is a scale running from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest 
degree of freedom. The scores are derived from survey investigations done in the countries.    
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Moldova 3 4 7 0.50 
Netherlands 1 1 2 0.99 
New Zealand 1 1 2 0.99 
Nicaragua 3 3 6 0.73 
Papua New Guinea 3 3 6 0.73 
Philippines 3 3 6 0.73 
Portugal 1 1 2 0.99 
Serbia* 
Kosovo 
3 
6 
2 
5 
5 
11 
0.88 
0.08 
Spain 1 1 2 0.99 
South Korea 1 2 3 0.98 
Tajikistan 6 5 11 0.08 
Tanzania 4 3 7 0.50 
Ukraine* 
Crimea 
3 
3 
2 
3 
5 
6 
0.88 
0.73 
United Kingdom 1 1 2 0.99 
USA 1 1 2 0.99 
Uzbekistan 7 7 14 0.01 
Sources: Freedom of the World <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year=2007>; 
Freedom in the Territories <www.mherrera.org/territories.htm>, accessed from the internet 17th 
October 2007. Countries with * indicate where there are different scores for the territories in question. 
For Hong Kong and Macau, for instance, the scores indicate that the regions are partly free, whereas 
China as a country is not free. Wallis and Futuna belonging to France have scores indicating a status of 
partly free, whereas France is free. Rodrigues in Mauritius is also partly free, while Mauritius is free. 
Kosovo in Serbia is not free, while Serbia is considered free; Crimea in Ukraine is considered partly 
free, while Ukraine is rated as free.  
 
The table shows that the majority of countries are free, according to the Freedom 
House ratings. Fifteen countries are considered fully democratic. Six countries are 
partially free and four countries are not free at all. This illustrates the fact that 
democracy might be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for 
territorial autonomies to occur. It is very interesting that territorial autonomies, in 
some cases, are established even in non-democratic environments. The ratings for the 
territorial autonomies are used according to the countries’ ratings despite there being 
cases where separate ratings occur. The sum of the ratings provides a scale running 
from 2 to 14. The value of 2 indicates the fuzzy score of a full degree of democracy 
(i.e. 2 ≥ 0.95), the value of 7 indicates the cross-over point (i.e. 0.5) and value 10 
indicates the lowest degree of democracy (i.e. 10 ≤ 0.05) in this context. As we can 
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see from the fuzzy scores, there is only one country which is out of the set of 
democracies, and that is Uzbekistan. A low degree of democracy is also found in 
other newly established states in the former Eastern block such as Azerbaijan and 
Tajikistan. China is almost out of the set of democracies, scoring 0.03, while the 
regions belonging to China have a higher score.  
 
4.2 The Regional Specific Factors 
 
The regional specific factors are conditions that are directly related to the regions in 
question. First, the historical strategic importance is considered and then other factors 
are deliberated on, such as geographical distance, possession of natural resources, and 
the existence of regional movements or parties and/or separatist groups. 
 
4.2.1 Historical Strategic Importance 
 
Many of the territorial autonomies have been military strategic outposts during both 
World Wars and during the Cold War. Other regions have functioned as colonies for 
their respective metropolitan powers. Some regions have even at times been disputed 
territories. During the 1960s, decolonization reached its climax with dependencies 
becoming sovereign states. In the 1960s and 1970s, decolonization became a global 
phenomenon as the Caribbean and South Pacific island microstates were established. 
By the 1980s, however, the pace of decolonization had slowed down. Decolonization 
was most rapid during the period of economic growth that coincided with diffusion 
and more widespread acceptance of notions of the nation-state.122 The island 
territories around the world could be considered remnants from the colonial heydays. 
Occasionally, states have changed borders, and therefore new maps have emerged, 
resulting in countries having different internal as well as external patterns.  
 
The prospects of establishing autonomy arrangements are strongest when the state 
undergoes a regime change. A period of regime change provides opportunities for 
                                                 
122 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998). The Last Colonies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 7. 
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autonomy for a variety of reasons.123 The leaders in charge of the transition in a 
country may have been opposed to the previous political system and a new balance of 
forces may facilitate the restructuring of the state. Groups wanting secession or 
autonomy may press their demands in a situation where a new regime may be weak. 
Autonomy could be established as a compromise among local groups or as a 
consequence of former colonial rulers.124 The kind of autonomy which is associated 
with home rule or local self-government has a long tradition. It extends back into 
antiquity, at least to the time of the great empires, when imperial masters traded off 
respect for local leadership and local governing customs in exchange for tribute and 
the promise of security.125  
 
A general trend regarding the issue of self-determination and autonomy can be traced 
back to the period after the First World War. The League of Nations paid attention to 
autonomy issues in three distinctive ways. First, new countries were established as a 
result of the war; second, colonies which belonged to the defeated powers were taken 
over by the victorious powers and were organized under a special commission system; 
third, in over 20 of the peace treaties, arrangements for protection of minorities as 
well as autonomy were enforced.126 
 
Decentralization and autonomy could also be seen as a national project. Every country 
establishes its own system according to the currently existing circumstances. Hans-
Joachim Heinze argues, for instance, that autonomy should not be seen as a static 
phenomenon but as a phenomenon changing through time and space.127 This leads to 
different autonomy arrangements occurring during various periods. It can also be 
difficult to distinguish between territorial and non-territorial forms of autonomy in 
particular periods. Autonomy becomes a process of development. 
 
                                                 
123 Yash Ghai (2000). Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework of Analysis, op.cit., pp. 14-15. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Robert Agranoff (2004). ‘Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations’, Regional and 
Federal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 27. 
126 Lauri Hannikainen (1998). ’Self-Determination and Autonomy in International Law’ in Markku 
Suksi (ed.): Autonomy – Applications and Implications. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 
79. 
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Territorial autonomies have also been used for military or strategic advantages in 
terms of natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and control over transport routes 
and waterways.128 Overseas outposts have functioned as geopolitical counters where 
rival powers have tried to secure military bases and intelligence stations in order to 
achieve their strategic goals.129 Metropolitan states have often stationed troops, 
paramilitary officers, and weapons in territories as an affirmation of sovereignty. The 
troops can ward off real or perceived dangers of foreign attack or irredentist 
expansion by neighboring states.130 The military presences in some regions also 
function as a means of giving assistance in natural disasters, training-grounds for war 
games and combat practice. Furthermore, supervision of territorial waters and 
exclusive economic zones are also protected by such troops.131  
 
Territories where military bases are located benefit from government transfers, 
investments in infrastructure, local employment, and the income from the purchasing 
of goods by military personnel stationed there.132 
 
Operationalization of Historical Strategic Importance 
 
Historical strategic importance is divided into whether or not the region has been a 
strategic military outpost or is still functioning as that today; whether or not the region 
has been a colonial territory for a considerably long time; and whether or not the 
region has become a territorial autonomy as a result of war or a conflict situation. 
Historical strategic importance will be considered as a possible explanation for the 
different degrees of autonomy. 
 
There might be regions that have been both military outposts and colonies at the same 
time, and other combinations might also be possible. Table 5, which follows, 
                                                                                                                                            
127 Hans-Joachim Heinze (1998). ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’ in Markku Suksi (ed.) 
op.cit., p. 19-20. 
128 Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005). ‘Self-Determination and autonomy: a conceptual 
introduction’, p. 6 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict 
Resolution. London and New York: Routledge. 
129 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 11. 
130 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 169. 
131 Ibid. 
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illustrates the historical strategic importance in this context. The factors are 
indicated by a yes or a no, for simplification. 
 
The fuzzy scores have been derived based on the following reasoning: if a region has 
a combination of all three indicators, it receives the value 1; if a region has a 
combination of two indicators, it receives the value 0.67. If the region only has one 
indicator present, it receives the value 0.33, and if the region lacks any of the 
indicators, it receives the value 0. The aforementioned, means that every indicator is 
equally important in this context. 
 
Table 5: Historical Strategic Importance 
 
Autonomy Military 
Outpost 
Colony War or Conflict 
Resolution 
Fuzzy Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) Yes No Yes 0.67 
American Samoa (US) Yes Yes No 0.67 
American Virgin Islands 
(US) 
No Yes No 0.33 
Andalusia (Spain) No No  Yes 0.33 
Anguilla (UK) No Yes Yes 0.67 
Aruba (NL) No Yes No 0.33 
Azores (Portugal) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Balearic Islands (Spain) No Yes No 0.33 
Basque Country (Spain) No No Yes 0.33 
Bermuda (UK) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Bougainville (Papua 
New Guinea) 
No Yes Yes 0.67 
British Virgin Islands 
(UK) 
No Yes No 0.33 
Canary Islands (Spain) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Catalonia (Spain) No No Yes 0.33 
Cayman Islands (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Cook Islands (NZ) No Yes No 0.33 
Corsica (France) No No No 0 
                                                                                                                                            
132 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 190. 
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Crimea (Ukraine) Yes No No 0.33 
Falkland Islands (UK) No Yes Yes 0.67 
Faroe Islands (DK) Yes No No 0.33 
French Polynesia 
(France) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia 
(Italy) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Gagauzia (Moldova) No No Yes 0.33 
Galicia (Spain) No No Yes 0.33 
Gibraltar (UK) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
(Tajikistan) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Greenland (DK) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Guam (US) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Guernsey (UK) Yes No No 0.33 
Hong Kong (China) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Isle of Man (UK) Yes No No 0.33 
Jeju Island (South Korea) No Yes No 0.33 
Jersey (UK) Yes No No 0.33 
Karakalpakstan 
(Uzbekistan) 
No No No 0 
Kosovo (Serbia) No No Yes 0.33 
Macau (China) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Madeira (Portugal) No Yes Yes 0.67 
Mayotte (France) Yes Yes No, but the 
Comoros claim 
the island 
0.67 
Mindanao (Philippines) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Montserrat (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Nakhichevan 
(Azerbaijan) 
Yes No Yes 0.67 
Netherlands’ Antilles 
(NL) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
New Caledonia (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Niue (NZ) No Yes No 0.33 
Norfolk Island 
(Australia) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
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North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
No Yes Yes 0.67 
Northern Ireland (UK) No No Yes 0.33 
Northern Mariana Islands 
(US) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
Oecussi Ambeno (East 
Timor) 
No Yes Yes 0.67 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Puerto Rico (US) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) No Yes No 0.33 
Sardinia (Italy) No No Yes 0.33 
Scotland (UK) No No No 0 
Sicily (Italy) No No Yes 0.33 
South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
No Yes Yes 0.67 
St Helena and 
Dependencies (UK) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) 
No Yes Yes 0.67 
Tokelau (NZ) No  Yes No 0.33 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
(Italy) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
(UK) 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) No No Yes 0.33 
Wales (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Wallis and Futuna 
(France) 
Yes Yes No 0.67 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) No Yes Yes 0.67 
Sources: Main sources used: Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998): The Last Colonies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Hurst Hannum (1996): Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination – 
The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Maria 
Ackrén (2005): Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i 
världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut; CIA – The World Factbook 2008 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> 
 
The table reveals that a majority of the territorial autonomies are de facto former 
colonies (i.e. 42 regions). There are also many regions which have been granted 
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autonomy as a result of wars or conflict situations. Other regions have served as 
military outposts during different time periods. There are only three territorial 
autonomies that have not had any strategic importance during their history, according 
to this categorization. These are Corsica in France, Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan, and 
Scotland in the United Kingdom. Corsica, as mentioned below, received its autonomy 
as a consequence of a decentralization process in France during the 1980s. 
Karakalpakstan has been an autonomous republic in the former USSR, and when 
Uzbekistan became independent, the region continued as an autonomous region 
within the new republic. Scotland has been an independent state over its history but 
received its present autonomous status as a consequence of the British devolution 
system in 1998 (including Wales). There are six territories, which have a combination 
of all three indicators. These are the Azores in Portugal, Guam and Puerto Rico in the 
USA, Mindanao in the Philippines, New Caledonia in France, and Turks and Caicos 
Islands in the UK. These territories have all received the value 1 according to the 
fuzzy scores. A brief résumé of the twentieth-century follows, in order to give an 
overview of the overall development of established territorial autonomies. 
 
After the First World War, asymmetrical institutions were established in the Åland 
Islands, Memel (a German-speaking region of Lithuania) and Danzig (a German-
speaking city in Poland).133 Nowadays, out of these regions, it is only the Åland 
Islands that still function as a territorial autonomy. The United Kingdom granted 
asymmetrical autonomy to both parts of Ireland in the Government of Ireland Act of 
1920, but the act came into force only in Northern Ireland where it lasted until 1972 
when Northern Ireland became autonomous.134 A number of autonomous 
arrangements also occurred after the Second World War, especially in Italy including 
the regions of South Tyrol, Valle d’Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. After the Franco 
dictatorship in Spain, asymmetrical autonomy was granted to the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia. France granted a very limited form of autonomy to Corsica in 
1982. Ukraine granted autonomy to Crimea in 1991 and Moldova granted autonomy 
                                                 
133 John McGarry, Queen’s University, Canada (2005). ‘Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational 
State’. Working Paper for the 3rd International conference on Federalism, Brussels, 3-5 March 2005, p. 
1. 
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to Gagauzia in 1994. In Africa, some regions have been autonomous for a short 
period of time, such as Eritrea, which enjoyed autonomy from Ethiopia between 1952 
and 1962, and Sudan’s southern region had autonomy from 1972 to 1983 but the 
region is still a disputed matter. Zanzibar, though, has been able to hold its position as 
an autonomous region within Tanzania since 1964. In Asia, the Philippines have 
agreed to the autonomy of the Muslim region of Mindanao since 1996 and Papua New 
Guinea granted autonomy to Bougainville after 2002.135 These are several cases of 
asymmetrical regions that have become autonomous during the twentieth century. 
 
There are other cases where negotiations for asymmetrical autonomy arrangements 
are ongoing. These cases, however, are excluded in this study. See, for example, the 
section concerning the dubious cases. 
 
4.2.2 Geographical Distance 
 
Geographical distance is often seen as a center-periphery division in the research. 
Centers and peripheries can be seen from different perspectives such as geographic, 
economic, and cultural divisions where mobilization of resources is the major 
concern.136 The convergence of institutional relations between the center and 
periphery often leads to decentralization or regionalization, and this has an effect on 
integration between the center and periphery. Local or intermediate governments 
increase their autonomy where they were once dependent.137 Centers and their 
hinterlands are mutually dependent. A regional center, for instance, serves and 
depends upon the customer base found in hinterland settlements, while the hinterlands 
support and depend upon the regional center for specialized functions. Strong centers 
                                                                                                                                            
134 John McGarry, Queen’s University, Canada (2005). ‘Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational 
State’, op.cit. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See e.g. Karl W. Deutsch (1987). ’Towards the scientific understanding of nationalism and national 
development: the crucial contribution of Stein Rokkan’, European Journal of Political Research 15, 
pp. 653-666. 
137 Richard Balme, Philippe Garraud, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, Stéphane Le May & Evelyne 
Ritaine (1994). ‘Analysing territorial policies in Western Europe: The Case of France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain’, European Journal of Political Research, 25, p. 391. 
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can help to promote strong regions and are essential for global competiveness.138 
The fact that regions are cut off from the rest of the country as a whole, could reflect 
the fact that they develop their own separate culture and view themselves as an agent 
affecting viability.139 Distance may promote autonomy or even secession in some 
cases. 
 
Geographical distance is considered to be one of the main factors for the successful 
occurrence of territorial autonomy regimes.140 Distance from the mother country 
seems to be important in receiving a special status of some kind. Geographical 
distance might function as a hindrance for the national government to exercise control 
over its peripheral territories.141 Territories far away are problematic to govern 
effectively from the center. 
 
Autonomy regimes often operate in remote or otherwise geographically unique 
locations, such as islands and enclaves.142 Territorial autonomies are recognized as 
constitutionally different from the mainland and distant from the metropolitan states. 
Their geographical basis as being attached to a particular nation-state is often a 
consequence of history.143 
 
Geographical distance can be measured as the distance between the autonomous 
region and its mainland and/or as proximity to a foreign country.144 Other 
measurements of distances are related to the center-periphery relation according to 
powers of control. Change in any autonomy arrangement is usually made by the 
center in consensus with the territorial unit in question.145 The communications 
                                                 
138 Kathryn A. Foster (1997). ’Regional Impulses’, Journal of Urban Affairs, Volume 19, Number 4, 
pp. 378-379. 
139 Jason Sorens (2005). ’The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced 
Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, April 2005, p. 319. 
140 W. Safran (2000). ’Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical 
Perspectives’ in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. 
London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 22.  
141 Pär M. Olausson (2007). Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that Determine 
Island Autonomy. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, p. 84. 
142 Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005), op.cit., p. 1. 
143 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 4. 
144 Pär Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 83. 
145 Robert Agranoff (2004), op.cit., pp. 31-34. 
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between the decision-making centers are crucial for the autonomous regions to 
develop and take over more matters if they wish to do so.146   
 
Operationalization of Geographical Distance 
 
Geographical distance is measured in this study according to the distance to the 
metropolitan capital. It is believed that the distance between the region’s capital and 
the capital of the metropolitan state has a major impact on which kind of degree of 
autonomy has been implemented in the peripheral region in question. A longer 
distance from the metropolitan power should lead to a higher degree of autonomy, 
since it is believed that a longer distance gives the region possibilities to rule more 
freely on its own. The reason why the distance between capitals has been chosen is its 
reference to the different centers of major power and the major political power vested 
in the capital of a country or a region. The communication relating to the distribution 
of power is therefore outlined between the capitals. The fuzzy scores will be 
computed with the calibration technique within the fs/QCA program. Thresholds for 
long distance, middle distance, and short distance will be used when calibrating the 
fuzzy scores. 
 
Table 6: The Geographical Distance 
 
Autonomy Distance (km) Fuzzy Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) 280 km 0.04 
American Samoa (US) 11870 km  0.98 
American Virgin Islands (US) 2650 km 0.17 
Andalusia (Spain) 420 km 0.05 
Anguilla (UK) 8750 km 0.90 
Aruba (NL) 9650 km 0.94 
Azores (Portugal) 1800 km 0.11 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 525 km 0.05 
Basque Country (Spain) 280 km 0.04 
Bermuda (UK) 7200 km 0.79 
                                                 
146 Daniel Elazar (1987). Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama 
Press, p. 37. 
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Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) 1000 km 0.06 
British Virgin Islands (UK) 8700 km 0.90 
Canary Islands (Spain) 1785 km 0.10 
Catalonia (Spain) 490 km 0.05 
Cayman Islands (UK) 9350 km 0.93 
Cook Islands (UK) 3780 km 0.31 
Corsica (France) 875 km 0.06 
Crimea (Ukraine) 630 km 0.05 
Falkland Islands (UK) 13500 km 0.99 
Faroe Islands (DK) 1300 km 0.08 
French Polynesia (France) 18450 km 1 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) 420 km 0.05 
Gagauzia (Moldova) 87,5 km 0.04 
Galicia (Spain) 472,5 km 0.05 
Gibraltar (UK) 1800 km 0.11 
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 300 km 0.04 
Greenland (DK) 3450 km 0.26 
Guam (US) 15670 km 1 
Guernsey (UK) 262,5 km 0.04 
Hong Kong (China) 2000 km 0.12 
Isle of Man (UK) 402,5 km 0.04 
Jeju Island (South Korea) 500 km 0.05 
Jersey (UK) 280 km 0.04 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) 800 km 0.06 
Kosovo (Serbia) 245 km 0.04 
Macau (China) 2000 km 0.12 
Madeira (Portugal) 1092,5 km 0.07 
Mayotte (France) 8800 km 0.91 
Mindanao (Philippines) 900 km 0.06 
Montserrat (UK) 8900 km 0.91 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) 300 km 0.04 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 9850 km 0.95 
New Caledonia (France) 19800 km 1 
Niue (NZ) 3375 km 0.25 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 2295 km 0.14 
North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
400 km 0.04 
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Northern Ireland (UK) 490 km 0.05 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) 15400 km 1 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) 150 km 0.04 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) 17640 km 1 
Puerto Rico (US) 2500 km 0.16 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 550 km 0.05 
Sardinia (Italy) 420 km 0.05 
Scotland (UK) 507,5 km 0.05 
Sicily (Italy) 420 km 0.05 
South Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
250 km 0.04 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) 8100 km 0.87 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) 4500 km 0.42 
Tokelau (NZ) 4320 km 0.39 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 455 km 0.05 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 8550 km 0.89 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 577,5 km 0.05 
Wales (UK) 210 km 0.04 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 20745 km 1 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 400 km 0.04 
Source: Bonniers stora världsatlas (1994). Bonnier Lexikon AB. Various scales and maps have been 
used, therefore the distances should be seen as a mere estimation. Distances have been drawn as 
straight lines without considering the longitudes and latitudes. 
 
The distances are all given in kilometers in this context. Wallis and Futuna has the 
longest distance from a metropolitan state; its relation being with Paris in France. 
Other French regions lying in the periphery are New Caledonia and French Polynesia. 
Among the American regions, we find that Guam and Northern Mariana Islands are a 
long way from Washington D.C., and among the British regions, the Pitcairn Islands 
and the Falkland Islands are the most remote areas in relation to London. The closest 
areas in relation to their respective metropolitan capital are Gagauzia in relation to 
Moldova’s capital Chisinau and Oecussi Ambeno in relation to East Timor’s capital 
Dili. 
 
The thresholds used for the fuzzy scores have been undertaken according to the 
following grounds: a long distance is indicated by 10 000 kms and over (as a full 
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membership in the set of long distance ≥0.95); the middle distance is indicated by 
5 000 kms (as a cross-over point 0.5); and the short distance is indicated with 500 kms 
(as a non-membership in the set of long distance ≤0.05). As can be seen from the 
point of the fuzzy scores, most regions are not too distant from the metropolitan 
power. There are 17 territorial autonomies that reach high scores, but the majority of 
the regions are not too remote from their respective metropolitan state.  
 
4.2.3 Possession of Natural Resources 
 
Most Commonwealth regions (parts of the former British Empire) can be divided into 
four major categories in terms of their export orientation: agriculture and fisheries; 
petroleum and minerals; tourism and services; and a group that has a mixture of the 
above mentioned orientations.147 One particular area of trade that has developed, 
especially in the Caribbean region, is offshore banking and financial services.148  
 
Natural resources can be divided into renewable and non-renewable resources. 
Renewable resources are, for example, in the form of coral reefs, forestry, fisheries 
and wildlife, while non-renewable resources are in the form of minerals. There are, of 
course, regions that have both renewable and non-renewable resources at the same 
time, such as beaches and wetlands. Even the climate can be counted in the mixed 
category.149 
 
Exploitation of natural resources can be regarded not only in negative terms, but also 
as including the development of natural resource assets or infrastructures (e.g. 
building a dam, planting trees, developing a mine, exploring petroleum). Natural 
resource exploitation also consists of the extraction of resources, the process of 
utilizing resources as utilities and the sale of processed products.150  
 
                                                 
147 A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (1997). London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 
p. 34. 
148 A Future for Small State…, p. 35. 
149 A Future for Small States…, p. 86. 
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During the twentieth century, many national governments devolved control of 
natural resources to private individuals, community groups, or sub-national 
governments. One of the benefits of this form of decentralization is that it provides a 
basis for participation and collective action. The drawback, however, has been that 
national governments have often rescinded control over land and other resources only 
after the ecosystem and the economic productivity of the area have been badly 
degraded. In many cases, natural resource decentralization initiatives are also driven 
by strong international forces. Although environmental protection has now, become 
an important factor when dealing with natural resources.151   
 
The possession of natural resources can be seen as a factor securing a region for 
having a special relationship between the region and the state. The region might be an 
important source for the exploitation of resources not found anywhere else within the 
state or for having assets for important utilities. 
 
Control over natural resources is a complex issue. Many states, which recognize 
various forms of territorial autonomy, view sub-soil resources as part of state 
patrimony, and thus can be exploited by the central government in the best interests of 
state economic development.152 In all cases, the exploitation of natural resources is 
almost certain to heighten conflicts between local/regional communities and central 
authorities.153 Indigenous peoples, for instance, living in peripheral regions have a 
spiritual idea of their relationship with the land and earth, which is basic to their 
existence and to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and culture.154 Conflicts arise 
between indigenous groups and dominant populations regarding exploitation of 
natural resources, if state-defined development projects do not have indigenous 
consent, or if adequate compensation is not outlined.155 
 
                                                                                                                                            
150 William Ascher (2007). ‘Issues and Best Practices in the Decentralization of Natural Resource 
Control in Developing Countries’, p. 293 in G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.) (2007): 
Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices. 
151 William Ascher (2007), op.cit., pp. 293-295. 
152 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 465. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 91. 
155 Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit, p. 85. 
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Generally, a territorial autonomy must have resources at its disposal. In a number 
of instances, institutions of self-governance have been left with significant tasks, but 
few financial or fiscal means to realize them. Sustainable autonomy settlements 
include a reasonable balance between the right to raise revenue locally, and the need 
to obtain additional funding from the center.156 
 
In Denmark, for example, the natural resources of Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
are treated differently. In Greenland, the natural resources are recognized in the Home 
Rule Act but the exploitation of the resources are to be managed according to a joint 
agreement between the Danish government and the Greenland government 
(Landsstyre).157 Revenues are then to be divided equally between Greenland and 
Denmark. The Faroe Islands, on the contrary, manage their own natural resources, 
including what may be major oil deposits on the Faroese continental shelf.158 Control 
and rights over natural resources seem to vary between different autonomy regimes. 
Some territories have exclusive rights and control over their own resources, while 
other regions have shared rule over these matters. It is not clear if specific natural 
resources lead to special status.  
 
Operationalization of Possession of Natural Resources 
 
Natural resources can be categorized as important, less important, or lacking. 
Important natural resources are those that can be exploited by industries and have the 
capacity to be extracted and transformed into other products. These include oil, gas 
and various forms of minerals. Less important natural resources are those that relate to 
the nutritional requirement of a region such as those impacting agriculture and 
fisheries. Some regions might have fertile soil for products such as fruits and 
vegetables, which do not grow anywhere else, or surrounding waters with unique 
fishing stocks. The lack of natural resources refers here to a negligible amount of 
                                                 
156 Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (2005), op.cit., p. 266. 
157 Robert Agranoff (2004), op.cit, p. 46 and Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 345. 
158 Elisabeth Nauclér (2005). ‘Autonomy and multilevel governance: Experiences in Nordic and 
Continental European cooperation’, p. 101 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, Self-
governance and Conflict Resolution, op.cit. 
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natural resources or no resources at all. The categorization of each factor will be 
indicated with yes or no in the table. 
 
The fuzzy scores are based on the following logic: if a region possesses both 
important and less important natural resources in combination, the region will receive 
the value 1; if the region only possesses important natural resources, the region will 
receive the value 0.67; and if the region only possesses less important natural 
resources, it will receive the value 0.33. The lack of natural resources will be graded 
with the value 0.  
 
Table 7: Possession of Natural Resources 
 
Autonomy Important 
Resources 
Less Important 
Resources 
Lack of Natural 
Resources 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) No No Yes 0 
American Samoa (US) No Yes No 0.33 
American Virgin Islands (US) Yes No No 0.67 
Andalusia (Spain) Yes No No 0.67 
Anguilla (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Aruba (NL) Yes No No 0.67 
Azores (Portugal) No Yes No 0.33 
Balearic Islands (Spain) Yes Yes No 1 
Basque Country (Spain) Yes No No 0.67 
Bermuda (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Bougainville (Papua New 
Guinea) 
Yes No No 0.67 
British Virgin Islands (UK) No No Yes 0 
Canary Islands (Spain) No Yes No 0.33 
Catalonia (Spain) No No Yes 0 
Cayman Islands (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Cook Islands (NZ) No No Yes 0 
Corsica (France) No No Yes 0 
Crimea (Ukraine) Yes No No 0.67 
Falkland Islands (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Faroe Islands (DK) Yes Yes No 1 
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(possible) 
French Polynesia (France) Yes Yes No 1 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) No No Yes 0 
Gagauzia (Moldova) No Yes No 0.33 
Galicia (Spain) No Yes No 0.33 
Gibraltar (UK) No No Yes 0 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
(Tajikistan) 
Yes Yes No 1 
Greenland (DK) Yes Yes No 1 
Guam (US) No Yes No 0.33 
Guernsey (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Hong Kong (China) No Yes No 0.33 
Isle of Man (UK) No No Yes 0 
Jeju Island (South Korea) No Yes No 0.33 
Jersey (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) Yes Yes No 1 
Kosovo (Serbia) No No Yes 0 
Macau (China) No No Yes 0 
Madeira (Portugal) No Yes No 0.33 
Mayotte (France) No No Yes 0 
Mindanao (Philippines) Yes Yes No 1 
Montserrat (UK) No No Yes 0 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) Yes No No 0.67 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) Yes No No 0.67 
New Caledonia (France) Yes No No 0.67 
Niue (NZ) No Yes No 0.33 
Norfolk Island (Australia) No Yes No 0.33 
North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
Yes No No 0.67 
Northern Ireland (UK) No No Yes 0 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) No Yes No 0.33 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) No No Yes 0 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) Yes Yes No 1 
Puerto Rico (US) Yes No No 0.67 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) No Yes No 0.33 
Sardinia (Italy) Yes No No 0.67 
Scotland (UK) Yes No No 0.67 
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Sicily (Italy) Yes Yes No 1 
South Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
Yes No No 0.67 
St Helena and Dependencies 
(UK) 
No Yes No 0.33 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) 
No Yes No 0.33 
Tokelau (NZ) No No Yes 0 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) No Yes No 0.33 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) No Yes No 0.33 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) No Yes No 0.33 
Wales (UK) Yes No No 0.67 
Wallis and Futuna (France) No No Yes 0 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) No Yes No 0.33 
Sources: CIA - The World Factbook 2008 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html> and other Encyclopedias on the Internet. 
 
The table shows that there are 25 regions that have less important natural resources 
and only nine regions which possess both important and less important natural 
resources at the same time. There are 15 regions which possess only important natural 
resources and 16 regions which lack natural resources altogether.  
 
4.2.4 Existence of Regional Movements, Parties and/or Separatist Groups 
 
Political participation takes many forms and has different aims. Sometimes state 
nationalists object to asymmetrical arrangements that discriminate between regions on 
the basis of nationality, in this sense, meaning that the region’s citizens are members 
of a distinct national community. States often seek to prevent such claims from arising 
by maintaining uniform centralization, by campaigns of assimilation, and even by 
banning political parties that claim to speak for national minorities.159 Other states 
permit autonomy, but ensure at the same time, that the borders of the regions are 
drawn in such a fashion that they do not serve as a focus for minority claims.160 
 
                                                 
159 John McGarry, Queen’s University, Canada (2005), op.cit., p. 4. 
160 Ibid. 
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Establishing a special relationship between a region’s government and its people is 
considered a means of encouraging loyalties to that government. On the other hand, 
asymmetrical forms of government are said to threaten the core principles of liberty 
and equality. Establishing a regional government on the basis of nationality suggests 
ownership of the region by a particular group and second-class citizenship for those 
outside the group. It also suggests that members of the common legislature from the 
asymmetrically autonomous region will be able to influence decisions that do not 
affect their region, while members from the rest of the country will have no say in the 
asymmetrically autonomous region.161 
 
The basis for ethnic mobilization can be seen through a variety of cultural markers: 
the use of skin color in the United States, language in Canada, tribal loyalties in 
Africa, religion in Northern Ireland and so on. Some movements demand outright 
secession; others aim for autonomy or pursue equal rights within the prevailing 
political system. These movements can be seen as powerful expressions of group 
identity and a desire for a more equitable distribution of political economic 
resources.162 Secessionist parties usually favor independence within a customs union 
arrangement, as the Scottish National Party (SNP) proposes with the respect to the 
European Union, and the Parti Québecois (PQ) with respect to Canada.163 Regional 
parties, on the other hand, are primarily organized to defend regional interests and 
traditions, but this defense often takes the form of closer integration with the center. 
The aim of many regional parties is to capture more resources from the center rather 
than to become more autonomous.164 
 
Development can lead to a rise in ethnic mobilization, since it provides resources to 
ethnic groups in the periphery. This increases their bargaining position and 
organizational capacity for action.165 Countries with significant secessionist parties, 
                                                 
161 John McGarry, Queen’s University, Canada (2005), op.cit., pp. 4-5. 
162 Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset (1992-93). ‘Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global 
Perspective’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Winter 1992-1993), p. 586. 
163 Jason Sorens (2004). ’Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy’, Electoral Studies 23, p. 728. 
164 Jason Sorens (2005). ’The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced 
Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, April 2005, p. 315. 
165 Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset (1992-93), op.cit, p. 596. 
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for instance, are more likely to decentralize rather than place emphasis on regions. 
Governments offer autonomy to regions to reduce the appeal of secessionist claims.166   
 
In the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), it is stated that: 
 
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.167 
 
If a state contains a section of the population that constitutes a “people” or a “nation”, 
then they are considered to have a right to self-determination in relation to that state. 
It is commonly held that such a “people” have some right to a special status of 
autonomy within the state.168 
 
Operationalization of the Variable 
 
The existence of regional movements/parties, separatist movements/groups and 
national parties has been dichotomized according to whether or not the region has any 
parties or movements. 
 
The fuzzy scores are determined from the dichotomous characteristics of having a 
regional movement/party or not, having a separatist movement or not, and having 
national parties or not. There are six combinations. A region can have all three 
characteristics and then receive the value 1, a region can have regional parties in 
combination with separatist movements and receive the value of 0.83, and the region 
can have regional parties in combination with national parties and receive the value of 
0.66. If the region only has regional parties, it receives the value of 0.50; if the region 
only has national parties available, it receives the value of 0.33; finally, if the region 
does not have any parties or movements present, it receives the value of 0.16. The 
                                                 
166 Jason Sorens (2004), op.cit., pp. 740-741. 
167 John Kilcullen (2008). ‘Self-Determination and the Right to Establish a Government’, Working 
Paper <http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/HelsinkiB.html>, accessed from Internet 17 March 
2008. See also Menschenrechte. Dokumente und Deklarationen, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
Bonn, 1999, pp. 60 and 71. 
168 Ibid. 
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value of 0.16 explains the fact that there is still political activism available in the 
form of independent candidates and whether parties or movements do not exist.  
 
The assumption is that if a region has all three characteristics available, it is a stronger 
region and has, therefore, a higher degree of autonomy. Regional movements/parties 
and separatist movements are considered as a stronger autonomy aspect than national 
parties. A regional identity might have been developed through these regional 
movements and there might be stronger links to the degree of autonomy in that 
perspective. 
 
Table 8: Existence of Regional Movements, Parties and/or Separatist Groups 
 
Autonomy Regional 
Movement/Party 
Separatist 
Movement 
National 
Parties 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) Yes Yes Yes 1 
American Samoa (US) No No Yes 0.33 
Am. Virgin Islands 
(US) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Andalusia (Spain) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Anguilla (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Aruba (NL) Yes No No 0.50 
Azores (Portugal) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Balearic Islands (Spain) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Basque Country 
(Spain) 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Bermuda (UK) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Bougainville (PNG) Yes Yes No 0.83 
British Virgin Islands 
(UK) 
Yes No No 0.50 
Canary Islands (Spain) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Catalonia (Spain) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Cayman Islands (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Cook Islands (NZ) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Corsica (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Crimea (Ukraine) Yes No Yes 0.66 
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Falkland Islands (UK) No No No 0.16 
Faroe Islands (DK) Yes Yes Yes 1 
French Polynesia 
(France) 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia 
(Italy) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Gagauzia (Moldova) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Galicia (Spain) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Gibraltar (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
(Tajikistan) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Greenland (DK) Yes Yes No 0.83 
Guam (US) No No Yes 0.33 
Guernsey (UK) No No No 0.16 
Hong Kong (China) Yes No No 0.50 
Isle of Man (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Jeju Island (South 
Korea) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Jersey (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Karakalpakstan 
(Uzbekistan) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Kosovo (Serbia) Yes Yes No 0.83 
Macau (China) Yes No No 0.50 
Madeira (Portugal) No No Yes 0.33 
Mayotte (France) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Mindanao (Philippines) Yes Yes No 0.83 
Montserrat (UK) Yes No No 0.50 
Nakhichevan 
(Azerbaijan) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Netherlands’ Antilles 
(NL) 
Yes No No 0.50 
New Caledonia 
(France) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Niue (NZ) Yes No No 0.50 
Norfolk Island 
(Australia) 
No No No 0.16 
North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
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(Nicaragua) 
Northern Ireland (UK) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Northern Mariana 
Islands (US) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Oecussi Ambeno (East 
Timor) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) No No No 0.16 
Puerto Rico (US) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) No No Yes 0.33 
Sardinia (Italy) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Scotland (UK) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Siciliy (Italy) Yes Yes Yes 1 
South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
St Helena and 
Dependencies (UK) 
No No No 0.16 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Tokelau (NZ) No No No 0.16 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
(Italy) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Turks- and Caicos 
Islands (UK) 
Yes No No 0.50 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) Yes No Yes 0.66 
Wales (UK) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Wallis and Futuna 
(France) 
Yes No Yes 0.66 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) Yes Yes No 0.83 
 Sources: CIA – The World Fact Book 2007 <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/>; List of active autonomist and secessionist movements 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_autonomist_and_secessionist_movements>, accessed 
from Internet 4th December 2007. 
 
Looking at the table, it can be seen that there are several territorial autonomies that 
reach the value 1; fourteen regions having all three aspects available. Six autonomies 
do not have any political movements or parties at all. These regions are the Falkland 
Islands, Guernsey, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena and Dependencies, and 
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Tokelau. In the parliaments in these regions, there are only independent candidates 
as representatives. Five regions have a combination of regional and separatist 
movements/parties. These regions are Bougainville, Greenland, Kosovo, Mindanao 
and Zanzibar. The majority of the regions have a combination of regional 
movements/parties and national parties. 
 
4.3 The Factors Affecting the Relationship between State and Region 
 
Factors affecting the relationship between state and region are potential explanations 
for territorial autonomy related to the level of the state. Ethnic distinctiveness is 
considered to be one of the most important factors in this case and is therefore given 
more consideration than other factors. Diverse perspectives exist on the concept of 
ethnicity and its relationship to the concept of minority. Therefore, the concept of 
ethnicity is outlined in the first section and the concept of minority is then scrutinized 
in a more general manner. Second, ethnic distinctiveness is believed to lead to 
autonomy, to a certain degree, especially in countries with several minorities, or 
where minorities are in a majority within a delimited territory. The assumption is that 
ethnic distinctiveness, in some form, gives rise to a certain degree of autonomy. The 
operationalization is considered in the last section of the first part of the study and 
then the size factor and economic viability are discussed once more in relation to the 
mother country. 
 
4.3.1 Ethnic Distinctiveness 
 
The concept of ethnicity has been used within anthropology since the 1950s and 
1960s and is still a central concept in the research. The term came into being in the 
United States to signify the quality of belonging to an ethnic group within a larger 
national state and territory. In this sense, ethnicity denoted minorities.169 The 
European sociological tradition does not focus exclusively on minorities. Ethnicity is 
seen in this context as a quality that can pertain to large and dominant groups such as 
                                                 
169 Anthony D. Smith (2006). ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism’, p. 170 in Gerard Delanty and Krishan 
Kumar (eds.): The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism. London: Thousand Oaks and New 
Delhi: Sage Publications Ltd.  
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the French or Poles as well as small groups such as the Frisians and Pomaks.170  
The ancient Greek term ethnos covers everything from a small band to a large 
nation.171 
 
In social anthropology, ethnicity refers to aspects of relationships between groups, 
who think of themselves as being different and who also are seen as culturally 
different by others.172 In addition, the concept has its place within other social and 
cultural disciplines. Within sociology, a similar definition is used, but here the 
concept has a wider meaning. Besides referring to cultural praxis and cultural values, 
characteristics such as languages, historical heritages, religions, clothing, and customs 
are also included.173 Ethnicity could also refer to a collective consciousness – a “we-
feeling”- that is not followed by the primordial characteristics (such as language, 
religion, heritage and the like). In this sense, ethnicity could be a situational or an 
instrumental process where the experience is determined by some kind of common 
project with a common future. The experience is according to this definition, a 
subjective feeling of “we” in contradiction to “the others”. If the group experiences an 
external threat, then the ethnic consciousness might be strengthened and lead to a 
struggle for material resources and cultural survival. According to this approach, an 
ethnic group is a collection of individuals that organize themselves to reach their 
specific goals.174 
 
Anthropologists have differentiated between different ‘levels’ of ethnicity. At the 
lowest level, we encounter a mosaic of ethnic categories: groupings of individuals 
classified as such by others or outsiders who endow them with a name, and look for 
commonalities according to cultural characteristics (e.g. a dialect or customs) and 
perhaps even a link to a specific location. At this level, the members of the ethnic 
group are aware of who they are not, but have no idea of themselves as a distinct 
cultural group with a common relationship. It is at the next level where ethnic 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993). Ethnicity & Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives, pp. 1-6. 
London: Pluto Press. 
173 Anthony Giddens (1994). Sociologi, Volym 2, p. 52. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
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networks and associations with common activities and purposes come into play. 
This leads to a sense of collective selfhood, at least among elites. At this point, oral 
traditions evolve and often shared myths of common ancestry and ties of presumed 
descent become important. Finally, at the most developed level, an ethnic community 
is aware of ‘who’ they are, ‘where’ and ‘when’ they are, together with an ethno-
history, for example, in chronicles and epics, and at this level a sense of solidarity 
emerges.175  
 
An ethnic group remains more or less discrete but is conscious of and in contact with 
members of other ethnic groups. This means that ethnic groups are established 
through contacts with others. Group identity is defined in relation to what they are 
not, i.e. in relation to non-members of the groups. The concept of an ethnic group has 
come to mean approximately the same as ‘people’.176 Ethnic groups could also be 
defined according to physical similarities, or similarities in customs, or both, or due to 
memories of colonization or migration, where they have a notion of common heritage 
and where this heritage becomes very important for the occurrence of group 
formation. In this sense, it is insignificant if there is any ties of blood or not (compare 
this with the concept of race).177 Ethnic groups are often locally rooted and their 
cultural identity is connected to a certain region’s ecological peculiarities and a 
specific way of resource exploitation. If this condition is altered, then separatist 
movements can emerge. During the colonialism in Central America, for example, 
there were conflicts regarding the use of land.178 
 
It is estimated that there are about 5,000 ethnic groups in approximately 160 states in 
the world. This implies that just one state out of ten could be considered homogenous 
regarding ethnicity.179 This also indicates that the borders between different peoples 
do not follow national borders. Other figures state that there are over 600 living 
                                                                                                                                            
174 Björn Hettne (1990). Etniska konflikter och internationella relationer, pp. 22-24. Göteborg: Padrigu 
Papers. 
175 A.D. Smith, op.cit., pp. 171-172. 
176 T.H. Eriksen, op.cit., pp. 9-10.   
177 Max Weber (1983). Ekonomi och samhälle – Förståendesociologins grunder 1, p. 277. Lund: 
Argos. 
178 B. Hettne, op.cit., p. 40. 
179 B. Hettne, op.cit., p. 55. 
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language groups in 184 states in the world.180 There are many more ethnic groups 
than there are ethnic nationalist movements.181 
 
Ethnic identity is approximately the same as class-consciousness, a proposed order, or 
a categorical identity.182 Personal relationships dominate in more simple societies. A 
typical conception in these circumstances is that personal relationships and positions 
go hand in hand. In more complex societies, the personal relationships are more 
diversified and the relationships are at many levels at the same time. The individuals 
have different networks and frames of reference.183 A society is considered to be 
ethnically homogenous if its citizens belong to one and the same cultural and 
linguistic tradition, or heterogeneous if there is a division of the population in two or 
several different cultural and linguistic groups.184 
 
Ethnically divided societies, where ethnic communities are geographically settled, 
tend to have decentralized state systems. These systems can, of course, differ in nature 
such as federalism in Switzerland, Austria and Belgium, regionalism in the 
Netherlands, and so forth. By contrast, ideologically divided societies tend to have 
centralized systems, although the degree of centralization may vary in each case as 
well as through time.185 
 
Politically, ethnic groups can be and are defined by their political aims. They are 
content to be called minorities if their aspirations do not extend beyond special 
linguistic, educational, or religious facilities. They proclaim their ethnicity if the goal 
is a particular form of autonomy. Furthermore, they may even designate themselves a 
‘nation’ or a ‘nationality’ if they aim to establish a separate state of their own.186 
                                                 
180 Will Kymlicka (1998). Multicultural Citizenship, p. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
181 Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2001). Volume 2, p. 152. San Diego: Academic Press. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Joseph Marko (1995). Autonomie und Integration, pp. 129 and 137, Rechstinstitute des 
Nationalitätensrechts im funktionalen Vergleich. Wien-Köln-Graz: Böhlau Verlag. 
184 J-E Lane & S. Ersson (1994). Politics and Society in Western Europe, 3rd Edition, p. 75. London: 
Sage Publications. 
185 Sergio Fabbrini (2000). ‘Political Change without Institutional Transformation: What Can We Learn 
from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s?’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 21, No. 2(April, 
2001), p. 179. 
186 Yash Ghai (2000). ’Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis’, p. 7 in Yash Ghai (ed.): 
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Autonomy is sometimes seen as a device to allow ethnic or other groups, claiming a 
distinct identity, to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them. The 
geographical concentration of a group is essential to territorial autonomy.187 
 
Territorial autonomy can reassure minority groups about their ability to control social, 
cultural, and economic matters that are important to the maintenance of communal 
identities and interests. The aim is to cede responsibilities over specified subjects, and 
a certain degree of self-determination, to a group that constitutes the majority in a 
specific region.188 Autonomy becomes the top of the hierarchy and constitutes the 
maximum legal status a minority may achieve within a state.189 
 
Societies can be classified on the basis of their level of ethnic heterogeneity through 
an index which measures the distribution of the population according to ethno-
linguistic fragmentation. In such a case, the probability of two random people 
belonging to various ethno-linguistic groups is an approximation. Compare this with 
Rae’s and Taylor’s fractionalization index, which computes the ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fragmentation. In this sense, we get a value between 0 and 1, where 0 
indicates low fragmentation and 1 high fragmentation.190 Another approach is to look 
at the percentage of the population using the dominant language or belonging to the 
dominant ethno-linguistic group.191    
 
Definitions on Minority 
 
The concept of ethnicity is closely related to the term of minority, which has just been 
mentioned. According to the World Directory of Minorities, a minority must be a non-
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Occasional Papers Series Nr 18/2002. 
191 J-E Lane & S. Ersson, op.cit., p. 75. 
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dominant group. Its members should possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population. They must also show, 
if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion, or language.192 This definition could be said to originate from the 
American tradition. Another very similar definition is Francesco Capotorti’s 
definition concerning groups that are numerically inferior to the rest of the population 
of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members possess the same 
characteristics as mentioned above (i.e. ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics).193 A third definition similar to the previous two is Jules Deschênes’ 
definition, but he goes a little bit further and includes not only the non-dominant 
position and the special characteristics with the sense of solidarity, but also a 
collective will to survive and the minority’s aim to achieve equality with the majority 
in fact and in law.194 
 
There are several international documents that deal with definitions of minorities. 
According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, recommendation 
1201 states the following definition in Article 1: a national minority is:195 
 
A group of persons in a state who: 
 a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;  
 b) maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with that state; 
c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; 
d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of 
that state or of a region of that state; 
e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common 
identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or the language 
 
 
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
there is no satisfactory universal definition of the term “minority”, which has proved 
acceptable. The difficulty in arriving at an acceptable definition lies in the variety of 
                                                 
192 Minority Rights Group International (ed.) (1997). World Directory of Minorities, p. xv. UK. 
193 G. Brunner and H. Küpper (2002). ‘European Options for Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy 
Models of Minority Self-Governance’, p. 15 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. 
Budapest: LGI Books. 
194 Brunner and Küpper, op.cit., p. 15. 
195 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly: Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional 
protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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situations in which minorities exist. Some live together in well-defined areas while 
others are scattered throughout the state. Some minorities have a strong sense of 
collective identity on a well-remembered or recorded history while others retain only 
a fragmented notion of their common heritage. In certain cases, minorities enjoy a 
considerable degree of autonomy. In others, there is no past-history of autonomy or 
self-government. Some minority groups may require greater protections than others, 
for particular reasons, such a long period of residency in a country, or they have a 
stronger will to maintain and develop their own characteristics.196 
 
The most commonly used description of a minority in a given state can be defined as 
a non-dominant group of individuals who share certain national, ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the majority population.197 
 
Other groups of individuals may find themselves in situations similar to those of 
minorities. These groups include migrant workers, refugees, stateless individuals and 
other non-nationals. These groups do not necessarily share certain ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics. They are protected against discrimination by the general 
provisions of international law, and have their additional rights guaranteed in, for 
example: the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families; the Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons; the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; and the 
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the 
Country in which They Live.198 
 
Different countries use various concepts and dimensions for identifying and defining 
minority populations. These often involve references to numerical weight, racial or 
                                                                                                                                            
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta93/erec1201.htm, retrieved 14 
December, 2006. 
196 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev. 1), 
Minority Rights. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs18.htm, 
retrieved 14 December, 2006. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
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ethnic origin, language, migration status, and religious affiliations.199 Another 
problem is the collection of data and in several countries this kind of data is not 
collected because of privacy legislation or because it might be considered too 
sensitive.200 
 
Within an autonomous territory there may be people of ethnic groups other than the 
one which constitutes the majority in the region in question. When establishing an 
autonomous regime, the rights of these groups must also be guaranteed.201 Every 
autonomy regime should include guarantees for the respect of human rights and non-
discrimination among all inhabitants. Similarly, a minority that has been granted 
autonomy should enjoy minority rights.202 
 
Operationalization of Ethnic Distinctiveness 
 
Ethnic distinctiveness is considered from the minority perspective where specific 
characteristics play a part. Ethnic distinctiveness, therefore, is taken to refer to a non-
dominant group of individuals who share the dimensions of certain ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the majority population in a 
given state. The ethnic distinctiveness of a region is contrasted with the mother 
country in question. If the autonomy varies in some primordial characteristic, this is 
indicated by the language, religion, or ethnic origin. The territorial autonomies are 
compared in relation to their respective metropolitan power in this sense, as the ethnic 
origin should be different from the mother country in question. If, for instance, a 
region has an ethnic origin derived from African roots, but where the population of 
the mother country is derived from European descent, this will indicate the difference 
between the mother country and the region in question. Language has been indicated 
where the region has another official language than the state in question or where 
there might be various official languages used at the same time. Language also 
indicates cases where another majority language is used other than that of the overall 
                                                 
199 Economic and Social Council (within UN): Economic Commission for Europe (2006). Gender and 
Minorities. ECE/CES/GE.30/2006/21. 3 July, 2006. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. 
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country. Dialects or various accents will not be included. Religion will be indicated 
if there is a different religion practiced in the region than in the majority of the state it 
relates to. The major religions in the world have been considered with Christianity 
divided into Protestantism, Catholicism and other, since these religions are often in 
conflictual relationships with each other. More divisions in the different religions are 
not considered here due to the difficulty of differentiating between different religious 
communities. Some manner of ethnic distinctiveness is believed to lead to different 
degrees of autonomy in this context. 
 
Table 9 provides an overview considering ethnic distinctiveness amongst territorial 
autonomies in the world. The fuzzy scores are divided according to the following 
logic: if a region differs in all three aspects, the region receives the value 1. If a region 
differs in two aspects, it receives the value 0.67. If a region only differs in one of the 
aspects, it receives the value 0.33. Finally, if a region does not differ in any aspect, it 
receives the value 0. This means that every primordial characteristic is equally 
important in this context. 
 
Table 9: Ethnic Distinctiveness amongst Autonomies in the World 
 
Autonomy Ethnic Distinctiveness Fuzzy Score 
Åland Islands (Finland)  Language 0.33 
American Samoa (US) Language and ethnic origin 0.67 
American Virgin Islands (US) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Andalucia (Spain) No diversity 0 
Anguilla (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Aruba (NL) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Azores (Portugal) No diversity 0 
Balearic Islands (Spain) Language 0.33 
Basque Country (Spain) Language 0.33 
Bermuda (UK) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) No diversity 0 
British Virgin Islands (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Canary Islands (Spain) No diversity 0 
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Catalonia (Spain) Language 0.33 
Cayman Islands (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Cook Islands (NZ) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Corsica (France) Language 0.33 
Crimea (Ukraine) Language 0.33 
Falkland Islands (UK) No diversity 0 
Faroe Islands (DK) Language 0.33 
French Polynesia (France) Language and ethnic origin 0.67 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) Language 0.33 
Gagauzia (Moldova) No diversity 0 
Galicia (Spain) Language 0.33 
Gibraltar (UK) Language and religion 0.67 
Gorno-Badakshan (Tajikistan) No diversity 0 
Greenland (DK) Language and ethnic origin 0.67 
Guam (US) Ethnic origin and religion 0.67 
Guernsey (UK) Language 0.33 
Hong Kong (China) Language and religion 0.67 
Isle of Man (UK) Language 0.33 
Jeju Island (South Korea) No diversity 0 
Jersey (UK) No diversity 0 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) Language 0.33 
Kosovo (Serbia) Ethnic origin, language and 
religion 
1 
Macau (China) Language and religion 0.67 
Madeira (Portugal) No diversity 0 
Mayotte (France) Ethnic origin, language and 
religion 
1 
Mindanao (Philippines) Religion 0.33 
Montserrat (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) No diversity 0 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
New Caledonia (France) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Niue (NZ) Ethnic origin, religion and 
language 
1 
Norfolk Island (Australia) Language 0.33 
North Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
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Northern Ireland (UK) Language and religion 0.67 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) Language 0.33 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) Language and ethnic origin 0.67 
Puerto Rico (US) Language and religion 0.67 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) No diversity 0 
Sardinia (Italy) Language 0.33 
Scotland (UK) No diversity 0 
Sicily (Italy) No diversity 0 
South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) No diversity 0 
Tokelau (NZ) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) Language 0.33 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) Language 0.33 
Wales (UK) Language 0.33 
Wallis and Futuna (France) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) Religion 0.33 
Sources: Maria Ackrén (2005). Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de 
självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut.; CIA - The World Factbook 2007 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, 
Constitution Finder <http://confinder.richmond.edu> and various web-pages such as encyclopedias and 
government pages. 
 
The table shows that eight autonomies differ when it comes to ethnic origin in relation 
to their respective mother country and eighteen autonomies differ in language. 
Language here means that the majority of the population in the region speaks a 
different mother tongue than the rest of the majority in their specific country, or that 
the region has several official languages in respect of its mother country. Mindanao in 
the Philippines, and Zanzibar in Tanzania, differ only in religion as both islands are 
Muslim territories. Thirteen autonomies have a combination of different language and 
ethnic origin in relation to their mother countries. Three autonomies (Kosovo, 
Mayotte, and Niue) differ in all three aspects in relation to their mother countries. 
Five autonomies differ in both language and religion. Guam differs in ethnic origin 
and religion. Fifteen autonomies have no differences in relation to their mother 
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countries. As can be observed, some kind of difference is very common. It seems 
that ethnic distinctiveness might be a sufficient condition for the occurrence of 
territorial autonomy. 
 
4.3.2 Size 
 
Size has been used in several studies as an independent variable. Dahl and Tufte 
(1973) saw a relationship between size and democracy; Hadenius (1992) also found a 
relationship between size and the level of democracy; additionally, Carsten Anckar, in 
his doctoral dissertation, has looked at the relationship between size and party systems 
in 77 states of the world.203 Krister Lundell has tested the relationship between size 
and electoral system choice in his doctoral dissertation, arguing that large countries 
tend to apply proportional systems to a higher extent than small countries.204 Dag 
Anckar writes, in a proposal for a research program, that size could have an effect on 
responsive rule in politics. He argues that as a consequence of size, smaller units are 
more prone to responsive rule than larger ones, even though this is in a form of dual 
relationship. The distance between leaders and the ordinary public is minimal and the 
possibilities for direct participation are guaranteed. On the other hand, since the units 
are small, specific problems occur. Resources are limited and units are politically and 
economically dependent on external actors. Dag Anackar furthermore, states that 
small units are less complex, more lucid and more open in their way of dealing with 
politics.205 In the field of international politics, the size of countries is seen as an 
assumption explaining the differences in their capabilities, and differences in size 
might also have an impact in leadership-styles and organizational climate in 
organization theory.206 
 
                                                 
203 See Carsten Anckar (1998). Storlek och partisystem. En studie av 77 stater. Åbo: Åbo Akademis 
förlag. 
204 See Krister Lundell (2005). Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice. A Macro-
Comparative Study 1945-2003. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, pp.158-163. 
205 Dag Anckar (1991). Size, Remoteness, Type of Government: The Small Island States of the World. 
Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi. Statsvetenskapliga 
institutionen, Serie A:341, pp. 6-7. 
206 Carsten Anckar (1997). ’Size and Democracy. Some Empirical Findings’, p. 19 in Dag Anckar and 
Lars Nilsson (eds.) Politics and Geography. Contributions to an Interface. Mid-Sweden University 
Press. 
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In an article about size, insularity, and democracy, Dag Anckar and Carsten Anckar 
depart from Hadenius’ work containing the assumption that island states are more 
democratic than others. While islands are, as a rule, small, and results indicate that 
size is connected to democracy, insularity is linked even more strongly with 
democracy.207 In a report from the Commonwealth Secretariat, economists show that 
there is a high correlation between population size and different economic indicators 
such as total GNP and land area.208 Another feature taking into account the 
relationship between size and other factors is research that considers the relationship 
between small states and vulnerability. It is argued that being small in size increases 
the necessity of facing high risks/threats which are unavoidable. Small states tend to 
face external constraints, risks, and threats which have an impact on them to a degree 
both qualitatively and quantitatively different from other states.209 
 
Size, in the matter of categorizing states, has two major dimensions, one where 
population size matters and the other where territorial area matters. It is accepted that 
the more people living in an area, the larger the unit. Large units have therefore large 
populations, while small areas have small populations. When the territorial dimension 
is used, it is argued that large units have large areas at their disposal and small units 
have small areas.210 
 
In research considering microstates, an arbitrary cut-off point is often made at 1,000 
km2 or one million inhabitants.211 Microstates are then states with less than one 
million inhabitants. In the research on islands and island autonomy, it is argued that 
size is a determinant in the sustainability of political autonomy, but it is not the only 
factor. There are a number of various factors leading to the sustainability of political 
                                                 
207 Dag Anckar & Carsten Anckar (1995). ’Size, Insularity and Democracy’, Scandinavian Political 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 211-229. 
208 A Future for Small States. Overcoming Vulnerability (1997). London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 
p. 8. 
209 Ibid, p. 15. 
210 Dag Anckar (1991). Världens små östater. Populationen jämte jämförelsepopulationer. 
Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi. Statsvetenskapliga 
institutionen, Serie A:350, p. 11. 
211 Dag Anckar (1991). Världens små östater ... op.cit., p. 18. and A Future for Small States…op.cit., p. 
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autonomy.212 In autonomy research, size should be considered in combination with 
other factors. 
 
The size of an ethnic group, for example, could function as an incentive for a state to 
accommodate that group, because otherwise it may disrupt the political system.213 On 
the other hand, it might be less risky to accommodate smaller communities, because 
they represent little danger to the system.214 The motivation for smaller, self-
governing political units has been accentuated by the desires to make governments 
more responsive to the individual citizen and to give expression to primary group 
attachments.215 Territorial autonomies function under the motto of, Parva sub ingenti, 
‘the small under the protection of the great’.216 The metropolitan state often takes care 
of foreign affairs, defense, and security issues, while the autonomous region has total 
internal self-government.  
 
Operationalization of Size 
 
In my study, I connect size to territorial autonomy. This suggests an approach other 
than that dealing with countries, since my interest lies in sub-units within the states. In 
the previous investigation, I used various thresholds for population size. I divided the 
territorial autonomies according to four categories: territories with less than ten 
thousand inhabitants, territories with more than ten thousand but less than hundred 
thousand inhabitants, territories with over one hundred thousand but less than one 
million inhabitants, and lastly, territories with over one million but less than ten 
                                                 
212 Ronald L. Watts (2000). ’Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective’, p. 33 in Godfrey 
Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands. The 
Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc. 
213 William Safran (2000). ’Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and 
Theoretical Perspectives’, p. 18 in William Safran and Ramón Máiz (eds.): Identity and Territorial 
Autonomy in Plural Societies, op.cit. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ronald L. Watts (2000). ‘ Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspetive’, p. 19 in Godfrey 
Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands…, op.cit. 
216 Wayne MacKinnon (1998). ’Dependency and Development in Prince Edward Island’, p. 175 in 
Godfrey Baldacchino & Robert Greenwood (eds.): Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic 
Development for Small Islands. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. Canada: The Institute of Island 
Studies, University of Prince Edward Island. 
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million inhabitants.217 This categorization was employed in the same manner when 
using states as units of investigation. This might not be the most appropriate way for 
sub-units. It would perhaps be better to address size in percentage points instead, 
computing the percentage of the population in the territorial autonomy in relation to 
the total population of the state in which the autonomy lies. This would also be better 
in a comparative view when comparing territorial autonomies with other regions 
within the states. Another problem relying on thresholds is that there are a number of 
territorial autonomies belonging to the same country in several cases. The share of the 
total population provides a more accurate picture of size according to the population 
as such. Large size is here considered to lead to a higher degree of autonomy than 
smaller size. This assumption is based on the logic that a larger population has more 
power to give to a voice for more autonomy. 
 
The table below illustrates the size factor. I have included the population in the 
autonomous region and the area in square kilometers. The third column shows the 
percentage of the population in accordance with the total population of the country, 
where the autonomy lies. The last column shows the fuzzy scores according to the 
calibration technique as used in previous sections. The thresholds for the calibration 
are 10 percent for fuzzy values ≥ 0.95 (full inclusion in the set of large size), 5 percent 
for the cross-over point and 0 percent for the fuzzy value of ≤ 0.05 (full exclusion in 
the set of large size). The thresholds have been chosen according to the distribution of 
the cases in this context. 
 
Table 10: Size according to Population and Area 
 
Autonomy Population Area in km2 Percentage of 
the Total 
Population 
Fuzzy 
Scores 
Åland Islands (Finland) 26,700 (2005) 1 527 km2 0.51 % 0.06 
American Samoa (US) 57,800 (2006) 199 km2 0.02 % 0.05 
Am. Virgin Islands (US) 108,600 (2006) 1 910 km2 0.04 % 0.05 
Andalusia (Spain) 8,000,000 (2006) 87 268 km2 19.78 % 1 
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Anguilla (UK) 13,500 (2006) 102 km2 0.02 % 0.05 
Aruba (NL) 71,900 (2006) 193 km2 0.43 % 0.06 
Azores (Portugal) 241,800 (2006) 2 333 km2 2.27 % 0.16 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 1,001,100 (2006) 4 992 km2 2.48 % 0.18 
Basque Country (Spain) 2,100,000 (2006) 7 234 km2 5.19 % 0.53 
Bermuda (UK) 65,800 (2006) 53,3 km2 0.11 % 0.05 
Bougainville (PNG) 175,200 (2000) 10 570 km2 3.02 % 0.23 
Br. Virgin Islands (UK) 23,100 (2006) 153 km2 0.04 % 0.05 
Canary Islands (Spain) 2,000,000 (2006) 7,447 km2 4.94 % 0.49 
Catalonia (Spain) 7,200,000 (2006) 32,114 km2 17.80 % 1 
Cayman Islands (UK) 45,400 (2006) 262 km2 0.07 % 0.05 
Cook Islands (NZ) 21,400 (2006) 236,7 km2 0.52 % 0.06 
Corsica (France) 264,000 (2002) 8 680 km2 0.41 % 0.06 
Crimea (Ukraine) 2,280,000 26 100 km2 4.62 % 0.44 
Falkland Islands (UK) 3,000 (2006) 12 173 km2 0.005 % 0.05 
Faroe Islands (DK) 47,300 (2006) 1 399 km2 0.87 % 0.08 
French Polynesia (France) 274,600 (2006) 4 167 km2 0.43 % 0.06 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (I) 1,208,300 7 845 km2 2.08 % 0.15 
Gagauzia (Moldova) 170,000 (2005) 1 832 km2 3.93 % 0.34 
Galicia (Spain) 2,769,200  29 574 km2 6.85 % 0.75 
Gibraltar (UK) 27,900 (2006) 6,5 km2 0.05 % 0.05 
Gorno-Badakshan 
(Tajikistan) 
250,000 (2004) 70 000 km2 3.53 % 0.29 
Greenland (DK) 56,400 (2006) 2 166 086 km2 1.03 % 0.08 
Guam (US) 171,000 (2006) 541,3 km2 0.06 % 0.05 
Guernsey (UK) 65,400 (2006) 78 km2 0.12 % 0.05 
Hong Kong (China) 6,940,400 (2006) 1 092 km2 0.53 % 0.06 
Isle of Man (UK) 75,400 (2006) 572 km2 0.12 % 0.05 
Jeju Island (South Korea) 583,000 (2006) 1 848 km2 0.01% 0.05 
Jersey (UK) 91,100 (2006) 116 km2 0.15 % 0.05 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) 1,200,000 (2005) 160 000 km2 4.32 % 0.40 
Kosovo (Serbia) 2,000,000 (2003) 10 887 km2 19.70 % 1 
Macau (China) 453,100 (2006) 28,2 km2 0.03 % 0.05 
Madeira (Portugal) 240,500 (2001) 794 km2 2.26 % 0.16 
Mayotte (France) 201,200 (2004) 374 km2 0.32 % 0.06 
Mindanao (Philippines) 2,803,800 (2000) 12 695 km2 3.08 % 0.24 
Montserrat (UK) 9,400 (2006) 102 km2 0.02 % 0.05 
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Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) 372,900 (2005) 5 500 km2 4.60 % 0.44 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 221,700 (2006) 960 km2 1.34 % 0.10 
New Caledonia (France) 219,200 (2006) 19 060 km2 0.34 % 0.06 
Niue (NZ) 2,200 (2006) 260 km2 0.05 % 0.05 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 1,800 (2006) 34,6 km2 0.009 % 0.05 
North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
249, 700 (2005)  32 159 km2 4.40 % 0.41 
Northern Ireland (UK) 1,700,000 (2001) 13 843 km2 2.80 % 0.21 
Northern Mariana Islands 
(US) 
82,500 (2006) 477 km2 0.03 % 0.05 
Oecussi Ambeno (East 
Timor) 
58,500 (2004) 815 km2 5.40 % 0.56 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) 45 (2006) 47 km2 0.0000 % 0.05 
Puerto Rico (US) 3,927,200 (2006) 13 790 km2 1.30 % 0.10 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 40,000 (2006) 109 km2 3.20 % 0.25 
Sardinia (Italy) 1,655,700 (2006) 24 090 km2 2.85 % 0.22 
Scotland (UK) 5,094,800 (2005) 78 772 km2 8.38 % 0.88 
Sicily (Italy) 5,017,200 (2006) 25 703 km2 8.63 % 0.90 
South Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
382,100 (2005) 27 407 km2 6.73 % 0.74 
St Helena and Dep. (UK) 7,500 (2006) 413 km2 0.01 % 0.05 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) 
7,000 (2006) 242 km2 0.01 % 0.05 
Tokelau (NZ) 1,400 (2006) 10 km2 0.03 % 0.05 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 962,500 (2004) 13 607 km2 1.66 % 0.12 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
(UK) 
21,100 (2006) 430 km2 0.03 % 0.05 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 122,900 (2005) 3 263 km2 0.21 % 0.05 
Wales (UK) 2,935,300 (2005) 20,779 km2 4.83 % 0.47 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 16,000 (2006) 274 km2 0.03 % 0.05 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 981,800 (2002) 2 332 km2 2.49 % 0.18 
Sources: Main sources used: Maria Ackrén (2005). Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk 
studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut; CIA – The World 
Factbook 2008 < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>; Various 
government pages on the Internet. 
 
The table shows that there are huge differences between the cases. The smallest 
region is the Pitcairn Islands with a population of only 45 inhabitants. The largest 
territory according to population is Andalusia in Spain with nearly eight million 
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inhabitants. The smallest territory according to area is Gibraltar with only 6.5 km2 
and the largest territory according to area is Greenland with over two million km2. 
When considering the relative size in the relation to the metropolitan countries, it can 
be seen that Andalusia is the largest constituting 19.78 percent of the total population 
of Spain, followed by Kosovo and Catalonia in relation to the total population of 
Serbia and Spain respectively. These figures give a more accurate picture of the 
autonomies’ relation within their respective countries. The relative size shows how 
large the territory really is in the context of their respective country.  
 
The fuzzy scores reveal that most of the regions are small. Nine regions are positioned 
over the cross-over point of 0.5, but most regions are located in the lower end of the 
spectrum.  
 
4.3.3 Economic Viability 
 
Small territories often face problems related to a small local market, external shocks, 
high transport costs, lack of economies of scale, lack of know-how, and a one-way 
production focusing on just one product or service.218 The most successful territories, 
however, have been those able to exploit new niches in the global circuits of capital, 
both legitimate and illegitimate. These regions have set themselves up as offshore 
financial centers. Financial service industries have particular attraction for overseas 
territories because other economic activities are weakly developed, and few local 
resources are required.219 Furthermore, offshore financial centers also bring other 
sectors with them, such as banks, insurance companies, trust and company firms, ship 
management, stockbrokers etc.220   
 
                                                 
218 Godfrey Baldacchino (2003). ’Jurisdictional Self-Reliance for Small Island Territories’, The Round 
Table, Issue 365, January 2003, p. 349. 
219 R. Aldrich and J. Connell (1998). The Last Colonies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
84-85. See also Mark P. Hampton and John Christensen (2002). ‘Offshore Pariahs? Small Island 
Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re-configuration of Global Finance’, World Development, Vol. 30, 
No. 9, pp. 1657-1673 for more information about OFCs and Tax Havens. 
220 Stephen Carse (1998). ’Sustaining Small Island Development: Isle of Man’, p. 271 in Godfrey 
Baldacchino & Robert Greenwood (eds.): Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for 
Small Islands. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University 
of Prince Edward Island. 
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Economic advances are said to occur in societies where innovation and creativity 
are encouraged. People must feel free to express their ideas and have the ability to 
participate in politics in a broad manner.221 Small entities often make use of free trade, 
which allows them to use their resources to sell certain goods and buy those 
commodities they cannot produce by themselves. In this way, a global marketplace is 
created which leads to greater economic competition.222 Jurisdiction could also be 
seen as a tool for economic development. Some of the most successful offshore 
dependencies around the world have inherited and maintained the core values of the 
British notion of the rule of law.223 Common Law practices can be seen to uphold 
confidential relationships between banker and client, strategic use of low or no direct 
taxes, and flexibility in developing commercial regulations and company laws.224 
 
Investigations have shown that there is clear evidence of a positive association 
between political dependence on larger states and levels of real per capita income in 
small islands. An alternative explanation would be that each island economy has been 
converging to the income level of a counterpart large economy or economies in the 
core of the global economy, so that island living standards derive their relativities 
from sources external to the region. The studies, therefore, show that politically 
integrated island territories generally exhibit the highest per capita incomes. There is a 
strong convergence to the metropolitan GDP, while those territories, which are 
situated in the periphery, exhibit weaker convergence and hence lower incomes.225 
 
Economic studies between non-sovereign islands and small island states reveal the 
fact that non-independent islands receive 36 times more bilateral aid than comparable 
                                                 
221 Henry F. Srebrnik (2000). ‘Identity, Culture and Confidence in the Global Economy’, p. 57 in 
Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: 
The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with Institute of 
Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada.  
222 Henry F. Srebrnik (200), op.cit., p. 61. 
223 William R. McKercher (2000). ‘The Isle of Man: Jurisdictional Catapult to Development’, pp. 92, 
103 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.), op.cit. 
224 Mark Hampton (1998). ‘Accident or Design? The Role of the State in Jersey’s Development as an 
Offshore Finance Centre’ pp. 293-295. 
225 Geoffrey Bertram (2004). ‘On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with Their Metropolitan 
Patrons’, World Development, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 343-364. 
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independent island states.226 This naturally needs to be considered when looking at 
the economic viability of the territorial autonomies. Most territorial autonomies 
receive aid or subsidies from their mother country. There is a clear relationship of 
dependence established between the metropolitan state and the autonomous region in 
question, partly because of the autonomous region’s wish to have the same living 
standards as the mainland. It could also be seen as insurance for the metropolitan state 
to have the autonomous region integrated into the economy of the country as a whole.    
 
Operationalization of GDP/Capita 
 
In this context, I used GDP/capita as the measurement of economic viability. This 
measurement is not without problems, but since I am dealing with regions, 
GDP/capita is the vital (and sometimes the only) measurement used for these 
territories. The operationalization of the variable was obtained from the World Bank 
Atlas methodology. The World Bank has used other measurements227 for their 
categorization, so here the limits between the categories are used as thresholds for 
what can be considered low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and 
high income regions. The low-income group is categorized with US$905 or less, the 
lower middle-income group is lying in the range US$906-US$3,595; the upper 
middle-income group is lying in between US$3,596-US$11,115 and the high-income 
group lies at US$11,116 or more.228 
 
To generate the fuzzy score, I used a value 1 for the high-income group, value 0.67 
for the upper middle-income group, value 0.33 for the lower middle-income group 
and 0 for the low-income group. High income is supposed to lead to a high degree of 
autonomy. 
 
                                                 
226 Geoff  Bertram & Bernard Poirine (2007). ‘Island Political Economy’, p. 352 in Godfrey 
Baldacchino (ed.): A World of Islands. Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince 
Edward Island in association with Agenda Academic, Malta. 
227 World Bank uses per capita GNI (gross national income, formerly GNP) as their measurement 
dealing with the countries of the world, see e.g. <http://go.worldbank.org/50KY0015VO>, accessed 
from Internet 31 March 2008. 
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Table 11: GDP/Capita for the Territorial Autonomies: 
 
Autonomy GDP/Capita in USD Fuzzy Score 
Åland Islands (Finland) 35,690 (2000) 1 
American Samoa (US) 5,800 (2005) 0.67 
Am. Virgin Islands (US) 14,500 (2004) 1 
Andalusia (Spain) 24,879 (2006) 1 
Anguilla (UK) 8,800 (2004) 0.67 
Aruba (NL) 21,800 (2004) 1 
Azores (Portugal) 12,326 (1995) 1 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 29,943 (2002) 1 
Basque Country (Spain) 30,680 (2004) 1 
Bermuda (UK) 69,900 (2004) 1 
Bougainville (PNG) 819 (1988) 0 
Br. Virgin Islands (UK) 38,500 (2004) 1 
Canary Islands (Spain) 16,445 (1999) 1 
Catalonia (Spain) 24,858 (2005) 1 
Cayman Islands (UK) 43,800 (2004) 1 
Cook Islands (NZ) 9,100 (2005) 0.67 
Corsica (France) 26,752 (2006) 1 
Crimea (Ukraine) 1,576 (1999) 0.33 
Falkland Islands (UK) 25,000 (2002) 1 
Faroe Islands (DK) 45,250 (2006) 1 
French Polynesia (France) 17,500 (2003) 1 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) 29,260 (2000) 1 
Gagauzia (Moldova) - 0.33* 
Galicia (Spain) 15,630 (2001) 1 
Gibraltar (UK) 27,900 (2000) 1 
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) - 0.33* 
Greenland (DK) 20,000 (2001) 1 
Guam (US) 15,000 (2005) 1 
Guernsey (UK) 44,600 (2005) 1 
Hong Kong (China) 37,300 (2006) 1 
Isle of Man (UK) 35,000 (2005) 1 
                                                                                                                                            
228 To see the categorizations visit World Bank 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 31 March 2008. 
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Jeju Island (South Korea) 16,457 (2006) 1 
Jersey (UK) 57,000 (2005) 1 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) - 0.33* 
Kosovo (Serbia) 1,066 (2001) 0.33 
Macau (China) 24,300 (2005) 1 
Madeira (Portugal) 19,000 (2000) 1 
Mayotte (France) 4,900 (2005) 0.67 
Mindanao (Philippines) - 0.33* 
Montserrat (UK) 3,400 (2002) 0.33 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) - 0.67* 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 16,000 (2004) 1 
New Caledonia (France) 15,000 (2003) 1 
Niue (NZ) 5,800 (2003) 0.67 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 45,343 (1996) 1 
North Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
- 0.33* 
Northern Ireland (UK) 19,940 (2000) 1 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) 12,500 (2000) 1 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) 560 (2004) 0 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) - 0.33* 
Puerto Rico (US) 19,300 (2006) 1 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 3,754 (2001) 0.67 
Sardinia (Italy) 19,360 (2000) 1 
Scotland (UK) 22,690 (2000) 1 
Sicily (Italy) 16,780 (2000) 1 
South Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (Nicaragua) 
- 0.33* 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) 2,500 (1998) 0.33 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) 7,000 (2001) 0.67 
Tokelau (NZ) 1,000 (1993) 0.33 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 34,940 (2000) 1 
Turks- and Caicos Islands (UK) 11,500 (2002) 1 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 31,570 (2000) 1 
Wales (UK) 19,280 (2000) 1 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 3,800 (2004) 0.67 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 303 (2004) 0 
Sources: CIA – The World Factbook 2007 <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-
book/geos/>; Maria Ackrén (2005). Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de 
100
  
101
101
självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut, pp. 106-107; 
<http://www.imedea.uib.es/pressdbfiles/000218/02-03.pdf>, accessed from Internet 13 December 
2007; <http://islands.unep/ch/IHD.htm#859>, accessed from Internet 13 December 2007; 
<http://www.demographia.com/db-intlppp.region.htm>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007; 
<http://www.crimea_portal.gov.ua/index.php?=4&tek=&par=&art=194&date=>, accessed from 
Internet 13 December 2007; Ignacio Lago-Peñas and Santiago Lago-Peñas (2005). ’Does the Economy 
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of the Causal Chain Connecting the Economy and the Vote in Galicia’, 
Economics & Politics, Volume 17, No. 2, July 2005, p. 225; 
<http://www.cgc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0016/3427/Section_09_-_Chapter_4_-
_The_Norfolk_Island_Economy.pdf>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007; 
<http://ethnia.org/ethnia-fiche.php?ask=Th-06>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007; 
<http://thesea.org/coralreef/africa/MauritiusRodriguez.htm>, accessed from Internet 14 December 
2007; <http://www.tzdac.or.tz/main/DPG%20subgroups/zanzibar/>, accessed from Internet 14 
December 2007; <http://english.jeju.go.kr/contents/index.php?mid=0203>, accessed from Internet 6 
March 2008. 
Fuzzy scores with * indicate estimations performed by the author. 
  
The table shows that most of the territorial autonomies are in the high-income group 
(a total of 41 regions). There are nine regions belonging to the upper middle-income 
group and twelve regions belonging to the lower middle-income group. There are 
only three regions which belong to the low income-group and these are Bougainville, 
Oecussi Ambeno and Zanzibar.  
 
As has been argued, there are many autonomous islands that are aid-funded, and 
therefore their per capita income might be higher than otherwise expected. The most 
subsidized economies within the group of autonomous islands are French Polynesia, 
Greenland, Mayotte, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, St 
Helena and Dependencies, St Pierre and Miquelon, Tokelau, and Wallis and 
Futuna.229 The figures for these regions should to a certain extent be disregarded. 
 
After this theoretical and empirical outline, the study then proceeds with the first 
analysis and a further exploration of the relations between the fuzzy-set and the 
dependent and independent variables. 
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5 Analysis of Territorial Autonomy According to Fuzzy-Set 
 
Fuzzy-set as a method has been seen as a middle path between quantitative and 
qualitative research.230 As a middle path, its strength has been to overcome some of 
the limitations within the conventional methods by using set-theoretic principles. As 
Ragin (2008) argues, fuzzy-set should be seen as an alternative approach and not as a 
compromise between the two worlds of quantitative and qualitative approaches.231 
 
The fuzzy-set approach is employed, in this study, as the major technique for 
analyzing the set-theoretic relationships between the variables in this investigation. In 
section 5.1, the fuzzy-set technique is generally outlined according to the basic logic 
within this particular technique. In section 5.2, the first fuzzy-set analysis is carried 
out to obtain the necessary conditions for the degree of autonomy. After the first 
analysis, we will move on to select the negative cases of non-autonomous regions, 
and thereafter, the second analysis for sufficiency is employed.  
 
The answer as to why a fuzzy-set has been used in this study is that the technique is 
rather new within the discipline of social sciences and the study employed will test 
this method to its limits. The underlying idea is to show how this method works 
within comparative politics, especially in the field of autonomy. There are few studies 
where the technique has been used throughout the entire study.232 Some studies have 
been replicated using this technique, but this study shows how it could be applied in 
the field of comparative politics. Territorial autonomy could be seen as a sub-set of 
the universe of autonomies, which has been shown in a Venn-diagram earlier in the 
study. 
                                                                                                                                            
229 Geoff Bertram & Bernard Poirine (2007), Appendix 1, pp. 374-377 in Godfrey Baldacchino (ed.): A 
World of Islands, op.cit. 
230 See for example Charles C. Ragin (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
231 Charles C. Ragin (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
232 See e.g. Svend-Erik Skaaning (2007). ’Explaining post-communist respect for civil liberty: A multi-
method tests’, Journal of Business Research 60 (2007), pp. 493-500; Jon Kvist (1999). ‘Welfare 
Reform in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s: Using Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal 
Types’, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 231-252 and Paul Pennings (2003). ‘Beyond 
dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets’, 
European Journal of Political Research 42, pp. 541-567. 
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Some notes about the calibration technique, and why it is important to mention it in 
this study. The fuzzy scores represent the case-oriented focus on sets and set 
membership; at the same time, they are also variable-oriented, allowing degrees of 
membership, and they show fine-grained variations between the cases.233 The 
calibration gives the researcher the possibility of distinguishing between relevant and 
irrelevant variation. Set-theoretic principles include subset relationships, which are 
central to the analysis of necessity and sufficiency. The principles also give the 
opportunity to look at set-intersection, which is central to the study of cases as 
configurations (combinations), set-union (which is central to the examination of 
alternate paths to the same outcome) and truth tables (which are used to explain causal 
complexity).234 
 
In comparison to the logic of regression analysis, fuzzy-set takes combinatorial 
factors into account. In regression analysis, for instance, the researcher estimates 
which condition (independent variable) has most effect on the dependent variable. 
There is no possibility of obtaining a combination of factors, but what we achieve 
instead is a competition between the independent variables of which one has the most 
probable explanatory power for the outcome in question. The variables in the equation 
compete on equal terms.  
 
Regression analysis gives the net effects of all variables. It has been stated, by some 
authors, that the difference between regression methods and fuzzy-set should be seen 
as two totally contrasting approaches, i.e. we cannot test the same hypotheses while 
conducting these two methods for the same data.235 We should be aware of which 
research question we are attempting to answer. 
 
 
 
                                                 
233 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit. 
234 Ibid. 
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5.1 The Fuzzy-Set Approach 
 
Fuzzy-set is a method that combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
method is used in various disciplines, including everything from artificial intelligence 
to washing machines and stock markets.236 Fuzzy-set gives the researcher an 
opportunity to use an interpretive algebra, a language, which is half verbal / half 
conceptual and half mathematical / half analytical. Its greatest contribution for social 
scientists is its potential for enlivening, intensifying and extending the dialog between 
ideas and evidences in social research.237 
 
Fuzzy-set is derivative of set theory within mathematical sciences. The values used 
are always at an interval between 0.0 and 1.0.238 The value 1.0 indicates full 
membership in a class or set, while value 0.0 indicates full non-membership.239 It is 
the prerogative of the investigator to choose the values between 0 and 1, but it must 
always be done openly and explicitly so that other researchers can test and evaluate 
the entire fuzzy-set.240 Fuzzy-set implies both differences in kind and degree at the 
same time.241 The value 0.5 is applied as the benchmark between what is more in than 
out, and less than 0.5 is more out than in, according to a specific set.242 To construct a 
fuzzy-set it is necessary to specify qualitative benchmarks on a continuum (between 
0.0 and 1.0). This means that the researcher has to combine fuzzy values with 
substantive theoretical criteria. The method’s aim is to establish a better fit between 
                                                                                                                                            
235 See e.g. Aaron Katz, Matthias vom Hau and James Mahoney (2005). ‘Explaining the Great Reversal 
in Spanish America: Fuzzy-Set Analysis versus Regression Analysis’, Sociological Methods & 
Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 539-573. 
236 Charles C. Ragin (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, p. 3. 
237 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 4. 
238 Paul Pennings (2003). ‘Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the 
executive with fuzzy-sets’, European Journal of Political Research 2003, 42, p. 542. 
239 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 6. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 149 and Jon Kvist (1999). ‘Welfare Reform in the Nordic 
Countries in the 1990s: Using Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal Types’, Journal of 
European Social Policy, 9 (3), p. 234. 
242 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 157. 
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theory and data, which is otherwise impossible with more conventional 
techniques. The method enhances the dialog between ideas and evidence.243 
 
Fuzzy membership scores address the varying degrees to which different cases belong 
to sets, not how cases rank relative to each other on dimensions of open-ended 
variation. Fuzzy-sets pinpoint qualitative approaches while at the same time assessing 
varying degrees of membership between full inclusion and full exclusion. In this 
sense, a fuzzy-set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been calibrated to 
indicate the degree of membership in a defined set.244 
 
The method offers the researcher the possibility of studying both qualitative and 
quantitative variations simultaneously. As a tool, it enables us to decide if the changes 
are marginal in nature when it comes to counting differences in degrees, or 
fundamental when counting differences in kind.245 Fuzzy-sets are used for deciding 
conjuncture causation (combinations of conditions) for a specific outcome. The logic 
behind this is to find causal patterns (i.e. necessary and sufficient causal conditions) 
behind the variables for the dependent variable (the outcome).246 The method enables 
the researcher to model complex and diverse constellations of case aspects, and to 
assess set-theoretic relations.247 
 
The fuzzy values indicate the degree to which relevant cases belong and the range of 
categories that the researcher uses for describing and analyzing them. These fuzzy-set 
scores reflect the concepts that exist in theoretical discussions. The investigator is 
obliged to think in terms instead of variables e.g. financial security instead of income; 
dangerous neighborhoods instead of criminal rates; rich countries instead of GDP per 
capita etc.248 While fuzzy-set is closely related to theoretical concepts, these concepts 
can be manipulated in a number of ways and offer new possibilities for presenting and 
                                                 
243 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 160-162. 
244 Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005). ‘Fuzzy Sets and Social Research’, Sociological 
Methods & Research 2005, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 424. 
245 Jon Kvist (1999), op.cit., p. 235. 
246 Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 543. 
247 Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005), op.cit., p. 425. 
248 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 165-167. 
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evaluating social theories.249 The method is very diverse in itself, which reflects 
the many ways in which fuzzy set assignments can be obtained.250 There is no 
universal application of fuzzy-set. Instead, there are numerous ways in many different 
applications.  
 
In fuzzy-set, it is possible to use the same strategies as in Boolean algebra, but the 
functions are slightly different. Negation or minimization is used to minimize with 1, 
e.g. fuzzy membership in non-A=1-fuzzy membership in the set of A. The logical and 
can be established by taking the minimum value of every case in a set where there is 
interaction between different values. For example, if a country’s value in poor 
countries is 0.34 and its value in democratic countries is 0.91, then the value in 
combination of both poor and democratic countries is 0.34. The logical or shows the 
maximum value in combination of every cases’ membership in a union. For example, 
if a country has the value 0.15 in the set of democratic countries and 0.93 in the set of 
developed countries, then the value 0.93 indicates the set of countries that are either 
democratic or developed.251  
 
The fuzzy values can be seen as a vector with 2k corners, where k gives the number of 
attributes, or conditions, which are available in a property space. With two fuzzy-sets 
there are four corners, with three fuzzy-sets there are eight corners and so on. The 
cases can vary in degree in the crisply defined locations (between fully in and fully 
out), and have partial membership in every location and in some cases even vary in 
degree according to membership in the outcome.252 In this study, I have eight possible 
conditions, i.e. 28 = 256 attributes or combinations in total. This implies that there are 
many combinations without empirical cases. This suggests that it is necessary to 
reduce the availability of possible combinations. 
 
Fuzzy-set is useful for identifying, categorizing, and measuring complex patterns of 
similarities and differences between the cases. The study of diversity is the main 
                                                 
249 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 171. 
250 Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005), op.cit., p. 429. 
251 Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006). Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in the Social Sciences, 
p. 5 and Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 172-173. 
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strength in this type of method, while it is possible with partial membership.253 
The total of logically possible groupings is also possible to calculate, when all 
separate conditions, all supplementary conditions and all two - or - more 
combinations of conditions are taken into account. The formula is 3k-1, where k again 
represents the number of conditions. This means that with three conditions we would 
have 26 possible groupings, with four conditions 80 and with five conditions as many 
as 242 groupings.254 This could be used for multiple tests of sufficiency.   
 
There is a degree of arbitrariness when it comes to the decision about whether or not 
one set is a subset of another. This is due to the fact that the fuzzy scores are elastic. It 
is said that a condition, for instance, is necessary when the value is consistently higher 
than the outcome (the outcome is then a subset of the condition); and a condition is 
seen sufficient when its value is consistently lower than the outcome (the condition is 
then a subset of the outcome). The logic can be illustrated by an example, it can be 
assumed that all politicians are popular, but that popularity alone might not be 
sufficient for success. In order to be successful, politicians must also obey party 
discipline, avoid scandals etc. Hence, popularity is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for success.255 It is said that necessary and sufficient conditions constitute a 
deterministic approach, while statistical analysis is more probabilistic by nature.256 
 
Fuzzy-set values offer a parsimonious way to identify necessary and sufficient 
conditions, while the values give the opportunity to apply the subset principle. When 
a case is necessary, then it is the outcome of a subset of the cause (i.e. Yi ≤ Xi, or if 
the outcome is present, then the cause is also necessary). In a case of sufficiency, it is 
the reverse: the cause is a subset of the outcome (i.e. Xi ≤ Yi, or if the cause is present, 
then the outcome is also present).257 
 
                                                                                                                                            
252 Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 183 and 194. 
253 Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., pp. 545-546. 
254 Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007). Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und 
Fuzzy Sets. Opladen &Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, pp. 63-64. 
255 Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 554. 
256 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2005). ‘Two-Level Theories and Fuzzy-Set Analysis’, 
Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 499. 
257 Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 554. 
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The weakness of fuzzy-set is that it demands a high degree of correspondence 
between concepts and fuzzy membership values. This means that it necessitates a 
close observation of analytical constructions of theoretical concepts and empirical 
evidence, which are both used to indicate membership in the sets. Different criteria 
are used to establish qualitative benchmarks and translations of data to fuzzy intervals 
and verbal qualifiers.258 If labels of sets are changed, the calibration should also 
change according to new anchors. Different sets require different scores and labels. 
 
Most concepts are vague in political science and hard to define or categorize. Fuzzy-
set is a proposed method for managing vagueness. The method helps the researcher to 
be more explicit about what he or she means and it can be used to help make analyses 
less fuzzy, when the vagueness is managed formally.259 Smithson argues that fuzzy-
set could be appropriate to use, along with statistical methods, for evaluating the 
results.260  
 
There seems to be no clear limitations with fuzzy-set, since the method could be used 
in a number of ways. The only limitation is the scale, since every variable has to be 
between 0.0 and 1.0. The researcher decides which values to use and, simultaneously, 
which can be seen as weaknesses. A great deal of work is determined by the 
researcher.  
 
Some critics have disparaged the use of QCA for not being able to distinguish a real 
model from a random model and for being too deterministic in its approach.261 Other 
critical points are related to missing variables.262 The critique is largely misguided 
because in QCA, there is no explicit connection of randomness, whether in the model, 
in the real world, or in the conception of causality. Neither is any assumption made 
                                                 
258 Jon Kvist (1999), op.cit., pp. 236-237. 
259 Jan Verkuilen (2005). ‘Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis’, Sociological Methods & 
Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 462-464. 
260 Michael Smithson (2005). ‘Fuzzy Set Inclusion: Linking Fuzzy Set Methods With Mainstream 
Techniques’, Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 432. 
261 Stanley Lieberson (2004). ‘Comments on the Use and Utility of QCA’, pp. 13-14 in Qualitative 
Methods, Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Organized Section on Qualitative 
Methods, Fall 2004, Vol. 2, No. 2. 
262 Jason Seawright (2004). ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis vis-a-vis Regression’, pp. 14-17 in 
Qualitative Methods, op.cit. 
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regarding variables (conditions) outside the model.263 The critique related to the 
discussion of omitted variables is not only specific to QCA; it is applicable to any 
empirical approach that attempts to explain a phenomenon through its 
characteristics.264   
 
The possibilities with fuzzy-set seem, in some ways, to be almost endless. It is up to 
the researcher to use this method according to his or her own judgment. The analysis 
should always be done openly so that the inter-subjectivity criterion is maintained. 
Fuzzy-set could be useful to use in combination with statistical methods, or seen as an 
alternative to conventional methods.  
 
5.2 Necessary Conditions 
 
First, an analysis with the necessary conditions is conducted. This is due to the 
discussion concerning selecting on the dependent variable. In section 3.1.1, it was 
outlined that selecting on the dependent variable can be seen as a tool for determining 
the necessary conditions for a positive outcome. The first part of the analysis only 
takes into account the territorial autonomies, and this is precisely the technique that is 
used in order to be able to reduce important explanatory factors for the next step in the 
investigation. It has also been stated by Mahoney and Goertz (2004)265 that research 
designs focused on necessary conditions are the only partial exception, where a 
researcher can test necessary cause hypotheses by selecting only cases with positive 
outcomes. 
 
This technique can also be illustrated by the fact that it is possible to distinguish 
between degree and kind in this context. For degree, we only need to take the 
                                                 
263 Gisèle De Meur, Benoît Rihoux and Sakura Yamasaki (2008). ‘Addressing the Critiques of QCA’, 
p. 159 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): Configurational Comparative Methods, Applied 
Social Research Methods Series, Volume 51. Sage Publications. 
264 Ibid. See also Benoît Rihoux (2003). ‘Bridging the Gap between the Qualitative and Quantitative 
Worlds? A Retrospective and Prospective View on Qualitative Comparative Analysis’, Field Methods, 
Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 351-365. The article discusses the major critiques regarding the QCA techniques 
overall. 
265 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). ‘The Possibility Principle: choosing negative cases in 
comparative research’, COMPASSS Working Paper WP 2004-19, 30 January 2004, can be accessed at 
<http://www.compasss.org/Mahoney_Goertz2004.pdf>. 
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territorial autonomies into account, but for the analysis of kind we have to include 
negative cases of non-autonomous regions. Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
unravel the conditions for territorial autonomy proper. In the next part of the analysis 
I take non-autonomous regions into account. See chapters 6 and 7.  
 
A hypothetical example would be: If we were interested in investigating the degree of 
democracy, the point of departure would be to choose countries where democracy 
occurs. Non-democracies or authoritarian states, which lack any form of democracy, 
would then be unnecessary to have within the investigation, since they do not belong 
to the set of democracies. However, to obtain the conditions as to why the democracy 
occurs, we need to include non-democracies or authoritarian states within the study. 
This is the same logic as applied here. 
 
To be able to evaluate trivial and relevant necessary conditions there are some tests 
that can be conducted. A trivial necessary condition is one that is present in all cases 
in the universe of analysis, both when the dependent variable is present and absent.266 
In set-theoretic terms, this means that X is a necessary condition for Y if Y is a subset 
of X. It is also stated that a maximally important necessary condition is also a 
sufficient condition at the same time. A trivial necessary condition is when X always 
occurs, and an irrelevant necessary condition is when Y never occurs.267 A necessary 
and a sufficient condition in fuzzy logic is one that lies on the X=Y diagonal line in a 
plot. The relevant necessary conditions are those where all the observations lie on or 
just below the diagonal line.268 
 
The assessment of analyzing the territorial autonomies is done with the fs/QCA 
program. All the variables in this study also have to be in a truth table, showing the 
degrees of membership in every subset in relation to the outcome. The independent 
variables that have been operationalized in the previous chapter are: democracy (D), 
historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), natural resources (N), 
                                                 
266 Gary Goertz (2003). ‘Assessing the importance of necessary or sufficient conditions in fuzzy-set 
social science’, COMPASSS Working Paper WP 2003-7, 11 June, 2003, can be accessed at 
<http://www.compasss.org/goertz2003.pdf>. 
267 Gary Goertz (2003), op.cit. 
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existence of regional movements/parties and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic 
distinctiveness (ED), size (S) and economic viability (E). The dependent variable or 
the outcome is the degree of autonomy (A). The following Table 12 shows the 
summary. 
 
Table 12: The Fuzzy-Set Truth Table for Degree of Autonomy 
 
Autonomy D H G N P ED S E A 
Åland Islands (Finland) 0.99 0.67 0.04 0 1 0.33 0.06 1 0.82 
American Samoa (US) 0.99 0.67 0.98 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.05 0.67 0.68 
American Virgin Islands (US) 0.99 0.33 0.17 0.67 0.66 0.33 0.05 1 0.50 
Andalusia (Spain) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.67 1 0 1 1 0.90 
Anguilla (UK) 0.99 0.67 0.90 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.05 0.67 0.50 
Aruba (NL) 0.99 0.33 0.94 1 0.50 0.67 0.06 1 0.68 
Azores (Portugal) 0.99 1 0.11 0.67 0.66 0 0.16 1 0.68 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.18 1 0.90 
Basque Country (Spain) 0.99 0.33 0.04 0.67 1 0.33 0.53 1 0.90 
Bermuda (UK) 0.99 0.67 0.79 0.33 0.66 0.67 0.05 1 0.82 
Bougainville (PNG) 0.73 0.67 0.06 0.67 0.83 0 0.23 0 0.68 
British Virgin Islands (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.90 0 0.50 0.33 0.05 1 0.50 
Canary Islands (Spain) 0.99 0.67 0.10 0.33 0.66 0 0.49 1 0.90 
Catalonia (Spain) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0 1 0.33 1 1 0.90 
Cayman Islands (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.93 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.05 1 0.82 
Cook Islands (NZ) 0.99 0.33 0.31 0 0.66 0.33 0.06 0.67 0.95 
Corsica (France) 0.99 0 0.06 0 1 0.33 0.06 1 0.14 
Crimea (Ukraine) 0.73 0.33 0.05 0.67 0.66 0.33 0.44 0.33 0.14 
Falkland Islands (UK) 0.99 0.67 0.99 0.33 0.16 0 0.05 1 0.50 
Faroe Islands (DK) 0.99 0.33 0.08 1 1 0.33 0.08 1 0.90 
French Polynesia (France) 0.99 0.67 1 1 1 0.67 0.06 1 0.82 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0 0.66 0.33 0.15 1 0.95 
Gagauzia (Moldova) 0.50 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.66 0 0.34 0.33* 0.90 
Galicia (Spain) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.33 1 0.33 0.75 1 0.90 
Gibraltar (UK) 0.99 0.67 0.11 0 0.50 0.67 0.05 1 0.50 
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 0.08 0.33 0.04 1 0.66 0 0.29 0.33* 0.05 
Greenland (DK) 0.99 0.67 0.26 1 0.83 0.67 0.08 1 0.90 
                                                                                                                                            
268 Ibid. 
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Guam (US) 0.99 1 1 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.05 1 0.23 
Guernsey (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.05 1 0.95 
Hong Kong (China) 0.50 0.67 0.12 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.06 1 0.90 
Isle of Man (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.04 0 0.50 0.33 0.05 1 0.90 
Jeju Island (South Korea) 0.98 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.33 0 0.05 1 0.23 
Jersey (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.50 0 0.05 1 0.90 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) 0.01 0 0.06 1 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.33* 0.35 
Kosovo (Serbia) 0.08 0.33 0.04 0 0.83 1 1 0.33 0.50 
Macau (China) 0.14 0.67 0.12 0 0.50 0.67 0.05 1 0.90 
Madeira (Portugal) 0.99 0.67 0.07 0.33 0.33 0 0.16 1 0.68 
Mayotte (France) 0.99 0.67 0.91 0 0.66 1 0.06 0.67 0.08 
Mindanao (Philippines) 0.73 1 0.04 1 0.83 0.33 0.24 0.33* 0.14 
Montserrat (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.91 0 0.50 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.50 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) 0.08 0.67 0.04 0.67 0.33 0 0.44 0.67* 0.05 
Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 0.99 0.67 0.95 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.10 1 0.68 
New Caledonia (France) 0.99 1 1 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.06 1 0.95 
Niue (NZ) 0.99 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.50 1 0.05 0.67 0.95 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 0.99 0.67 0.14 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.05 1 0.50 
North Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
0.73 0.67 0.04 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.41 0.33* 0.14 
Northern Ireland (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0 1 0.67 0.21 1 0.14 
Northern Mariana Islands (US) 0.99 0.67 1 0.33 0.66 0.67 0.05 1 0.82 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) 0.50 0.67 0.04 0 0.33 0.33 0.56 0 0.14 
Pitcairn Islands (UK) 0.99 0.33 1 1 0.16 0.67 0.05 0.33* 0.23 
Puerto Rico (US) 0.99 1 0.16 0.67 1 0.67 0.10 1 0.95 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 0.73 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.33 0 0.25 0.67 0.35 
Sardinia (Italy) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.67 1 0.33 0.22 1 0.95 
Scotland (UK) 0.99 0 0.05 0.67 1 0 0.88 1 0.82 
Sicily (Italy) 0.99 0.33 0.05 1 1 0 0.90 1 0.95 
South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
0.73 0.67 0.04 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.74 0.33* 0.14 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) 0.99 0.67 0.87 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.68 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) 0.99 0.67 0.42 0.33 0.66 0 0.05 0.67 0.50 
Tokelau (NZ) 0.99 0.33 0.39 0 0.16 0.67 0.05 0.33 0.68 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.12 1 0.95 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 0.99 1 0.89 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.05 1 0.90 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 0.99 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.05 1 0.95 
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Wales (UK) 0.99 0.33 0.04 0.67 1 0.33 0.47 1 0.08 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 0.73 0.67 1 0 0.66 0.67 0.05 0.67 0.23 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 0.50 0.67 0.04 0.33 0.83 0.33 0.18 0 0.82 
* Estimations performed by the author. 
 
The first step will be to explore the subset relationships between each independent 
and the dependent variable. This could be said to be a kind of “bivariate” analysis. 
With fuzzy-set, a subset relation is indicated when membership scores in one set are 
consistently less than or equal to their corresponding membership scores in another 
set.269 This is done with simple XY-plots. It is also possible to use a combination of 
causal conditions as well, according to the logical and/or and negation strategy. This 
is the next step in the analysis and it is simply done to be able to say something about 
the necessary conditions in this sense. An argument for causal necessity can be 
supported when it can be demonstrated that instances of an outcome (dependent 
variable) constitute a subset of instances of a causal condition (independent 
variable).270 Figure 4 illustrates this fuzzy-set relation. In this figure, the outcome (Y) 
is a subset of the causal condition (X). This means that all Yi values are less than or 
equal to their corresponding Xi values. 
 
Figure 4: Fuzzy Subset Relation with Perfect Consistency 
 
 
                                                 
269 See Charles C. Ragin (2000, 2008) op.cit. 
270 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., p. 53. 
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Membership in Causal Condition (X) 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 1.00 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.58 
 
The figure shows a perfect necessary condition with 100 percent consistency in this 
case. This has been done with hypothetical data only, in order to demonstrate perfect 
consistency. It is necessary to think in triangles in fuzzy-set, while using XY-plots. 
On the right-hand side underneath the line we have a necessary cause, even if the 
cases are scattered around in the triangle. 
 
In my analysis, I first tested the relationship between the degree of membership in the 
set of democracy (D) and the degree of membership in the set of autonomy (A) 
according to the same logic applied previously.  
 
Comparing the democracy ratings with degree of autonomy from the previous 
chapters supplies a notion of how the scores relate to each other. Beginning with 
Australia, and its Norfolk Island region, it can be seen that a high degree of 
democracy does not always relate to a high degree of autonomy. Norfolk Island is 
placed in the middle of the scale when it comes to the degree of autonomy. Azerbaijan 
has a low degree of democracy and its region Nakhichevan also has a low degree of 
autonomy, so there seems to be a connection between a low degree of democracy and 
a low degree of autonomy in this case. China has a low score for degree of 
democracy, but Hong Kong has a better score for that particular degree. The 
interesting situation here is that both Hong Kong and Macau, both regions belonging 
to China, score high on degree of autonomy. The situation is reversed since a low 
degree of democracy here is correlated with a high degree of autonomy. Denmark has 
a high degree of democracy, which corresponds to a high degree of autonomy, in the 
regions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. East Timor has a quite low degree of 
democracy, and here the relation to the region of Oecussi Ambeno is straightforward. 
The low degree of democracy is correlated with a low degree of autonomy in the 
region. Finland scores high on degree of democracy and its region, the Åland Islands, 
have a high degree of autonomy, so here the connection between high degree of 
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democracy and high degree of autonomy can be visualized. France scores high on 
degree of democracy, but only two of its regions (French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia) have high degree of autonomy. The other regions (Corsica, Mayotte, St. 
Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna) score low on degree of autonomy. 
Therefore, there is no clear relation between degree of democracy and degree of 
autonomy which all these examples illustrate. Both a high and a low degree of 
democracy can lead to both a high and a low degree of autonomy. The assumption 
cannot be verified or falsified according to this description. The fuzzy-set analysis 
will give us a more accurate picture of the situation described here. 
 
Figure 5: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Democracy 
 
     
Democracy  
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.94 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.68 
 
The figure shows the relationship between the two sets where the degree of autonomy 
is the outcome and democracy is seen as the condition for the outcome. The set-
theoretic consistency shows a score of 0.94 (or 94 percent consistent). Consistency 
scores should be as close to 1.0 (perfect consistency) as possible.271 The consistency 
assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in showing the condition 
                                                 
271 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit. 
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thought to be necessary for the outcome. The set-theoretic coverage, on the other 
hand, displays the relevance of the necessary condition.272 Consequently, there is little 
point in looking at the coverage scores if consistency scores are low. In general, the 
level of consistency in correspondence with the subset principle used to identify 
necessary conditions should preferably exceed 0.85 or be at least 0.90.273  
 
It is, of course, possible to calculate the consistency level by hand. For calculating the 
consistency level for necessary conditions, the following formula is used: 
 
Consistency for Necessary Conditions (Yi ≤ Xi) = ∑ (min (Xi, Yi)) ⁄ ∑ (Yi),  
 
where “min” indicates the selection of the lower value of the two values. When all Yi 
values are less than or equal to their corresponding Xi values this formula returns a 
value of 1. When many Yi exceed their corresponding Xi values by wide margins it 
returns a value less than 0.5.274 If we calculate the subset of the two conditions we 
receive the value of 0.94 (i.e. 38.32 ⁄ 40.64 = 0.94).  
 
The coverage level could also be calculated by hand according to the following 
formula:  
 
Coverage/Relevance of Necessary Conditions (Yi ≤ Xi) = ∑ (min (Xi, Yi)) ⁄ ∑ (Xi), 
 
where “min” again refers to the lower value of the two values and it is the same 
formula as for consistency, but the denominator is changed to ∑ (Xi) instead of ∑ 
(Yi). A very low coverage corresponds to an empirically irrelevant or even 
                                                 
272 Ibid. 
273 Svend-Erik Skaaning (2007). ‘Explaining post-communist respect for civil liberty: A multi-methods 
test’, Journal of Business Research, op.cit., p. 495. See also Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius 
Wagemann (2007), op.cit., p. 213. 
274 Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007), op.cit., p. 213 and see also Charles C. Ragin 
(2006), ‘Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage’, Political 
Analysis, Volume 14, Number 3, Summer 2006, pp. 291-310. 
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meaningless necessary condition.275 If we do this calculation for the subset 
relation of democracy and autonomy we receive the value 0.68 (i.e. 38.32 / 56 = 
0.68).  
 
As can be seen from the figure, degree of autonomy can be seen as a subset of 
democracy, which means that democracy is necessary for autonomy to occur. 
Necessity is shown when the cases are on the right below the diagonal in the plot. The 
points represent the cases. Sometimes the same point illustrates several cases at the 
same time, since there might be cases with the same combination. Democracy 
indicates that it is a superset of the outcome. Recalling the discussion about 
democracy in section 4.1., the necessary condition established is in line with the 
theoretical arguments about the relationship between these conditions. Most authors 
have noticed this relationship and it is also valid empirically as shown in this figure. 
Since a necessary condition exists, the causal condition of democracy can be omitted 
from the analysis of the sufficiency of causal combinations.  
 
Let us then proceed to looking at the subset relationship between historical strategic 
importance (H) and degree of autonomy (A).   
 
Comparing the degree of autonomy with the historical strategic importance gives us a 
representation of how historical events have affected the kind of autonomy each 
territory has received. Looking first at the six regions with the highest score on the 
historical strategic factor, we obtain the following pattern: three of the regions (New 
Caledonia, Puerto Rico, and Turks and Caicos Islands) all have a high degree of 
autonomy, but the other three regions (Azores, Guam, and Mindanao) have a lower 
degree of autonomy. The Azores are above average, while Guam and Mindanao are at 
the lower end of the spectrum. Looking then at the three regions with no historical 
importance, we can see that it is only Scotland that has a high degree of autonomy, 
while the other regions (Corsica and Karakalpakstan) have a low degree of autonomy. 
                                                 
275 Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007), op.cit., p. 214 and Charles C. Ragin (2006), 
op.cit. 
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The historical strategic factor does not give any clear image of the relationship 
between historical events and the degree of autonomy.  
 
Figure 6: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
History 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.68 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.78 
 
This figure shows that the cases are distributed quite equally between the two sets. As 
has been argued in section 4.2.1, historical events have played a major role in the 
progression to autonomy, but this factor should be viewed in combination with other 
factors, since history in itself does not explain the degree of autonomy as such. 
Different paths leading towards autonomy will be scrutinized further on in the study.  
 
It is then necessary to consider the appearance of the relationship between the degree 
of autonomy (A) and geographical distance (G). 
 
When looking at the most remote areas, we observe the following relationship 
between long distance and degree of autonomy. French Polynesia, New Caledonia 
and Northern Mariana Islands all score high on degree of autonomy while the other 
remote areas such as Guam, Pitcairn Islands, and Wallis and Futuna all have a low 
score as to the degree of autonomy. If we then look at regions which are located near 
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the metropolitan center, we receive the following picture. Among the twelve 
regions situated closest to the metropolitan power, the Åland Islands, the Basque 
Country, Gagauzia, Guernsey, Isle of Man and Zanzibar all have a high score as to the 
degree of autonomy while the other regions score low on degree of autonomy. There 
is no clear evidence that a considerable distance should lead to a high degree of 
autonomy. It seems that it is almost the reverse. 
 
Figure 7: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Geographical Distance 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.37 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.70 
 
The figure shows that most cases are positioned above the diagonal on the left hand 
side, which implies that geographical distance might be considered as an irrelevant 
necessary condition in this context. The consistency is at 0.37 and can therefore be 
considered very low.  
 
If we then look at the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and the 
possession of natural resources (N) we receive the following picture: 
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Figure 8: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Natural Resources 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.50 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.74 
 
The plot of the graph shows an uncertain relationship between the two sets. It could 
be argued that possession of natural resources could be a somewhat necessary 
condition, but it is hard to estimate when looking at the figure. The possession of 
natural resources seems to have no effect on the degree of autonomy in this sense. 
 
Proceeding on to the mapping of the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) 
and the existence of regional parties/movements and/or separatist groups (P) the 
following plot has been created: 
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Figure 9: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Parties 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.78 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.77 
 
The plot shows a consistency level of 0.78 and a coverage level of 0.77. The cases are 
scattered quite evenly in the figure. If we look at the relationship between a high 
degree of autonomy and a high degree of political mobilization, we can see that 
regions scoring 1, in the above figure, are in most cases those that also have a high 
score as to the degree of autonomy. It is only Anguilla, Corsica, Northern Ireland and 
Wales that have a lower degree of autonomy. Political activism in the form of various 
movements seems to have somewhat of an impact on the degree of autonomy. 
 
The following figure shows the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and 
ethnic distinctiveness (ED). This relation has in theory a very important impact in 
order for autonomy to occur, but it can also be questioned as to whether it is 
empirically relevant. 
 
When comparing the differences between ethnic distinctiveness and the variations in 
the degree of autonomy, it can be noticed that the absence or a low degree of ethnic 
diversity seems to lead, in most cases, to a higher degree of autonomy than otherwise. 
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There are, of course, exceptions, but a high degree of ethnic diversity seems to 
lead to a low degree of autonomy. This implies that ethnic distinctiveness might not 
be as crucial as has been argued by many authors in previous investigations. Figure 10 
demonstrates the relationship. 
 
Figure 10: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Ethnicity 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.48 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.78 
 
This figure shows that ethnic distinctiveness might be seen as a somewhat irrelevant 
necessary condition for autonomy. Most cases are in the upper left hand side of the 
figure. It remains to be seen if this variable is relevant when testing combinations of 
factors.  
 
The next figure illustrates the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and 
size (S). The plot of the graph below shows the relationship. 
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Figure 11: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Size 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.28 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.76 
 
The figure shows that size could be seen as an irrelevant necessary condition. Size 
does not seem to have any impact on the variations in the degree of autonomy, since a 
small size can also lead to a high degree of autonomy as well as a large size. Size may 
be significant, but again a combination of causal conditions testing sufficiency is 
needed to be able to explain the relationship. In theory size is of importance in several 
areas of research, but in the field of autonomy it is stated that size is relevant in 
combination with other factors. See section 4.3.2.  
 
The final necessity to be tested was that of the economic viability.  
 
When looking at the relationship between the various income groups and the degree 
of autonomy, it is clear that most of the regions belonging to the high-income group 
also have a high degree of autonomy. There are naturally, some exceptions such as 
Corsica, Guam, Jeju Island, Northern Ireland and Wales. These regions are weak 
autonomies, but nevertheless belong to the highest income group. The regions 
belonging to the lowest income group show some diversity between each other. 
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Bougainville and Zanzibar score high on the degree of autonomy while Oecussi 
Ambeno is seen as a weak autonomy. The GDP/capita does seem to have an impact 
on the various degrees of autonomy, but a further exploration is needed. Plot 12 
reveals the relationship between degree of autonomy (A) and economy (E). 
 
Figure 12: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and 
Economy 
 
 
Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.91 
Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.71 
 
The plot of the graph shows us that a necessity is evident between the degree of 
autonomy and economic viability. It seems that economic viability is a superset of the 
outcome in this case. Economic viability can then be omitted from the analysis of the 
sufficiency of causal combinations.  
 
The negation of every variable should be tested in order to see if there might be 
necessary conditions according to this alternative method. In this context, while 
running the same analysis with the negation of every variable, no necessary condition 
was found. The only variable reaching a quite high consistency is that of a small size 
(s) with a consistency at 0.85 and coverage of 0.69. Since no variable reached the 
consistency of 0.90, no necessary condition was found.  
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To summarize this exercise it can be said that two possible necessary conditions 
have been found for the degree of autonomy and those are the degree of democracy 
and economic viability. Other conditions must be tested according to the sufficiency 
of causal combinations. The two necessary conditions differ in a sense, since 
democracy has both a strong theoretical and empirical base, while economic viability 
is based on a theoretically weaker position. 
 
There were initially eight conditions overall, and this implied that the number of 
possible combinations were 28 = 256 combinations in total. This, of course, told us 
that there were many combinations without empirical cases. After the necessity test, 
we can say that there are only six conditions left to be tested. The possible amount of 
combinations is then reduced to 26 = 64 combinations in total. There is, therefore, a 
risk that only two cases are to be found that share the same combination, and all the 
other cases represent one combination each. This appears to be true when testing the 
total combinations. It is only the pair of Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta that 
shares the same combination and outcome in this context (see table 12). Consequently 
it became necessary to further reduce the possibility of too many combinations, and 
when reduced to five conditions 25 = 32 total combinations were obtained. It could be 
argued that this is still too many combinations, since the risk remains of having only a 
few cases in every combination.  
 
The question then arose of which condition should then be excluded from the 
analysis. One possibility was to only choose the conditions that have a strong 
theoretically grounded position in the literature, and leave out some of the more 
empirically based conditions. It could be argued that the conditions that have a strong 
base in theory should be the most vital conditions for autonomy. Conversely, some 
more empirical conditions could lead to new options that had not been evaluated 
before. Since fuzzy-set is argued to aim at a better fit between theory and empirical 
data, we choose the most theoretically relevant conditions in this instance. This choice 
is also in line with the arguments made by some methodologists. It is argued that to be 
able to test the theory in question, we need those independent variables that constitute 
the core of the theory for the phenomenon, which usually comprise of five or fewer 
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independent variables.276 In consequence, the possession of natural resources (N) 
has been excluded from the analysis. The conditions to be tested for the sufficiency of 
causal combinations are: historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance 
(G), existence of regional parties/movements and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic 
distinctiveness (ED) and size (S). The assessment of the sufficiency test was carried 
out after the selection of the control group had been accomplished.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
276 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2006). ‘Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle’ p.186 
in Gary Goertz (2006). Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
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6 The Selection of the Control Group 
 
The selection of the control group had to be made in an appropriate manner. The 
problem was how to choose between relevant and irrelevant cases. Fortunately, there 
were some suggestions in the literature about selecting cases where the principles 
followed could be found. According to Mahoney and Goertz, one departure would be 
to follow the so-called Possibility Principle.277 According to this principle, cases 
should be chosen where the outcome was of interest, i.e. territorial autonomy, as one 
possibility.278 Cases where the outcome is impossible are irrelevant. The Possibility 
Principle then states that the negative cases should be those where the outcome has a 
real possibility of occurring. Cases that lack both the cause and the outcome are, of 
course, irrelevant, since the hypothesis then cannot be tested. Furthermore, the Rule of 
Inclusion tells us that cases are relevant if their value on at least one independent 
variable is positively related to the outcome of interest.279 The Rule of Inclusion 
means that an outcome should be seen as possible if at least one independent variable 
of the theory under investigation predicts its occurrence. The negative (or control) 
cases are used to test the theory in question.280 In this context, we tested which 
conditions lead towards territorial autonomy proper. It is assumed that there are 
various paths leading to the outcome, so a combination of conditions is therefore of 
interest. As has been stated earlier, the five conditions of historical strategic 
importance (H), geographical distance (G), existence of regional parties/movements 
and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED) and size (S) constitute the 
core of the theory in this context. These five conditions are seen relevant for territorial 
autonomy to occur together with the already stated necessary conditions of democracy 
(D) and economic viability (E). We have to remember that every condition defined as 
necessary, in effect, is also included in every sufficient combination. In set theoretic 
                                                 
277 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). ‘The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 653-
669. 
278 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2006). ‘Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle’ p. 
178 in Gary Goertz (2006), op.cit. See also James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). ‘The Possibility 
Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research’, op.cit. 
279 Gary Goertz and Mahoney (2006), op.cit., p. 186. 
280 Gary Goertz and Joseph Hewitt (2006). ‘Concepts and Selecting (on) the Dependent Variable’, p. 
159 in Gary Goertz (2006), op.cit. 
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terms, if for example AB is sufficient for Y, and C is necessary, the pattern is AB 
← Y ← C.281 
 
Another approach would be to use the Rule of Exclusion. The Rule of Exclusion 
provides a tool for categorizing an observation as irrelevant if it possesses a value on 
a variable that is known from previous research to make an outcome of interest 
impossible.282 This rule is used in conjunction with one or more independent variables 
that have already been tested and established as variables that can be eliminated. 
Since the theory under investigation has not yet been tested, this approach is not 
applicable in this circumstance. 
 
To be able to apply the Possibility Principle within fuzzy-set analysis, two general 
steps can be followed. First, since the interest lies to test whether the variables are 
jointly sufficient for the outcome, we can apply the AND-to-OR Replacement Rule.283 
This is the fuzzy version of the Rule of Inclusion. At least one independent variable is 
present in the combination. It is the highest value of the independent variables that is 
then taken into account, according to the logical or, where the maximum value is in 
focus. Second, the next step is to decide and justify the exact threshold or cut-off 
point at which the outcome is considered possible. In practice, one usually has to set 
this threshold at a fairly high level (e.g., > 0.50) to ensure that at least one 
independent variable is clearly present in all cases.284 A lower threshold could be 
considered, if it serves the purpose better, i.e. if there are reasons to believe that a 
higher threshold will exclude too many cases as irrelevant.285 
 
Possible cases would be island regions and land-locked regions that do not have a 
special status within their countries. The regions should be at the highest 
administrative level within their states but they should not meet the definition of 
territorial autonomy used in the investigation. Island regions are chosen since 
evidences show that most territorial autonomies in the world are de facto islands (44 
                                                 
281 E-mail conversation with Charles C. Ragin 9 April 2008. 
282 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), op.cit., p. 658. 
283 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), op.cit., p. 659. 
284 Ibid. 
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out of 65). This implies that island regions seem to have an ability to develop into 
an asymmetrical form of government more often than land-locked areas. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that some of the important explanatory factors are available for the 
island regions. Some regions might have played a role as former colonies or have 
been military outposts for their metropolitan states. They might lie on the periphery 
and therefore a specific identity might have been established. Island regions would 
also be small in size and so forth. Some land-locked regions should also be chosen to 
uphold the relationship between the different forms of areas. A smaller amount of 
land-locked regions in respect to island regions was selected, since the proportion of 
land-locked regions is smaller than that of island regions within the investigation. The 
same reasons should apply as for island regions. Another aspect to remember is that 
one of the two necessary conditions has to be fulfilled. This means that the regions 
had to be chosen from either a democratic environment or because of economic 
viability. 
 
In a previous dissertation about island autonomy, only island autonomies and islands 
without autonomy were chosen according to the criteria that the islands were to be 
found on the sub-national level, but above the municipal level within the states.286 
Islands without autonomy were considered regions without any special status in this 
study. An article about conditions for island autonomy shows a sample group of non-
autonomous islands where the selection has been conducted as a random group with 
as wide a dispersion over different parts of the world as possible.287 A conference 
paper about microstates and their decentralized systems shows that among the 43 
microstates in the world, ten states have decentralized systems of which four are 
federal states.288 These lists from a previous dissertation, the article and the 
conference paper formed the basis for selecting the cases for my purpose in this 
investigation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
285 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), op.cit. 
286 Pär M. Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 34. 
287 Maria Ackrén and Pär M. Olausson (2008). ‘Condition(s) for Island Autonomy’, International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, pp. 227-258. 
288 Dag Anckar (2008). ‘Decentraliserade litenheter. En kartläggning och en förklaring’. Conference 
Paper for the XV Nordic Congress in Political Science, Tromsø, Norway, 6-9 August 2008. 
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One aspect of importance when choosing the negative cases in my context was, of 
course, to follow the characteristics mentioned in section 3.3. The non-autonomous 
regions should be regions with a weak form of distribution of power. They should 
possess internal functions only, and they should be directly under the national 
jurisdiction within the state and have no involvement in amendment procedures, 
concerning the constitution or other statutes or acts. Furthermore, they should lack or 
have negligible abilities to impose taxes of their own. This means that the regions 
should score 0 on the degree of autonomy. As mentioned earlier in the study, two 
such cases had already been found, i.e. Gorno-Badakshan (in Tajikistan) and 
Nakhichevan (in Azerbaijan). To be able to outline the sufficient conditions, several 
cases that score 0 on the dependent variable were needed, and a possible number of 
cases for this purpose would be approximately fifteen cases. Ten of the cases should 
then constitute island regions and five land-locked areas to be able to have the same 
proportion as in the set of territorial autonomy. The non-autonomous regions are 
described in a superficial manner since they are only considered as a control 
mechanism, enabling the analysis of sufficiency in this context. 
 
6.1 Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
The microstate of Antigua and Barbuda in the Caribbean is divided into six parishes 
and two dependencies: Barbuda and Redonda. According to the constitution of 
Antigua and Barbuda, there has to be a Council for Barbuda, which acts as the local 
government on the island. The Parliament of the country decides the functions and 
membership of the Council of Barbuda. The national parliament may also alter any 
provisions of the Barbuda Local Government Act from 1976.289 This means that 
Barbuda only deals with internal matters specific to the island and acts as a region in 
relation to the national government. Barbuda will be considered as one of the possible 
cases for territorial autonomy. The other dependency of Redonda is an uninhabited 
island.  
 
                                                 
289 The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda <http://www.ab.gov.ag/gov_v2/shared/constituion.html>, 
accessed from the Internet 2 May 2008. 
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Denmark has two autonomous islands as has been mentioned in the set of 
territorial autonomies (i.e. the Faroe Islands and Greenland). Metropolitan Denmark is 
divided into five regions since January 2007. One of the regions encompasses the 
capital area of Copenhagen.290 The region of Syddanmark could be seen as a potential 
candidate for territorial autonomy, since there is a German minority living in this 
particular region. Each region has a regional council with 41 members. The regions 
are a result of an administrative reform which abolished the former counties.  
 
Estonia is divided into counties and towns at the regional level.291 There are two 
island counties: Hiiumaa and Saaremaa. The county government (Maavalitsus) of 
each county is led by a county governor (Maavanem), who represents the national 
government at the regional level. Governors are appointed by Eesti Valitsus 
(government) for a term of five years. Since every county functions alike, there is no 
difference as to which county we choose. I chose Saaremaa since it is the largest 
island of the two island counties.  
 
Fiji is divided into four divisions and a dependency: Rotuma.292 Rotuma has been 
mentioned in the section about label autonomies. The island functions as a province 
and a district within the republic of Fiji. Each province is governed by a council with 
an executive head (roko tui) whose appointment has been approved by the Fijian 
Affairs Board, which must also approve all rates and by-laws applied by the 
provincial council.293 Rotuma will be considered as a possible case in this context. 
 
France has a complex system of various administrative divisions in communes, 
departments, regions, special status areas, and overseas territories.294 Some of the 
territorial regions have been mentioned and included in the sphere of territorial 
autonomies, but there are still some overseas departments/regions that have not yet 
                                                 
290 CIA – The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/da.html>. 
291 See Chapter XIV in the Constitution of Estonia at 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/en00000_.html>, accessed from the Internet 2 May 2008. 
292 CIA – The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/fj.html> 
293 <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FToday2006_2007.doc>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2008. 
294 See Title XII, Article 72-77 in the French Constitution. 
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been included in the study. These are Guadeloupe295, Martinique, French Guiana, 
and Réunion. French Guiana was excluded, because the region functions in the same 
manner as the other regions of France and because of the need to reduce the French 
influence in the sample group. The regions of Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion 
will be included as the group of French Overseas Departments/Regions. These regions 
are considered to function as the other departments of the mainland of France with the 
possibility of developing into territorial autonomies in the future. Guadeloupe and 
Martinique are situated in the Caribbean, while Réunion is in the Indian Ocean 
outside Madagascar and Mauritius in Africa. 
 
Greece is divided into 13 peripheries and 51 prefectures, and as has been mentioned 
in the section of dubious cases, the country has one autonomous region (Mount 
Athos).296 The peripheries all function in the same manner, so I chose Crete as the 
example illustrating the possible territorial autonomy in this context. 
 
Hungary is divided into 19 counties and 23 urban counties (consisting of towns) on 
the regional level.297 While amending the Act XXI of 1996, the Act XCII of 1999 
divided Hungary into regions in accordance with the requirements of the European 
Union. Since then, Hungary has established seven planning statistical regions, which 
cover all the counties, and county and regional development councils have also been 
established.298 The seven regions will take over the responsibilities of the counties in 
the near future. The region of Southern Great Plain will be chosen as a possible case 
for territorial autonomy in this context. 
 
                                                 
295 The islands of Saint-Barthélemy and the French part of Saint-Martin have become overseas 
collective territories and seceded from Guadeloupe in 2007. They were formerly part of Guadeloupe. 
This means that the territories function in a similar way to French Polynesia, Mayotte, Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna, and could therefore be included in the group of territorial 
autonomies. Since they have recently been granting this status, they are, however, excluded from the 
analysis in this context. <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9117392/Guadeloupe>, accessed from 
Internet 7 May 2008. 
296 CIA – The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/gr.html>. See also p. 43 for an explanation about Mount Athos. 
297 CIA – The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/hu.html>. 
298 <http://www.magyarorszag.hu/english/abouthungary/data/country/administration.html>, accessed 
from Internet 28 May 2008. 
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Latvia has undergone some changes over time with regard to administrative 
division of the country. In 1998, the Law on Administrative Territorial Reform was 
adopted. Until the completion of this reform, the country's division into five statistical 
regions (the Riga region including the cities of Riga and Jurmala and the district of 
Riga, plus the regions of Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale) remains in force. 
This division can be seen to align most suitable with the NUTS level 3 regional 
criteria that are accepted in the European Union, and it is closely based on the 
administrative territorial division of Latvia during the first period of independence.299 
Since this regional division is used within the EU, I have followed the same division 
here. The region of Vidzeme was seen as the possible case in this context. 
 
The Netherlands has two overseas areas as has been mentioned in the section about 
territorial autonomies. These are Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean. 
The mainland of the Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces which, in their turn, are 
divided into municipalities. The provinces handle all sub-national and regional 
matters of importance. They all have provincial governments elected every fourth 
year.300 Since every province function in a similar manner, there is no difference 
which province was chosen. I chose Utrecht as the possible case in this context. 
 
Norway is divided into 19 counties and every county has some autonomy in 
accordance to the state level. Some functions are divided between the state level and 
the municipalities.301 Finnmark was chosen as the possible case, since the region has 
the Sami population and there have been some suggestions that the Sami people 
should be given more autonomy.  
 
São Tomé and Príncipe have been mentioned in the section on label autonomies. The 
country is divided into seven districts. Six are located on the island of São Tomé and 
one encompasses the island of Príncipe. Príncipe has more autonomy than the other 
                                                 
299 Portrait of the Regions <http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/lv_national.htm>, 
accessed from Internet 28 May 2008. 
300 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_the_Netherlands>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008. 
301 CIA – The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/no.html>. 
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districts and can therefore be considered as a possible case; as the island can be 
considered to function as a region and a district at the same time. 
 
The Solomon Islands in the Pacific Ocean are divided into nine provinces and one 
capital territory. The provinces function in the same way.302 The provinces have local 
elections and handle internal matters related to the regions. The provinces are divided, 
in their turn, into municipalities.303 I chose Santa Isabel as the possible case in this 
context. Santa Isabel is an island province among other island provinces belonging to 
Solomon Islands. 
 
Vanuatu has a similar system to the Solomon Islands. Vanuatu is divided into six 
provinces in which all have their local regional councils; representatives in the council 
have to consist of custom chiefs.304 Here the province of Malampa was chosen. 
Malampa consists of three islands: Malakula, Ambrym and Paama. The first letters of 
the islands constitute the name of the province. 305 
  
The previously mentioned regions were my control group of the 15 non-autonomous 
regions in this context. As summarized in the table below, we see that three of the 
regions belong to France, and the other twelve territories are scattered around 
different parts of the world and belong to different countries. The regions have been 
chosen with the necessity of democracy in mind. All countries except Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands are democracies. Fiji and the Solomon Islands are partly free 
according to Freedom House. Another approach has been to choose some of the 
regions from countries that have already experienced territorial autonomy. It is 
believed that these countries are subsequently more often willing to give some regions 
special status.     
 
 
                                                 
302 See Chapter XII, Article 114 in the Constitution of the Solomon Islands 
<http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/> and CIA World Factbook 2008. 
303 Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit. 
304 Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, Chapter 13 
<http://www.vanuatugovernment.gov.vu/government/library/constitution.html>, CIA – The World 
Factbook 2008 and Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit. 
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Table 13: The Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous Region Degree of 
Autonomy 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda) 0 0 
Crete (Greece) 0 0 
Finnmark (Norway) 0 0 
Guadeloupe (France) 0 0 
Malampa (Vanuatu) 0 0 
Martinique (France) 0 0 
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe) 0 0 
Réunion (France) 0 0 
Rotuma (Fiji) 0 0 
Saaremaa (Estonia) 0 0 
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands) 0 0 
Southern Great Plain (Hungary) 0 0 
Syddanmark (Denmark) 0 0 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) 0 0 
Vidzeme (Latvia) 0 0 
 
All regions scored 0 at the degree of autonomy and therefore also have a fuzzy score 0 
in this context. The five land-locked areas are Finnmark, Southern Great Plain, 
Syddanmark, Utrecht and Vidzeme. All other regions are island regions. In the next 
section I outline the characteristics of these regions, regarding the five most important 
explanatory factors. 
 
6.2 Characteristics of the Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
All possible explanatory factors follow the same pattern and operationalization, which 
has previously been conducted within the set of territorial autonomies. The same 
strategy is followed here, when using the set of non-autonomous regions. Only the 
five most important factors will be included. As mentioned above, these are historical 
                                                                                                                                            
305 Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit. 
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strategic importance, geographical distance, existence of regional movements, 
parties and/or separatist groups, ethnic distinctiveness and size. 
 
Beginning with historical strategic importance, it had to be considered whether the 
region had been a military outpost, a colony, or a victim of war or conflict. The 
following table shows the historical strategic importance. 
 
Table 14: Historical Strategic Importance for Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous 
Region 
Military 
Outpost 
Colony War or 
Conflict 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and 
Barbuda) 
No Yes (together with 
Antigua) 
No 0.33 
Crete (Greece) Yes  No No 0.33 
Finnmark (Norway) Yes Yes No 0.67 
Guadeloupe (France) No Yes Yes 0.67 
Malampa (Vanuatu) No Yes (refers to the 
whole country) 
Yes 0.67 
Martinique (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Príncipe (São Tomé and 
Príncipe) 
No Yes (together with 
São Tomé) 
Yes 0.67 
Réunion (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Rotuma (Fiji) No Yes  No 0.33 
Saaremaa (Estonia) Yes No Yes 0.67 
Santa Isabel (Solomon 
Islands) 
Yes Yes (refers to the 
whole country) 
No 0.67 
Southern Great Plain 
(Hungary) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Syddanmark (Denmark) No No No 0 
Utrecht (The 
Netherlands) 
No No Yes 0.33 
Vidzeme (Latvia) No No Yes 0.33 
Sources: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2336.htm>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008; 
<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008; 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/4252578.stm>, accessed from Internet 5 
May 2008; <http://www.vanuatutourism.com/vanuatu/cms/en/vanuatu.html>, accessed from Internet 6 
May 2008; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/4537753.stm>, accessed from 
Internet 6 May 2008; <http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/history.html>, accessed from Internet 6 May 
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2008; <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-6135/Reunion>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; 
<http://www.rotuma.net/os/History.html>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; 
<http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195&Itemid=261>, 
accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; 
<http://www.pacificislandtravel.com/solomon_islands/about_destin/santaisabel.html>, accessed from 
Internet 6 May 2008; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnmark>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.hungary-tourist-guide.com/southern-great-plain.html>, accessed from Internet 29 May 
2008; <http://www.provincie-utrecht.nl/prvutr/internet/plaatjes.nsf/all/StartEnglish?opendocument>, 
accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://circa.europa.eu/irc/clsis/regportraits/info/data/en/lv002_geo.htm>, accessed from Internet 30 
May 2008. 
 
As can be seen from the table, the same kind of patterns are evident as were seen in 
the territorial autonomies. Two of the French territories (Martinique and Réunion) 
score 1 on the fuzzy score since they have all the categories available. Some regions 
have a combination of colonialism and war or conflict situations in the past; other 
regions have functioned simply as a colony or have been victims of wars or conflict 
situations in history. It is only Syddanmark that scored 0 on this feature. 
 
As regards geographical distance, the distance was measured between the capitals as 
had been done with the territorial autonomies. The table below indicates the distances 
in kilometers. 
 
Table 15: Geographical Distance for Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous Region Distance (km) Fuzzy Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda) 50 km 0.04 
Crete (Greece) 315 km 0.04 
Finnmark (Norway) 1500 km 0.09 
Guadeloupe (France) 8100 km 0.87 
Malampa (Vanuatu) 270 km 0.04 
Martinique (France) 8100 km 0.87 
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe) 150 km 0.04 
Réunion (France) 9900 km 0.95 
Rotuma (Fiji) 675 km 0.05 
Saaremaa (Estonia) 192,5 km 0.04 
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands) 135 km 0.04 
Southern Great Plain (Hungary) 140 km 0.04 
Syddanmark (Denmark) 180 km 0.04 
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Utrecht (The Netherlands) 35 km 0.04 
Vidzeme (Latvia) 87,5 km 0.04 
Source: Bonniers stora världsatlas (1994). Bonnier Lexikon AB. Various scales and maps have been 
used, therefore the distances should be seen as a mere estimation. Distances have been drawn as 
straight lines without considering the longitudes and latitudes. 
 
The table shows that Utrecht is the nearest region being located only 35 kms from its 
capital, and the French regions are, of course, the most remote areas according to 
geographical distance. The other regions are located in the range of 50 km to 1,500 
km from their respective national capitals. The fuzzy scores show the same pattern 
and the same thresholds have been used as in the previous set of territorial autonomy 
(i.e. 10 000 km ≥ 0.95, 5 000 km = 0.5 and 500 km ≤ 0.05), when using the 
calibration technique. The non-autonomous regions share the same pattern as 
territorial autonomies with regard to geographical distance. Some regions are far away 
while others are close to their respective metropolitan capitals.  
 
The following table considers the existence of regional and national parties, 
movements and/or separatist groups. I have used the same categorization as has been 
used for the set of territorial autonomies (see section 4.2.4 and the discussion 
regarding the operationalization of the variable). 
 
Table 16: Existence of Parties and/or Movements within the Non-Autonomous 
Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous Region Regional 
Party 
National 
Party 
Separatist 
Group 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and 
Barbuda) 
Yes Yes No 0.66 
Crete (Greece) No Yes No 0.33 
Finnmark (Norway) No Yes No 0.33 
Guadeloupe (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Malampa (Vanuatu) No Yes No 0.33 
Martinique (France) Yes Yes Yes 1 
Príncipe (São Tomé and 
Príncipe) 
No Yes No 0.33 
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Réunion (France) Yes Yes No 0.66 
Rotuma (Fiji) No Yes No 0.33 
Saaremaa (Estonia) No Yes No 0.33 
Santa Isabel (Solomon 
Islands) 
No Yes No 0.33 
Southern Great Plain 
(Hungary) 
No Yes No 0.33 
Syddanmark (Denmark) Yes Yes No 0.66 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) No Yes No 0.33 
Vidzeme (Latvia) No Yes No 0.33 
Sources: <http://www.barbudaful.net/politics.html>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>, retrieved 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.theodora.com/wfb/guadeloupe_government.html>, retrieved 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Vanuatu-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html>, 
retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Martinique.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 
May 2008; <http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/political_parties.html>, accessed from Internet 7 May 
2008; <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Reunion.htm>, retrieved 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FToday2006_2007.doc>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2008; 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html>; 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.ssb.no/kfvalgkand/tab-2007-06-26-01.html>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.regionsyddanmark.dk/wm182138>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/Newsletters/Theme-in-Focus/4168/>, accessed from Internet 30 May 
2008.  
 
The table shows that national parties are the only groups available to most of the 
regions, which is not surprising since they are all under the national supervision. 
Barbuda, Réunion and Syddanmark have a combination of both regional parties and 
national parties, and Guadeloupe and Martinique are the most politically active with 
all types of possible movements available.  
 
In the next table, how ethnic distinctiveness appears within the group of non-
autonomous regions is indicated. In this context, I also followed the same principle as 
I have done with the other variables. See section of 4.3.1 and the discussion about the 
operationalization of the variable. 
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Table 17: Ethnic Distinctiveness within the Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous Region Ethnic Distinctiveness Fuzzy Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda) No Diversity 0 
Crete (Greece) No Diversity 0 
Finnmark (Norway) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Guadeloupe (France) Ethnic origin  0.33 
Malampa (Vanuatu) No Diversity 0 
Martinique (France) Ethnic origin  0.33 
Príncipe (São Tomé and 
Príncipe) 
No Diversity 0 
Rèunion (France) Ethnic origin 0.33 
Rotuma (Fiji) Ethnic origin and language 0.67 
Saaremaa (Estonia) No Diversity 0 
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands) No Diversity 0 
Southern Great Plain (Hungary) No Diversity 0 
Syddanmark (Denmark) Language 0.33 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) No Diversity 0 
Vidzeme (Latvia) No Diversity 0 
Sources: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html#People>; 
<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>; <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107545.html>, retrieved 7 
May 2008; <http://www.vanuatuparadise.com/NewFiles/anglais/iles/mallicolo_ang.html>, retrieved 7 
May 2008; <http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/wfb.php3?CODEPAYS=MTN>, retrieved 7 
May 2008; <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/S-o-Tom-and-Pr-ncipe.html>, 
retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/Reunion-Island.html>, retrieved 7 May 
2008; <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/shop_pickandmix/free_chapters/fiji-rotuma.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 7 May 2008; 
<http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207&Itemid=259>, 
accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=sb>, 
retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnmark>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.hktdc.com/emergingmarketguide/2-1.htm>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.toppensidor.com/om/danmark/default.asp?topic=Danmark>, accessed from Internet 29 
May 2008; CIA – The World Factbook 2008 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/lg.html#People>. 
 
As can be seen in the table, the non-autonomous regions differ very little in their 
relationship with their metropolitan states. The French regions differ in ethnic origin, 
while Finnmark in Norway (has a population of indigenous Sami) and Rotuma in Fiji 
differ in both ethnic origin and language. Syddanmark differs only in language, since 
a minority of German speakers is to be found there. All other regions lack any 
diversity.  
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The last variable to be taken into account, before the actual analysis, is size. The 
size variable follows the same pattern when conducting the operationalization, as has 
been done in the previous analysis with the territorial autonomies.  
 
Table 18: Size according to the Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous 
Region 
Population Area in km2 Percentage of the 
Total Population 
Fuzzy 
Score 
Barbuda (Antigua and 
Barbuda) 
1,500 175 km2 2.1 % 0.15 
Crete (Greece) 630,000 8 336 km2 5.9 % 0.63 
Finnmark (Norway) 72,399 48 618 km2 1.5 % 0.11 
Guadeloupe (France) 445,000 1 705 km2 0.7 % 0.07 
Malampa (Vanuatu) 35,329 2 779 km2 16.4 % 1 
Martinique (France) 394,000 1 100 km2 0.6 % 0.07 
Príncipe (São Tomé and 
Príncipe) 
6,000 136 km2 2.9 % 0.22 
Réunion (France) 802,911 2 510 km2 1.3 % 0.10 
Rotuma (Fiji) 3,000 30 km2 0.3 % 0.06 
Saaremaa (Estonia) 39,231 2 922 km2 3 % 0.23 
Santa Isabel (Solomon 
Islands) 
30,000 2 999 km2 5.2 % 0.53 
Southern Great Plain 
(Hungary) 
1,367,000 18 339 km2 13.6 % 0.99 
Syddanmark (Denmark) 1,194,659 12 191 km2 21.8 % 1 
Utrecht (The 
Netherlands) 
1,190,604 1 386 km2 7.3 % 0.80 
Vidzeme (Latvia) 257,883 15 346 km2 11.5 % 0.98 
Sources: The same sources as in the previous tables have been used and also the following sites 
<http://www.finnmark.no/page.jsp?id=2&mid=1>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Hungary>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; 
<http://www.latreg.lv/pub/default.php?lang=eng&lapa=82&oid=82>, accessed from Internet 30 May 
2008. 
 
The table shows that the Hungarian region, the Danish region, the Dutch region and 
the French island of Réunion are the most populous. The smallest region according to 
population is the island of Barbuda with 1,500 inhabitants. The smallest region 
according to area is Rotuma with only 30 km2 and the largest territory according to 
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area is Finnmark in the northern part of Norway with over 48 000 km2. Looking at 
the relative size, we see that Syddanmark is the largest with a population of 21.8 
percent of the total population of Denmark, Malampa follows with 16.4 percent of the 
total population of Vanuatu, and Southern Great Plain has 13.6 percent of the total 
population of Hungary. The fuzzy scores are derived from the same categorization 
used in the previous section about the set of territorial autonomies (i.e. 10% ≥ 0.95, 
5% = 0.5 and 0% ≤ 0.05). The table shows the same pattern as for the territorial 
autonomies. Some regions are large, while others are small. 
 
The next chapter includes these fifteen units of analysis into the main analysis in order 
to test the sufficiency of combinations for the outcome of territorial autonomy proper. 
The following table is a summary of the fuzzy table for the non-autonomous regions. 
Historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), political parties, 
movements and separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED), size (S), and degree 
of autonomy (A) are all included in the table. 
 
Table 19: The Fuzzy-Set Truth Table for Non-Autonomous Regions 
 
Non-Autonomous Region H G P ED S A 
Barbuda (Antigua and 
Barbuda) 
0.33 0.04 0.66 0 0.15 0 
Crete (Greece) 0.33 0.04 0.33 0 0.63 0 
Finnmark (Norway) 0.67 0.09 0.33 0.67 0.11 0 
Guadeloupe (France) 0.67 0.87 1 0.33 0.07 0 
Malampa (Vanuatu) 0.67 0.04 0.33 0 1 0 
Martinique (France) 1 0.87 1 0.33 0.07 0 
Príncipe (São Tomé and 
Príncipe) 
0.67 0.04 0.33 0 0.22 0 
Réunion (France) 1 0.95 0.66 0.33 0.10 0 
Rotuma (Fiji) 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.67 0.06 0 
Saaremaa (Estonia) 0.67 0.04 0.33 0 0.23 0 
Santa Isabel (Solomon 
Islands) 
0.67 0.04 0.33 0 0.53 0 
Southern Great Plain 0.33 0.04 0.33 0 0.99 0 
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(Hungary) 
Syddanmark (Denmark) 0 0.04 0.66 0.33 1 0 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) 0.33 0.04 0.33 0 0.80 0 
Vidzeme (Latvia) 0.33 0.04 0.33 0 0.98 0 
 
The table shows all combinations for the non-autonomous regions according to the 
fuzzy sets. There are two groups consisting of four regions each which share the same 
combination of four conditions out of the five conditions used in this context. The 
only factor that distinguishes these regions is size. The first group consists of 
Malampa, Príncipe, Saaremaa and Santa Isabel. The second group consists of Crete, 
Southern Great Plain, Utrecht and Vidzeme. The next sections deal with the 
sufficiency test that has been stated to be required.  
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7 Analysis and Results 
 
The second step in the analysis is to include the previously mentioned non-
autonomous regions into the fs/QCA program together with the set of territorial 
autonomies in order to unravel the possible combinations leading towards territorial 
autonomy proper. This implies that 80 entities are under investigation in this latter 
analysis. Section 7.1 discusses the steps in the program, and what obtained from 
running the analysis. In section 7.2 an evaluation of the results is outlined. 
 
7.1 Fuzzy-Set Approach with Sufficient Conditions 
 
The assessment of the sufficiency of causal combinations was carried out with the 
Truth Table Algorithm within the fs/QCA program. Turning the fuzzy sets to truth 
tables has three main advantages. First, it shows the direct correspondence between 
the rows of a truth table and the corners of the vector space defined by fuzzy-set 
causal conditions. Second, the distribution of cases can be assessed across the 
logically possible combinations of causal conditions. Third, consistency of the 
evidence can be assessed for each causal combination, with the argument that it is a 
subset of the outcome.306 It is important to note that when using the truth table to 
analyze the results of fuzzy set assessments, the truth table rows do not represent 
subsets of cases, as they do in crisp-set analyses (or Boolean approaches). Rather, the 
rows represent the 2k causal arguments that can be constructed from a given set of 
causal conditions.307  
 
The table obtained by running the analysis in the fs/QCA program appears as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
306 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit. 
307 Charles C. Ragin (2008). Chapter 5: ’Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA)’, 
pp. 87-121 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.). Configurational Comparative Analysis. Sage 
Publications. 
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Table 20: Truth Table within the fs/QCA Program 
 
Row H G P ED S Number Outcome A Consistency 
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.88 
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.87 
3 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0.84 
4 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.81 
5 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 0.80 
6 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.80 
7 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 0.79 
8 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.78 
9 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.77 
10 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.72 
11 1 0 1 0 0 7 0 0.71 
12 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.70 
13 0 0 1 0 0 14  0 0.70 
14 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.66 
15 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0.65 
16 0 0 1 0 1 7 0 0.62 
17 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0.45 
18 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0.41 
... 32      0  ? 
 
The rows represent the configurations or possible combinations, and the letters 
indicate the explanatory factors as have been mentioned earlier. The number column 
shows the number of cases that have a membership in the respective causal 
combination higher than 0.5. The consistency value shows the consistency level for 
the entire fuzzy-set, not just each configuration. The consistency level is always based 
on all cases in the Truth Table Algorithm.308 The threshold for consistency has been 
chosen at 0.75 in this context showing the value 1 at the outcome variable. This 
means that 75 percent of the cases’ fuzzy membership scores in a causal combination 
must be consistent (i.e. they must lie above the main diagonal in the XY-plot) for a 
positive outcome. A consistency level should at least capture 75-80 percent of the 
                                                 
308 Explanation by Charles C. Ragin at the “Short Course in Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
Fuzzy-Sets” at University of Arizona, September 16, 2008. 
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cases in an analysis of this kind. The threshold is also chosen due to the gap 
between the consistency scores of 0.77 and 0.72. Where there is a large gap between 
the consistency values, this is where the cut-off point has to be made. Furthermore, 
this means that the cut-off point determines which causal combinations pass fuzzy-set 
theoretic consistency and which do not. Causal combinations with consistency scores 
above the cut-off value are designated fuzzy subsets of the outcome and are coded 1, 
while those below the cut-off value are not fuzzy subsets and are coded 0.309 As can 
be seen from the table, it is only row 1-18 that involve the studied cases. From row 
19-32, no empirical evidence was found. These rows show what is called logical 
remainders in this case. The logical remainders have been excluded in this context.310 
I have only been taken combinations which involve the cases. Logical remainders 
appear as a consequence of limited diversity. This is due to the fact that several cases 
share the same combination and therefore it is not necessary to include all logically 
possible combinations in the analysis.311     
 
When running the analysis through the program, we obtained three different solutions: 
the complex, the parsimonious and the intermediate solution. All three solutions are 
valid, but in general, the parsimonious solutions are too parsimonious, since they 
often eliminate important conditions (e.g. necessary conditions). On the whole, the 
complex solutions are too complex for they include causal conditions that are 
irrelevant from the perspective of knowledge, and superfluous according to the results 
of the parsimonious solution. Usually the intermediate solution makes most sense and 
is the solution taken into account.312 The program uses three different treatments of 
the remainder combinations, i.e. the combinations, which have been set to the value of 
0. In the complex solution, all remainders are set to false, which leads to no 
                                                 
309 See Charles C. Ragin (2004). ‘From Fuzzy Sets to Crisp Truth Tables’, COMPASSS Working Paper 
WP-2004-28 (Posted 7 December 2004), can be accessed at 
<http://www.compasss.org/Raginfztt_April05.pdf> 
310 In csQCA the minimization procedure calls for another approach when managing the logical 
remainders than in fsQCA, see e.g. Benoît Rihoux and Gisèle De Meur (2008). ‘Crisp-Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (csQCA)’, pp. 56-65 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): 
Configurational Comparative Methods, op.cit. 
311 See Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2006). ‘Reducing complexity in Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the consolidation of democracy’, 
European Journal of Political Research 45, pp. 751-786. 
312 E-mail conversation with Charles C. Ragin 9 April 2008. See also Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit. 
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counterfactuals being allowed. In simplistic terms, no remainders are used. In the 
parsimonious solution, any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler 
solution is used (remainders are used without evaluating their plausibility), and in the 
intermediate solution, only remainders that are “easy” counterfactual cases are 
allowed to be incorporated into the solution.313 This means that logical remainders are 
restricted to those that are most plausible. 
 
The discussion about “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals is concerned with how the 
remainders are treated in the program. Here, a continuum can be imagined, where at 
one end there are “easy” counterfactuals where it is assumed that by adding a 
redundant causal condition to a configuration known to produce the outcome, will still 
produce the outcome. Then at the other end the more “difficult” counterfactuals, 
which attempt to remove a contributing causal condition from a configuration 
displaying the outcome, on the assumption that this cause is redundant and the 
reduced configuration, still produces the outcome.314 Most researchers prefer 
explanations that are somewhere between these two extremes, the so-called 
intermediate solutions. Intermediate solutions are simply subsets of the most 
parsimonious solution and supersets of the solution allowing maximum complexity. 
This solution is based on the interest in causal conditions that are shared by the 
positive cases, i.e. believed to be linked to the outcome, and not displayed by any 
negative cases.315 
 
The intermediate solution used in this context has been chosen according to the 
presence of each condition. In the program, it is possible to choose three different 
options, the first being the presence of the conditions, the second being the absence of 
the conditions, and the third being the inclusion of either presence or absence of 
conditions. It is, of course, possible to have a combination of both present and absent 
conditions as well. Since my assumption is that every condition should be present in 
order to unravel it, that is if the combination of conditions are relevant for territorial 
                                                 
313 Charles C. Ragin (2008). User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Tucson, 
Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, p. 81. 
314 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., p. 162. 
315 Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., pp. 164-166. 
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autonomy to occur, and therefore I have included every variable as present. The 
table below shows the intermediate solution obtained in the program. 
 
Table 21: The Intermediate Solution within the fs/QCA Program 
 
Combination Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Consistency 
ED·s + 0.4552 0.2104 0.7315 
H·G 0.3201 0.0753 0.7113 
Solution Coverage 0.5305   
Solution Consistency   0.6971 
Uppercase letters indicate presence and lowercase letters absence or negation. The sign “+” indicates 
the logical or and the sign “·” indicates the logical and. 
 
We obtained two different routes leading towards territorial autonomy. The first 
indicates that ethnic diversity in combination with small size leads to territorial 
autonomy while, the second indicates that a combination of historical strategic 
importance, together with long geographical distance, is sufficient for autonomy. 
These paths are so-called INUS-conditions. INUS-conditions mean causal conditions 
that are insufficient but necessary parts of the causal recipes which are themselves 
unnecessary but sufficient.316 These conditions are capable of generating the same 
outcome. 
 
To illustrate how the cases occur within each combination of conditions, Table 22 
lists the cases in each combination according to their respective fuzzy set values. 
 
Table 22: Configurations for the Regions 
 
Region ED·s H·G Degree of Autonomy 
Åland Islands (Finland) 0.33 0.04 0.82 
American Samoa (USA)  0.67 0.67 0.68 
American Virgin Islands (USA) 0.33 0.17 0.50 
Andalusia (Spain) 0 0.05 0.90 
                                                 
316 Explanation by Charles C. Ragin at the “Short Course in Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
Fuzzy-Sets” at University of Arizona, August 26-September 18, 2008. 
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Anguilla (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.67 0.50 
Aruba (The Netherlands) 0.67 0.33 0.68 
Azores (Portugal) 0 0.11 0.68 
Balearic Islands (Spain) 0.33 0.05 0.90 
Basque Country (Spain) 0.33 0.04 0.90 
Bermuda (United Kingdom) 0.67 0.67 0.82 
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) 0 0.06 0.68 
British Virgin Islands (UK) 0.33 0.33 0.50 
Canary Islands (Spain) 0 0.10 0.90 
Catalonia (Spain) 0 0.05 0.90 
Cayman Islands (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.33 0.82 
Cook Islands (New Zealand) 0.33 0.31 0.95 
Corsica (France) 0.33 0 0.14 
Crimea (Ukraine) 0.33 0.05 0.14 
Falkland Islands (United Kingdom) 0 0.67 0.50 
Faroe Islands (Denmark) 0.33 0.08 0.90 
French Polynesia (France) 0.67 0.67 0.82 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy) 0.33 0.05 0.95 
Gagauzia (Moldova) 0 0.04 0.90 
Galicia (Spain) 0.25 0.05 0.90 
Gibraltar (United Kingdom) 0.67 0.11 0.50 
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 0 0.04 0.05 
Greenland (Denmark) 0.67 0.26 0.90 
Guam (USA) 0.67 1 0.23 
Guernsey (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.04 0.95 
Hong Kong (China) 0.67 0.12 0.90 
Isle of Man (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.04 0.90 
Jeju Island (South Korea) 0 0.05 0.23 
Jersey (United Kingdom) 0 0.04 0.90 
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) 0.33 0 0.35 
Kosovo (Serbia) 0 0.04 0.50 
Macau (China) 0.67 0.12 0.90 
Madeira (Portugal) 0 0.07 0.68 
Mayotte (France) 0.94 0.67 0.08 
Mindanao (Philippines) 0.33 0.04 0.14 
Montserrat (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.33 0.50 
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) 0 0.04 0.05 
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Netherlands’ Antilles (NL) 0.67 0.67 0.68 
New Caledonia (France) 0.67 1 0.95 
Niue (New Zealand) 0.95 0.25 0.95 
Norfolk Island (Australia) 0.33 0.14 0.50 
North Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
0.59 0.04 0.14 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) 0.67 0.05 0.14 
Northern Mariana Islands (USA) 0.67 0.67 0.82 
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor) 0.33 0.04 0.14 
Pitcairn Islands (United Kingdom) 0.67 0.33 0.23 
Puerto Rico (USA) 0.67 0.16 0.95 
Rodrigues (Mauritius) 0 0.05 0.35 
Sardinia (Italy) 0.33 0.05 0.95 
Scotland (United Kingdom) 0 0 0.82 
Sicily (Italy) 0 0.05 0.95 
South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
(Nicaragua) 
0.26 0.04 0.14 
St Helena and Dependencies (UK) 0.35 0.67 0.68 
St Pierre and Miquelon (France) 0 0.42 0.50 
Tokelau (New Zealand) 0.67 0.33 0.68 
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy) 0.33 0.05 0.95 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 0.33 0.89 0.90 
Valle d’Aosta (Italy) 0.33 0.05 0.95 
Wales (United Kingdom) 0.33 0.04 0.08 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 0.67 0.67 0.23 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 0.33 0.04 0.82 
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda) 0 0.04 0 
Crete (Greece) 0 0.04 0 
Finnmark (Norway) 0.67 0.09 0 
Guadeloupe (France) 0.33 0.67 0 
Malampa (Vanuatu) 0 0.04 0 
Martinique (France) 0.33 0.87 0 
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe) 0 0.04 0 
Réunion (France) 0.33 0.95 0 
Rotuma (Fiji) 0.67 0.05 0 
Saaremaa (Estonia) 0 0.04 0 
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands) 0 0.04 0 
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Southern Great Plain (Hungary) 0 0.04 0 
Syddanmark (Denmark) 0 0.04 0 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) 0 0.04 0 
Vidzeme (Latvia) 0 0.04 0 
 
The table shows the fuzzy-set scores for each region within each configuration of 
combination. The highlighted cases are those that have a degree of autonomy, which 
is 0.50 or higher, and where some of the fuzzy-set scores are lower than the outcome 
(fuzzy scores of 0 are not considered, due to non-membership in the set). These cases 
are those that are explained according to the analysis of sufficiency. The cases with 
italics constitute the non-autonomous regions in this context. There are 32 cases 
overall, which cover both configurations and explain the positive outcome. This 
means that there is an overlap between the two paths. The cases have ED·s·H·G in 
their configurations. All four conditions are present for the 32 cases in this context. 
The other cases are considered inconsistent according to the fuzzy logic. The total 
number of 34 cases is explained by the combination of ethnic distinctiveness and 
small size alone, and 44 cases are explained by the combination of historical strategic 
importance and geographical distance alone. As can be seen in Table 21, the raw 
coverage for the configuration of ethnic distinctiveness in combination with small size 
lies at 0.46 and the consistency is at 0.73. The configuration of historical strategic 
importance and geographical distance has a coverage score of 0.32 and a consistency 
at 0.71. The solution coverage reaches a value of 0.53, which measures the proportion 
of membership in the outcome that is explained by the complete solution. The 
solution consistency is in this case 0.70 and illustrates how often membership in the 
solution is a subset of membership in the outcome. The unique coverage shows the 
cases covered by the configuration of ED·s or H·G alone without the overlapping 
cases. These scores are low since there are a large number of cases which overlap. 
This also means that the overlapping cases are overdetermined by the conditions in 
this context. 
 
As can be seen from Table 22, there are also cases which are not covered by any of 
the four conditions in this context. Most cases do have a degree of autonomy under 
the crossover limit of 0.50, but there are still cases, such as the Falkland Islands and 
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Scotland, which are not explained by the four conditions used in the analysis. This 
means that there are other possible explanations regarding these cases, which are not 
unraveled here. To be able to unravel the conditions for these cases, a more in-depth 
analysis should take place, which takes other possible explanatory factors into 
account. 
 
For illustration it can be of importance to show why it is problematic to examine 
INUS causes as single instances. Table 23, that follows, shows the logic behind this 
argument. 
 
Table 23: The Problem with Examining INUS Causes as Single Instances317 
 
 X absent X present 
Outcome present 1. There are cases here because 
multiple recipes exist for the 
outcome, including some that do 
not involve X 
2. There are cases here because 
X is an INUS condition – an 
ingredient in at least one of the 
recipes for the outcome 
Outcome absent 3. There are cases here because 
some cases lack both outcome 
and membership in the recipes 
that do not include X 
4. There are cases here because 
X sometimes occurs without the 
other ingredients that it must be 
combined with in order to 
generate the outcome 
 
There are cases in every cell, since combinations are vital to produce the outcome in 
question. It is not sufficient that one condition is present or absent. It is the 
combination which is of importance. In a conventional statistical analysis, cases 
would preferably be in cells 2 and 3. Cases in cells 1 and 4 would undermine the 
researcher’s argument. 
 
The assessment of fuzzy-set gives us a value-added analysis in the form of the 
negative outcome as well. It is possible to run the same analysis and reach the 
sufficiency for non-autonomy in this circumstance. When running the same kind of 
                                                 
317 Ibid. 
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analysis as mentioned previously, with the negative outcome, we receive the 
following truth table: 
 
Table 24: Truth Table for Non-Autonomy 
 
Row H G P ED S Number Outcome ~A Consistency 
1 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 0.93 
2 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 0.92 
3 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0.83 
4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.82 
5 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.82 
6 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.80 
7 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.79 
8 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.76 
9 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0.75 
10 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.73 
11 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 0.70 
12 0 0 1 0 1 7 0 0.69 
13 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.66 
14 1 0 1 0 0 7 0 0.66 
15 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0.65 
16 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.64 
17 0 0 1 0 0 14 0 0.63 
18 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 0.58 
The sign “~” is indicating the negation of the outcome. 
 
As can be seen in the Table, the consistency threshold has been chosen at 0.90 in this 
case, since the drop between 0.92 and 0.83 signals a huge gap between the different 
configurations. This means that 90 percent of the cases are taken into account in the 
analysis. Table 25 indicates the intermediate solution. 
 
Table 25: The Intermediate Solution for Non-Autonomy 
 
Configuration Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Consistency 
p·S 0.2825 0.2825 0.9368 
153
  
154
154
Solution Coverage 0.2825   
Solution Consistency   0.9368 
 
As we can see, the consistency for the solution is very high at 0.94, but the coverage 
is quite low at only 0.28. This might be explained by the fact that not all non-
autonomous regions have been included in the investigation, since we have only used 
a control group in this context. The path explaining non-autonomy is no existence of 
parties/movements in combination with a large size. 
 
What do the results indicate? The positive outcome, i.e. territorial autonomy, is 
explained by the two configurations of ethnic distinctiveness and small size and/or 
historical strategic importance combined with long geographical distance. These two 
configurations also include the necessary condition of democracy. We have to remind 
ourselves that necessary conditions should be included with the sufficiency conditions 
as well. Since the threshold for the positive outcome was chosen at a consistency level 
of 0.75, this implied that the limit was to cover 75 percent of the cases in this context. 
With a higher threshold, another result may have been attained. In set-theoretic terms, 
coverage of 75 percent of the cases is satisfactory. As in conventional methods, it is 
sufficient to be close to the ultimate truth. It is hard to arrive at perfect consistency 
levels in social sciences, as the real world is too complex to allow the unraveling of 
the great truths. 
 
The result does not bring any surprising evidence on to the table. Democracy as a 
necessary condition for territorial autonomy to occur has been stated by many authors 
and this empirical test merely confirms the statements made in previous research. The 
paths of ethnic distinctiveness combined with small size also confirm some of the 
theoretical statements made by many authors. Here a small warning can be given: 
ethnic distinctiveness alone is not a sufficient condition, but in combination with 
small size, it is quite different. The path of historical strategic importance combined 
with long geographical distance also seems plausible in light of previous research. 
The evidence is that some former theoretical statements have been proved to hold true 
with a larger set of empirical material than has been undertaken before. The 
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interesting feature with fuzzy-set is that a researcher is able to do more in-depth 
analyses with regard to any diverse cases that might have appeared. This analysis can 
be seen as a starting point for more in-depth investigations in the future. Another 
factor is that we are also able to say something about the negative outcome, i.e. non-
autonomy in this case. For territorial autonomy to occur, absence of 
parties/movements and existence of large size might seem to be a hindrance for 
developing into the special status that has been called for. Since a control group of 
only 15 entities has been used for the negative outcome, this result can only be valid 
for this particular context. 
 
7.2 Evaluation of the Results 
 
The necessary conditions were obtained from one state related factor, democracy, and 
one interrelated factor, economic viability. As has been argued by many authors 
conducting research on autonomy, democracy could also be argued to be valid for the 
group of territorial autonomies. Most regions belong to democratic states and 
therefore score high on the degree of democracy. The factor of economic viability 
shows that most regions belong to the highest income group according to the World 
Bank Atlas methodology. This evidence can only be seen in a more empirical light. It 
seems that autonomous regions have become prosperous by establishing new niche 
markets and have therefore been able to compete on the world market. Economic 
viability should perhaps be seen as a consequence of autonomy and not as a condition 
for it. Having autonomy means that regional governments can plan and organize their 
own economy in a way that fits their own context. Since there is a weak causal 
relation in the literature between economic viability and territorial autonomy, it is 
impossible to say in which direction the causal mechanism might go. Regional 
governments may have full decision rights regarding the economic sphere, and 
therefore economic issues can be seen as being more related to the competencies of 
the regions as a whole. On the other hand, some regions, which have been rich regions 
from the beginning of their autonomy status, might have been able to continue as 
prosperous regions throughout their development. 
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We obtained two possible directions as regards what was considered to constitute 
special autonomous arrangements. These were the combination of ethnic 
distinctiveness combined with small size and/or historical strategic importance 
combined with geographical distance. The various degrees of territorial autonomy 
were explained by democracy and economic viability in this context. In comparative 
analysis, it is crucial to be aware of what research question(s) we really would like to 
answer and which kind of tool we should employ for different studies. The models 
used in quantitative statistical analyses are not perhaps the best tools to answer our 
current research questions. We have to remember that statistics is best applicable 
when a relatively large number of cases and a given population is available. Both 
fuzzy-set and regression strategies have their own strengths and weaknesses. Fuzzy-
set gives us combinations of factors which statistical analysis do not give us. The 
additional value with fuzzy-set is that counterfactual cases can also be taken into 
account. 
 
The investigation has shown a generalization in the set of territorial autonomies. We 
obtained clear results from the fuzzy-set analysis. Two different trends leading to 
territorial autonomy have been elaborated and at the same time some evidence was 
obtained concerning different degrees of territorial autonomy. The cases undertaken 
in this investigation need to be put into a wider context, and the following section 
prior to the conclusion, seek to provide this broader context about these cases. 
 
Governments that have established territorial autonomy have had to consider flexible 
solutions for diverse societies. It is clear that ethnic distinctiveness and small size are 
crucial factors for constituting special regions. Historical factors and geographical 
distances are also crucial elements leading to special treatment by the governments of 
states. The special autonomous regions are cases with a diversity from the majority 
perspective and at the same time they play a role as unifying the states’ territorial 
integrity. What can be learned from this study is that to be able to establish a 
successful territorial autonomy, regions must have a minority that is capable of 
demanding special rights in order to preserve their own culture, language and ethnic 
origin. The regions should not be too large, and some historical traditions play a part 
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e.g. special status or involvement in conflicts and wars, being border regions, 
being former colonies. The regions should also be situated in the periphery so as to be 
able to show that they can manage on their own independently from the center. 
Another important factor is that to be able to succeed in establishing these 
asymmetrical regions, a democratic environment is necessary. 
 
The condition of existence of parties/movements and/or separatist groups has not, in 
this context, had any major effect leading to territorial autonomy. However, the 
variable cannot be totally excluded, since it appears that the non-existence of this 
condition together with large size explains the negative outcome. The condition might 
have some significance in other possible configurations not undertaken in this 
investigation. Theoretically, the variable has some importance affecting the 
establishment of autonomy. The variable of economic viability as a necessary 
condition for the various degrees of autonomy was omitted in the latter analysis, since 
it was not clear which causal direction this variable took. 
 
If the territorial autonomies are viewed from a federal perspective, we can say that 
regions of this kind can be seen as some kind of quasi-federal arrangements. 
Federalism is designed to achieve some degree of political integration based on a 
combination of self-rule and shared rule. There is always a written constitution that 
declares the terms by which powers are shared in the political system, and which 
powers can only be altered by extraordinary procedures. Decentralization is the norm 
by which the political system functions, where the constituent units participate as 
partners in national governmental activities. In federal systems, it is also essential to 
have an internal division of authority and power based on a territorial basis. These 
elements seem to exist for territorial autonomies as well. Usually, a territorial 
autonomy is consequent upon a constitutional or at least some jurisdictional basis, and 
there is a system of decentralization between the national/state level and the 
autonomous region in question. Some powers might be shared, while others are 
explicitly in the hands of the autonomous region. The element of participation as 
partners in national governmental activities is often connected to economic or 
sometimes international matters. 
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Through further study of territorial autonomies, there is the potential for establishing 
better developed theories in conflict studies and nation-building. Territorial 
autonomies can be used as examples when evaluating which option a state should 
adopt. Territorial autonomies could also serve as successful examples of conflict-
solving mechanisms. Within studies of nation-building or state-building, territorial 
autonomies provide examples of how potential new countries could emerge. There is 
much room for combining these cases with other relevant areas of inquiry. This study 
is simply a first step in illustrating the diversity of mechanisms available. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study has been to outline the concept of autonomy both from a general 
view and from a more delimited view focused on territorial autonomy in particular. 
Autonomy in a broad perspective takes various forms such as personal, cultural, 
functional, administrative, and legislative autonomy. The territorial autonomies used 
in this study refer to administrative and legislative forms of autonomy. These 
asymmetrical regions within states constitute the two highest levels according to 
Tkacik’s model. The contribution of the investigation has been to map the 
asymmetrical, special/unique, territorial sub-national units that do not fit into the 
general pattern of the state of which they are part. The entities can be seen as flexible 
solutions of governance within states. 
 
In this investigation, 65 territorial autonomies have been analyzed within 25 countries 
in the world. The set of territorial autonomy has been ascertained from the 
constitutions and other relevant jurisdictional documents. A type of index has been 
established to review the different degrees of autonomy between the cases. 
Characteristics used, for this purpose, have been: distribution of power, functions, 
constitutional basis, control over generic autonomy provisions, and tax abilities.  
 
The purpose of the study has been to elaborate on both the different degrees of 
territorial autonomy and the routes leading to territorial autonomies as such. Degree 
and kind have been analyzed simultaneously according to a step-by-step mode. In 
order to elucidate the different paths leading to territorial autonomy proper, a control 
group of fifteen other sub-national regions with less or no autonomy was chosen. 
 
Another part of the study illustrates how an alternative comparative approach, such as 
fuzzy-set, could be applied within this area of research. The method commences from 
what conventional statisticians would call “the forbidden fruit”, by conducting the 
selection on the dependent variable. Fuzzy-set is a more inductive, bottom-up model, 
which relates to set-theory within mathematical science. The technique also considers 
complex configurations, and is not used to consider any net effects. The problem 
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when using this technique was the elaboration according to a two-step strategy. 
The first step was to analyze the degree of territorial autonomy according to necessary 
conditions, and the second step was to analyze the territorial autonomy proper 
according to sufficient conditions. 
 
A broad range of various possible explanatory factors was used in the investigation. 
These factors were chosen according to the general literature about autonomy. 
Democracy was chosen, since there is a mutual understanding between authors that 
territorial autonomy can only be established in democratic environments, if they are 
going to be functional and stable. The findings show that democracy is indeed a 
necessary condition for the different degrees of territorial autonomy, and at the same 
time democracy is also included as a sufficient condition for territorial autonomy to 
occur. 
 
Historical strategic importance has been crucial for the occurrence of territorial 
autonomies. Some regions have functioned as colonies or operated as military 
outposts, or have been established as the result of war or conflicts. Historical events 
have not affected the establishment of territorial autonomy in isolation. Findings show 
that historical strategic importance is crucial in combination with geographical 
remoteness. Geographical distances from the mother country, together with the 
historical position, are the features of importance for territorial autonomy to occur. 
This combination explains 44 out of the 65 territorial autonomies. 
 
Possession of natural resources has been assumed to explain the different degrees of 
autonomy, but this factor does not seem to have any effect on territorial autonomy. It 
is not possible to conclude that possession of natural resources really plays a 
significant role in this context. This factor was omitted in the second analysis, since it 
did not have any major theoretical basis.  
 
Existence of regional parties/movements or separatist groups was seen in the light of 
demands for more self-government and the fact that governments seem to offer 
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regions autonomy to reduce secessionist claims. This factor, however, does not 
show any significance in either the degree or kind of autonomy in this context. 
 
Ethnic distinctiveness, according to many authors, plays a major role in establishing 
territorial autonomy. Results show, however, that ethnic distinctiveness is only 
important in combination with small size, not as a feature of its own. The combination 
of ethnic distinctiveness and small size explains 34 out of the 65 cases. 
 
Economic viability has been seen as a possible factor resulting in both different 
degrees and kinds of autonomy. Economic viability is a necessary condition 
constituting the different degrees of territorial autonomy. It is, though, doubtful if this 
factor can be seen as a condition for autonomy but rather that it should be seen as a 
consequence of autonomy instead.  
 
The paths leading towards territorial autonomy proper overlap, and a total of 32 cases 
can be explained by the four conditions together of: ethnic distinctiveness, small size, 
historical strategic importance, and geographical distance. This means that all four 
factors play a crucial role in establishing these special systems of governments.  
 
In conclusion, we can say that the two most important factors for the degree of 
territorial autonomy are democracy and economic viability. These factors are 
necessary conditions, while the combinatorial factors constituting a territorial 
autonomy proper are sufficient conditions. For development or establishment of 
territorial autonomy, it is clear that ethnic distinctiveness in the form of a minority 
should exist and the population in the region should not be too large. Other features 
which also contribute are the historical strategic importance of being former colony, 
the remnants of war or conflicts, and even military outposts together with 
geographical distance. The relationships between the center and periphery, both from 
a historical and current perspective, seem to have a tendency to lead to special 
management of territories.  
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An added value with the fuzzy-set analysis, is that conditions were also obtained 
explaining the negative outcome, i.e. non-autonomy. While running this analysis we 
identified a combination of the non-existence of parties/movements and separatist 
groups combined with large size as the path explaining non-autonomy. This analysis 
is, however, only valid for this particular context, since we have used a limited 
number of non-autonomous regions. 
 
As a consequence of this investigation, further questions have arisen. One example is 
the question of why some governments tend to choose asymmetrical solutions above 
other alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate the similarities and differences 
between the countries possessing territorial autonomies. This would be analysis of 
countries at a macro-level rather than the sub-national level examined here. Another 
interesting line of investigation would be as to find out the reason why some countries 
are more successful in developing autonomous regions, while other countries prefer 
more symmetrical systems, such as those found in some brands of federalism. Such 
questions as these would be interesting to investigate in the near future. 
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Svensk sammanfattning 
 
Autonomi är ett mångfasetterat och omdiskuterat begrepp inom det 
samhällsvetenskapliga området. Det finns ingen universell vedertagen definition. 
Istället diskuteras begreppet ur olika synvinklar med olika innehåll. En del författare 
försöker dra gränser mellan olika former av autonomi, såsom personlig, kulturell, 
funktionell, administrativ och territoriell eller lagstiftande autonomi. 
 
Min avhandling tar avstamp i området kring de territoriella formerna av autonomi. 
Med territoriell autonomi menas i detta sammanhang ett geografiskt definierat 
område som skiljer sig från andra subnationella enheter (federala delstater, 
kommuner etc.) i en specifik stat och som erhållit någon form av specialstatus med 
lagstiftande och/eller regelgivande (administrativ) makt. Territoriell autonomi 
används här i en vidare betydelse för att erhålla så stor variation som möjligt mellan 
enheterna i undersökningen. 
 
Syftet är att kartlägga vilka områden som kan räknas till gruppen territoriell autonomi 
ur ett globalt perspektiv och vilka förklaringsmekanismer som ligger bakom 
upprättandet av dessa regioner. De potentiella förklaringsfaktorerna identifieras med 
nödvändiga och tillräckliga villkor enligt en färsk metod kallad fuzzy-set som härrör 
från mängdläran inom matematiken. 
 
Forskningsdesignen utgår ifrån att välja på den beroende variabeln, d.v.s. territoriell 
autonomi i detta sammanhang. Designen har valts eftersom det inte finns någon 
vedertagen lista över de specialområden som behandlas i kontexten. 
 
Den första delen i avhandlingen diskuterar kartläggningen av områdena utgående från 
ländernas konstitutioner och andra juridiska dokument där vi kan finna spår av 
territoriella autonomier. Områdenas maktfördelning, funktioner, konstitutionell grund 
och ändringsmöjligheter vad gäller förändringar i regionernas egna 
författningar/statut/självstyrelselagar räknas upp som definierande aspekter för dessa 
områden. Dessa aspekter ligger till grund för graden av autonomi eller den variation 
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som råder mellan regionerna. På detta sätt går det att avgöra vilka territoriella 
autonomier som har en starkare autonom ställning jämfört med svagare territoriella 
autonomier. 
 
De oberoende variablerna eller de möjliga förklaringsfaktorerna är hämtade från den 
allmänna litteraturen kring autonomifrågor i stort. I detta sammanhang har de 
vanligaste förekommande faktorerna valts. Faktorerna delas in i statsrelaterade 
förklaringar som har med moderlandet att göra, regionalspecifika faktorer som är 
direkt anknutna till regionen som sådana och faktorer som är i ett inomstatligt 
förhållande mellan stat och region. 
 
Demokrati är den enda statsrelaterade förklaringsfaktorn som används. Här antas att 
regimtypen av en stat har betydelse för hur tänkbart det kan vara för en territoriell 
autonomi att etableras. Demokrati operationaliseras med hjälp av Freedom House 
indexet och kalibreras sedan med fuzzy-set. De flesta autonoma regionerna 
förekommer i demokratiska stater. Hela femton länder är fria, medan sex länder är 
delvis fria och endast fyra länder hör till kategorin icke-fria länder. 
 
De regionalspecifika faktorerna utgörs av den historiskt strategiska betydelsen som 
regionen haft i tiderna, det geografiska avståndet i förhållandet till moderlandet, 
tillgången på naturresurser och existensen av regionala rörelser eller partier och/eller 
existensen av separatistgrupper.  
 
Den historiskt strategiska betydelsen delas in i om området utgjort en militär utpost, 
koloni eller varit offer för krig eller konfliktsituationer. Det geografiska avståndet 
mäts fågelvägen mellan huvudstaden i landet och huvudorten i regionen ifråga. Här är 
tanken den att avståndet mellan maktcentra har betydelse för om regionen uppnått en 
specialstatus eller inte. Tillgång på naturresurser delas in i viktiga, mindre viktiga och 
obefintliga tillgångar. Regioner som innehar viktiga naturresurser anses ha en bättre 
chans att erhålla specialstatus i sammanhanget. Existensen av regionala 
rörelser/partier och/eller separatistgrupper delas in i endast ja eller nej. Existensen av 
nationella partier tas även med i beaktande. Existensen av regionala rörelser/partier 
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och/eller separatistgrupper anses utgöra en viktig faktor för att en region ska 
kunna få sin röst hörd och via dessa kanaler påverka sin egen situation. 
 
De inomstatliga faktorerna eller faktorer som är relaterade till både moderland och 
region utgörs av etnisk särprägel, storlek enligt befolkningsmängd och ekonomisk 
livskraft. Etnisk särprägel utgår ifrån minoritetsperspektivet där regionens befolkning 
jämförs med majoritetsbefolkningen i landet. Karaktäristika som ligger till grund för 
en etnisk särprägel utgörs av etniskt ursprung, religion och språk. Storleksvariabeln 
mäts som procentenhet mellan den totala befolkningen i landet jämfört med regionens 
andel av befolkningen. Ekonomisk livskraft utgörs av BNP/capita och här används 
Världsbankens indelning som måttenhet. 
 
Allt som allt börjar den första analysen med att ta alla åtta förklaringsfaktorer i 
beaktande enligt nödvändighetstestet i fuzzy-set. Fuzzy-set används här som en 
tvåstegsmodell där första analysen endast tar de 65 territoriella autonomierna i 
beaktande. Inom fuzzy-set är alla variabler eller villkor kalibrerade enligt en skala 
från 0 till 1. Värdet 0 illustrerar fullvärdigt utanförskap i ett set eller i en klass/mängd, 
medan värdet 1 illustrerar fullvärdigt medlemskap i ett set. Forskaren väljer själv sina 
gränsvärden för alla variabler i sammanhanget, men det bör ske öppet så att andra kan 
utvärdera hela fuzzy-set tabellen och utföra en replikering av analysen. Inom fuzzy-
set är det möjligt att erhålla kombinationer av variabler som förklarar det utfall som 
intresserar oss. Fuzzy-set kan ses som en alternativ metod till mer konventionella 
metoder. Inom fuzzy-set är det möjligt att kombinera kvantitativa och kvalitativa 
analyser på en och samma gång. Metoden möjliggör att förklara grad och typ på 
samma gång. Medlemskapsvärdena i fuzzy-set utgör medlemskapsvärden i 
undergrupper och på samma gång illustrerar värdena graden av medlemskap i en viss 
klass. Tekniken ger oss möjlighet att bestämma vilka konfigurationer som är viktiga 
för ett specifikt utfall, hur dessa kombinationer ser ut i förhållande till varandra, och 
vi kan även utnyttja metoden för att göra vidare analyser.   
 
Nödvändighetstestet har här gjorts med enkla XY- diagram för att visa hur enheterna 
ligger i förhållande till den beroende variabeln. Analysen görs även för att kunna 
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eliminera de nödvändiga faktorerna, så att dessa inte behöver störa den senare 
analysen för tillräcklighet. Då analysen genomförts erhåller vi två nödvändiga villkor 
i detta sammanhang och dessa utgörs av demokrati och ekonomisk livskraft. Dessa 
variabler elimineras i den andra delen av analysen. 
 
I den andra delen av analysen som är ett test för tillräcklighet har vi även eliminerat 
tillgång på naturresurser som en irrelevant variabel i sammanhanget. Tillgång på 
naturresurser har endast en svag förankring i litteraturen i förhållande till territoriell 
autonomi. Dessutom har en kontrollgrupp på möjliga territoriella autonomier tagits 
med för att vi ska kunna testa tillräcklighet på ett vettigt sätt. De möjliga fallen utgörs 
av en grupp regioner som kunde tänkas utgöra territoriella autonomier men som inte 
uppnått den status som efterfrågas. Dessa utgörs av en grupp regioner från olika delar 
i världen och uppgår till 15 stycken. Tillräcklighetsanalysen ger oss två olika vägar 
som leder till territoriell autonomi. Den ena kombinationen utgörs av etnisk särprägel 
kombinerat med liten befolkningsstorlek och den andra kombinationen är historisk 
strategisk betydelse kombinerat med geografiskt avstånd. De flesta fall täcker båda 
kombinationerna. Demokrati har även här använts som en nödvändig faktor som 
bakgrund till valet av kontrollenheter. 
 
Resultatet bekräftar tidigare forskning i sammanhanget. För att en territoriell 
autonomi ska kunna uppkomma bör det finnas en minoritet i området, befolkningen 
bör inte vara alltför stor, det bör finnas någon historisk bakgrund till tidigare 
specialförhållanden och regionen bör befinna sig på ett tillräckligt geografiskt avstånd 
i förhållande till moderlandet. Vidare bör en demokratisk miljö vara förhärskande för 
att territoriella arrangemang av detta slag ska få sin livskraft och kunna fungera. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166
  
167
167
References 
 
 
A Future for Small States. Overcoming Vulnerability 1997. London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
 
Ackrén, Maria 2005. Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de 
självstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut. 
 
Ackrén, Maria 2006. ”The Faroe Island’s Options for Independence”, Island Studies 
Journal (e-journal), Volume 1, No. 2, pp. 223-238. 
 
Ackrén, Maria 2008. “Italiens regionalisering med fokus på Friulia-Venezia Giulia” 
pp. 165-177 in Pontus Tallberg (red.): Regioner i Europa. Utgiven av Region Skåne, 
Västra Götalandsregionen och Regionplane- och trafikkontoret, 2008. 
 
Ackrén, Maria and Pär M. Olausson 2008. “Condition(s) for Island Autonomy”, 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, pp. 227-258. 
 
Agranoff, Robert 1996. ”Federal Evolution in Spain”, International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 385-401. 
 
Agranoff, Robert 2004. “Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations”, 
Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 26-65. 
 
Aldrich, Robert and John Connell 1998. The Last Colonies. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheo 1997. “Autonomy and the State of the Autonomies: 
Autonomy and Subsidiarity as Techniques for Conflict Management and State 
Building”. Paper presented at the XVII World Congress of the International Political 
Science Association, Korea, August 1997. 
 
Anckar, Carsten 1997. “Size and Democracy. Some Empirical Findings”, pp. 19-42 in 
Dag Anckar and Lars Nilsson (eds.): Politics and Geography. Contributions to an 
Interface. Mid-Sweden University Press. 
 
Anckar, Carsten 1998. Storlek och partisystem. En studie av 77 stater. Åbo: Åbo 
Akademis förlag. 
 
Anckar, Carsten 2008. ”Size, Islandness, and Democracy: A Global Comparison”, 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 433-459. 
 
Anckar, Carsten, Mårten Eriksson and Jutta Leskinen 2002. “Measuring Ethnic, 
Linguistic and Religious Fragmentation in the World”. Department of Political 
Science. Åbo Akademi University. Occasional Papers Series Nr 18/2002. 
 
167
  
168
168
Anckar, Dag 1991. Size, Remoteness, Type of Government: The Small Island 
States of the World. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid 
Åbo Akademi, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Serie A: 341. Åbo: Åbo Akademi. 
 
Anckar, Dag 1991. Världens små östater. Populationen jämte jämförelsepopulationer. 
Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, 
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Serie A: 350. Åbo: Åbo Akademi. 
 
Anckar, Dag 2008. “Decentraliserade litenheter. En kartläggning och en förklaring.” 
Conference Paper for the XV Nordic Congress in Political Science, Tromsø, Norway, 
6-9 August 2008. 
 
Anckar, Dag and Carsten Anckar 1995. ”Size, Insularity and Democracy”, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 211-229. 
 
Ascher, William 2007. “Issues and Best Practices in the Decentralization of Natural 
Resource Control in Developing Countries”, pp. 292-305 in G. Shabbir Cheema and 
Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.) 2007: Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and 
Practices. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Baldacchino, Godfrey 2003. “Jurisdictional Self-Reliance for Small Island 
Territories”, The Round Table, Issue 365, January 2003, pp. 349-360. 
 
Balme, Richard, and et.al. 1994. “Analysing territorial policies in Western Europe: 
The Case of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain”, European Journal of Political 
Research 25, pp. 389-411. 
 
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Gisèle De Meur 1994. ”Conditions of Democracy in 
Interwar Europe. A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses”, Comparative Politics, 
Volume 26, Number 3 (April 1994), pp. 253-279. 
 
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Gisèle De Meur 2002. ”Reduction of Complexity”, pp. 270-
284 in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds.): Authoritarianism and 
Democracy in Europe 1919-1939: Comparative Analyses. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Bernhardt, Rudolf 1981. “Federalism and Autonomy”, pp. 23-28 in Yoram Dinstein 
(ed.): Models of Autonomy. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
 
Bertram, Geoffrey 2004. “On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with Their 
Metropolitan Patrons”, World Development, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 343-364. 
 
Bertram Geoff & Bernard Poirine 2007. “Island Political Economy”, pp. 325-377 in 
Godfrey Baldacchino (ed.): A World of Islands. Canada: The Institute of Island 
Studies, University of Prince Edward Island in association with Agenda Academic, 
Malta. 
 
Bonniers stora världsatlas 1994. Bonnier Lexikon AB. 
168
  
169
169
 
Braumoeller, Bear F. and Gary Goertz 2000. “The Methodology of Necessary 
Conditions”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 
844-858. 
 
Brunner, G. and H. Küpper 2002. “European Options for Autonomy: A Typology of 
Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance”, pp. 11-36 in Kinga Gál (ed.): 
Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books.  
 
Burgess, Michael 2006. Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Carse, Stephen 1998. “Sustaining Small Island Development: Isle of Man” pp. 268-
291 in Godfrey Baldacchino & Robert Greenwood (eds.): Competing Strategies of 
Socio-Economic Development for Small Islands. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. 
Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island. 
 
Cesar, M. Carlos 2000. “Status of the Autonomous Region of the Azores”, p. 340 in 
Quel Statut pour les Îles d’Europe? What Status for Europe’s Islands?. Commission 
des Îles Conférence des Régions Périphiériques maritimes d’Europe: L’Harmattan.  
 
Chalmers, Douglas 2002. “Scotland Year Zero – From Words to Action”, pp. 125-149 
in Kinga Gàl (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Cheema, G. Shabbir and Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.) 2007. Decentralizing Governance: 
Emerging Concepts and Practices. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Collier, David 1995. “Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: 
The Case of Selection Bias”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 
(June 1995), pp. 461-466. 
 
Collier, David and James Mahoney 1996. “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in 
Qualitative Research”, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 56-91. 
 
Conversi, Daniele 2000. “Autonomous Communities and the Ethnic Settlement in 
Spain”, pp. 122-144 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cornell, Svante E. 2002. “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict – Caucasian Conflicts in 
Theoretical Perspective”, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (January 2002), pp. 245-276. 
 
Csurgai, Guyala 2002. “Geopolitical Aspects of the Minority Question in Central and 
South Eastern Europe”, pp. 55-72 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in 
Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Deutsch, Karl W. 1987. “Towards the scientific understanding of nationalism and 
national development: the crucial contribution of Stein Rokkan”, European Journal of 
Political Research 15, pp. 653-666. 
169
  
170
170
 
De Meur, Gisèle and Dirk Berg-Schlosser 1994. “Comparing political systems: 
Establishing similarities and dissimilarities”, European Journal of Political Research 
26, pp. 193-219. 
 
De Meur, Gisèle and Dirk Berg-Schlosser 1996. “Conditions of Authoritarianism, 
Fascism, and Democracy in Interwar Europe. Systematic Matching and Contrasting of 
Cases for “Small N” Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 
1996), pp. 423-468. 
 
De Meur, Gisèle, Benoît Rihoux and Sakura Yamasaki 2008. “Chapter 7: Addressing 
the Critiques of QCA”, pp. 147-165 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): 
Configurational Comparative Methods. Sage Publications. 
 
Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian D. Derbyshire 1999. Political Systems of the World. New 
Edition, Volume Two. Oxford: Helicon Publishing. 
 
Dinstein, Yoram 1981. “Autonomy”, pp. 291-303 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): Models of 
Autonomy. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
 
Duchacek, Ivo D. 1986. The Territorial Dimension of Politics. Within, Among, and 
Across Nations. Boulder and London: Westview Press. 
 
Economic and Social Council (within the United Nations): Economic Commission for 
Europe 2006. Gender and Minorities. ECE/CES/GE.30/2006/21. 3 July, 2006. 
 
Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University 
of Alabama Press. 
 
Elazar, Daniel J. 1996. “From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift”, 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 417-429. 
 
Encyclopedia of Nationalism 2001. Volume 2. San Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland 1993. Ethnicity & Nationalism – Anthropological 
Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Fabbrini, Sergio 2000. “Political Change without Institutional Transformation: What 
Can We Learn from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s?”, International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 173-196. 
 
Foster, Kathryn A. 1997. “Regional Impulses”, Journal of Urban Affairs, Volume 19, 
Number 4, pp. 375-403. 
 
Gàl, Kinga 2002. “Minority Governance on the Threshold of the Twenty-First 
Century”, pp. 1-8 in Kinga Gàl (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI 
Books. 
 
170
  
171
171
Ghai, Yash 2000. “Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnicity and 
Economic Diversity”, pp. 77-98 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ghai, Yash 2000. “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis”, pp. 1-26 in 
Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ghai, Yash and Anthony Regan 2000. “Bougainville and the Dialectics of Ethnicity, 
Autonomy and Separation”, pp. 242-265 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Giddens, Anthony 1994. Sociologi. Volym 2. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
 
Goertz, Gary 2003. “Assessing the importance of necessary or sufficient conditions in 
fuzzy-set social science”, COMPASSS Working Paper, WP 2003-7, 11 June 2003, can 
be accessed at <http://www.compasss.org/goertz2003.pdf>. 
 
Goertz, Gary and Joseph Hewitt 2006. “Concepts and Selecting (on) the Dependent 
Variable”, pp. 159-176 in Gary Goertz: Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney 2005. “Two-Level Theories and Fuzzy-Set 
Analysis”, Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 497-538. 
 
Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney 2006. “Negative Case Selection: The Possibility 
Principle”, pp. 177-210 in Gary Goertz: Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hampton, Mark 1998. “Accident or Design? The Role of the State in Jersey’s 
Development as an Offshore Finance Centre”, pp. 292-311 in Godfrey Baldacchino & 
Robert Greenwood (eds.): Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for 
Small Islands. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. Canada: The Institute of Island 
Studies, University of Prince Edward Island. 
 
Hampton, Mark P. and John Christensen 2002. “Offshore Pariahs? Small Island 
Economies, Tax Havens, and Re-configuration of Global Finance”, World 
Development, Vol. 30, No.9, pp. 1657-1673. 
 
Hannikainen, Lauri 1998. “Self-Determination and Autonomy in International Law”, 
pp. 79-95 in Markku Suksi (ed.): Autonomy – Applications and Implications. The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Hannum, Hurst 1996. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The 
Accomodation of Conflicting Rights. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
171
  
172
172
Hannum, Hurst and Richard B. Lillich 1980. “The Concept of Autonomy in 
International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Volume 74, Issue 4 
(October 1980), pp. 858-889. 
 
Heinze, Hans-Joachim 1998. “On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy”, pp. 7-32 in 
Markku Suksi (ed.): Autonomy – Applications and Implications. The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International. 
 
Hettne, Björn 1990. Etniska konflikter och internationella relationer. Göteborg: 
Padrigu Papers. 
 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks 2003. “Unraveling the Central State, but How? 
Types of Multi-Level Governance”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 
2 (May 2003), pp. 233-243. 
 
Jackson, Robert J. and Doreen Jackson 1993. Contemporary Government and 
Politics. Democracy and Authoritarianism. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall 
Canada. 
 
Jalali, Rita and Seymour Martin Lipset 1992-1993. “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A 
Global Perspective”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Winter 1992-
1993), pp. 585-606. 
 
Jansson, Gunnar 2000. “Introductory Speech: Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving 
Mechanism within the Council of Europe” in Seminar on Autonomy as a Conflict-
Solving Mechanism. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, Utrikesdepartementet. 
 
Katz, Aaron, Matthias vom Hau and James Mahoney 2005. “Explaining the Great 
Reversal in Spanish America: Fuzzy-Set Analysis versus Regression Analysis”, 
Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, May 2005, pp. 539-573. 
 
Kilcullen, John 2008. ’Self-Determination and the Right to Establish a Government’ 
<http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/HelsinkiB.html>, accessed from Internet 
17 March 2008. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (eds.) 1994. Designing Social 
Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Korhecz, Tamás 2002. “Chances for Ethnic Autonomy in Vojvodina: Analysis of the 
Latest Autonomy Proposal of Hungarian Political Parties in Vojvodina”, pp. 273-297 
in Kinga Gàl (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Kurian, Georg Thomas (ed.) 2007. Encyclopedia of the World’s Nations and Cultures, 
Volume III. New York: Facts on File. 
 
172
  
173
173
Kvist, Jon 1999. “Welfare Reform in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s: Using 
Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal Types”, Journal of European Social 
Policy, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 231-252. 
 
Kymlicka, Will 1998. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lago-Peñas, Ignacio and Santiago Lago-Peñas 2005. “Does the Economy Matter? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Causal Chain Connecting the Economy and the Vote in 
Galicia”, Economics & Politics, Volume 17, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 215-243. 
 
Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson 1994. Politics and Society in Western Europe. 3rd 
Edition. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Lapidoth, Ruth 2001. “Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements”, 
C.A.P. Working Paper. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. 
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf 
 
Légaré, André and Markku Suksi 2008. “Rethinking the Forms of Autonomy at the 
Dawn of the 21st Century”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 
15, No. 2-3, pp. 143-155. 
 
Lieberson, Stanley 2004. “Comments on the Use and Utility of QCA”, Qualitative 
Methods, Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Organized 
Section on Qualitative Methods, Fall 2004, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 13-14. 
 
Loughlin, John 2000. “Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western 
Europe”, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 10-34. 
 
Lundell, Krister 2005. Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice. A 
Macro-Comparative Study 1945-2003. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.  
 
Mahoney, James 2004. “Comparative-Historical Methodology”, Annual Review of 
Sociology, Vol. 30 (August 2004), pp. 81-101. 
 
Mahoney, James 2007. “Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics”, 
Comparative Political Studies, Volume 40, Number 2 (February 2007), pp. 122-144. 
 
Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz 2004. “The Possibility Principle: choosing negative 
cases in comparative research”, COMPASSS Working Paper WP 2004-19, 30 
January, 2004, can be accessed at 
<http://www.compasss.org/Mahoney_Goertz2004.pdf>. 
 
Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz 2004. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing 
Negative Cases in Comparative Research”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 
98, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 653-669. 
 
Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz 2006. “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research”, Political Analysis, Volume 14, pp. 227-249. 
173
  
174
174
 
Marko, Joseph 1995. Autonomie und Integration. Rechtsinstitute des 
Nationalitätsrechts im funktionalen Vergleich. Wien-Köln-Graz: Böhlau Verlag. 
 
McGarry, John 2005. “Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational State”, 
Working Paper for the 3rd International conference on Federalism, Brussels, 3-5 
March 2005. 
 
McKercher, William R. 2000. “The Isle of Man: Jurisdictional Catapult to 
Development”, pp. 91-106 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons 
from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with Institute of Island Studies, 
University of Prince Edward Island, Canada. 
 
Menschenrechte. Dokumente und Deklarationen 1999. Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, Bonn, Deutschland. 
 
Minority Rights Group International (ed.) 1997. World Directory of Minorities. 
United Kingdom. 
 
Morata, Francesc 2001. “Spanish Regions in the European Community”, pp. 115-133 
in Barry Jones and Michael Keating (eds.): The European Union and the Regions. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr 1982. “Case Selection, Conceptualizations and 
Basic Logic in the Study of War”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, 
No. 4 (November 1982), pp. 834-856. 
 
Nauclér, Elisabeth 2005. “Autonomy and multilevel governance: Experiences in 
Nordic and Continental European cooperation”, pp. 98-116 in Marc Weller and Stefan 
Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Neukirch, Claus 2002. “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Gagauz 
Territorial Autonomy in the Republic of Moldova”, pp. 105-123 in Kinga Gál (ed.): 
Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Newman, David and Ghazi Falah 1997. “Bridging the gap: Palestinian and Israeli 
discourses on autonomy and statehood”, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers. Royal Geographic Society, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 111-129. 
 
Nordquist, Kjell-Åke 2001. “Åland i ett jämförande internationellt perspektiv” , pp. 
95-101 in Harry Jansson och Johannes Salminen (red.): Den andra Ålandsfrågan – 
Autonomi eller självständighet?. Julius Sundbloms Minnesstiftelse. Mariehamn: 
Ålands Tidnings Tryckeri AB. 
 
Olausson, Pär M. 2007. Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that 
Determine Island Autonomy. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press. 
174
  
175
175
 
Oostindie G. 2006. ”Dependence and Autonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions: 
The Case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, The Round Table, Vol. 95, No. 386, 
pp. 609-626. 
 
Paddison, Ronan 1983. The Fragmented State. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell 
Publisher. 
 
Palermo, Francesco 2007. Information from Professor and Director of the Institute for 
Studies on Federalism and Regionalism, University of Verona. E-mail Contact at 21 
April, 2007. 
 
Pennings, Paul 2003. “Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional 
control of the executive with fuzzy-sets”, European Journal of Political Research 42, 
pp. 541-567. 
 
Peters, B. Guy 1998. Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. London: Macmillan 
Press. 
 
Pierre, Jon 1994. Den lokala staten – Den kommunala självstyrelsens förutsättningar 
och restriktioner. Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell. 
 
Przeworski, Adam & Henry Teune 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
New York: Wiley-Interscience. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2000. Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2004. ‘From Fuzzy Sets to Crisp Truth Tables’, COMPASSS 
Working Paper WP-2004-28 (Posted 7 December 2004), can be accessed from 
<http://www.compasss.org/Raginfztt_April05.pdf> 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2006. “Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their 
Consistency and Coverage”, Political Analysis, Volume 14, Number 3, Summer 2006, 
pp. 291-310. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. “Fuzzy-Sets: Calibration versus Measurement”, pp. 174-198 
in David Collier, Henry Brady, and Janet Box-Steffensmeier (eds.): Methodology 
Volume of Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. “Chapter 5: Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using Fuzzy 
Sets (fsQCA)”, pp. 87-121 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): 
Configurational Comparative Analysis. Sage Publications. 
 
175
  
176
176
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis. Tucson, Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona 
 
Ragin, Charles C. and Paul Pennings 2005. “Fuzzy Sets and Social Research”, 
Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 423-430. 
 
Ragin, Charles C. and John Sonnett 2005. “Between Complexity and Parsimony: 
Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis”, pp. 180-197 in 
Sabine Kropp und Michael Minkenberg (eds.): Vergleichen in der 
Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
 
Rainer, Karl 2002. “The Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano-South Tyrol”, pp. 
89-103 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Rihoux, Benoît 2003. “Bridging the Gap between the Qualitative and Quantitative 
Worlds? A Retrospective and Prospective View on Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis”, Field Methods, Vol. 15, No. 4, November 2003, pp. 351-365. 
 
Rihoux, Benoît and Gisèle De Meur 2008. ”Chapter 3: Crisp-Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (csQCA)”, pp. 33-68 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin 
(eds.): Configurational Comparative Methods. Sage Publications. 
 
Riker, William H. 1996. “European Federalism. The Lessons of Past Experience”, pp. 
9-24 in J.J. Hesse and V. Wright (eds.): Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, 
and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rothchild, Donald and Caroline A. Hartzell 2000. “Security in Deeply Divided 
Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy”, pp. 254-271 in William Safran and 
Ramón Máiz (eds.): Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London: 
Frank Cass Publishers. 
 
Safran, William 2000. “Spatial and Functional Dimension of Autonomy: Cross-
national and Theoretical Perspectives”, pp. 11-34 in William Safran and Ramón Máiz 
(eds.): Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers. 
 
Safran, William and Ramón Máiz (eds.) 2000. Identity and Territorial Autonomy in 
Plural Societies. London: Frank Cass Publishers. 
 
Sasse, Gwendolyn 2001. “The ‘New’ Ukraine: A State of Regions”, Regional and 
Federal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 69-100. 
 
Schneider, Carsten Q. & Claudius Wagemann 2006. “Reducing complexity in 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the 
consolidation of democracy”, European Journal of Political Research 45, pp. 751-
786. 
 
176
  
177
177
Schneider, Carsten Q. & Claudius Wagemann 2007. Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy Sets. Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara 
Budrich. 
 
Seawright, Jason 2004. ”Qualitative Comparative Analysis vis-a-vis Regression”, 
Qualitative Methods, Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, 
Organized Section on Qualitative Methods, Fall 2004, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 14-17. 
 
Silverström, Sören 2004. De rättsliga ramarna för vissa autonomiers och 
mikrostaters förhållande till Europeiska Unionen. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-
statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, Rättsvetenskapliga institutionen, Ser. 
A: 543. Åbo: Åbo Akademi. 
 
Skaaning, Svend-Erik 2007. “Explaining post-communist respect for civil liberty: A 
multi-methods test”, Journal of Business Research 60 (2007), pp. 493-500. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 2006. “Ethnicity and Nationalism”, pp. 169-181 in Gerard Delanty 
and Krishan Kumar (eds.): The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism. London, 
Thousand Oaks and Delhi: Sage Publications. 
 
Smithson, Michael 2005. “Fuzzy Set Inclusion: Linking Fuzzy Set Methods With 
Mainstream Techniques”, Sociological Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 431-
461. 
 
Smithson, Michael and Jay Verkuilen 2006. Fuzzy-Set Theory – Applications in the 
Social Sciences. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 147. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Sohn, Louis B. 1981. “Models of Autonomy within the United Nations Framework”, 
pp. 5-22 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): Models of Autonomy. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books. 
 
Sorens, Jason 2004. “Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy”, Electoral Studies 
23, pp. 727-752. 
 
Sorens, Jason 2005. “The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced 
Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, April 2005, pp. 304-
326. 
 
Srebrnik, Henry F. 2000. “Identity, Culture and Confidence in the Global Economy”, 
pp. 56-71 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons from the Political 
Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. London and New 
York: Macmillan Press in association with Institute of Island Studies, University of 
Prince Edward Island, Canada. 
 
Stepan, Alfred 1999. “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model”, Journal 
of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 4, pp. 19-34. 
 
177
  
178
178
Stepan, Alfred 2001. “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, 
(Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism”, pp. 315-361 in 
Alfred Stepan (ed.): Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Suksi, Markku 1995. Frames of Autonomy and the Åland Islands. Meddelanden från 
Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, Rättsvetenskapliga 
institutionen, Ser. A: 433. Åbo: Åbo Akademi. 
 
Suksi, Markku 1996. ”Aspekter på autonomi” pp. 93-98 in Minorities and Conflicts – 
Minoriteter och konflikter. Meddelanden från Ålands högskola, nr 9. Mariehamn: 
Ålands högskola. 
 
Suksi, Markku 2005. Ålands konstitution. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag. 
 
Tarlton, Charles D. 1965. ”Symmetri and Asymmetri as Elements of Federalism: A 
Theoretical Speculation”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Nov., 1965), pp. 
861-874. 
 
Tkacik, Michael 2008. “Characteristics of Forms of Autonomy”, International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, pp. 369-401. 
 
Toft, Monica D. 2001. “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building, and 
the Failed Transition in Georgia”, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 
Autumn 2003, pp. 123-142. 
 
Verkuilen, Jay 2005. “Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis”, Sociological 
Methods & Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 462-496. 
 
Vizi, Balázs 2002. “Minority Groups and Autonomy from an International Political 
Perspective”, pp. 37-54 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. 
Budapest: LGI Books. 
 
Watts, Ronald L. 2000. “Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective”, pp. 17-
37 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): Lessons from the Political 
Economy of Small Islands. The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. London: Macmillan 
Press and New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Watts, Ronald L. 2005. “Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships”, pp. 233-253 in 
Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds.): Theories of Federalism – A Reader. 
New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Weber, Max 1983. Ekonomi och samhälle – Förståendesociologins grunder 1. Lund: 
Argos. 
 
Weller, Marc and Stefan Wolff 2005. “Recent trends in autonomy and state 
construction”, pp. 262-270 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, Self-
governance and Conflict Resolution. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
178
  
179
179
Wolff, Stefan and Marc Weller 2005. “Self-determination and autonomy – A 
conceptual introduction”, pp. 1-25 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): Autonomy, 
Self-governance and Conflict Resolution. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Internet: 
 
Act on Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1993 
<http://www.lagtinget.aland.fi/eng/act.html>, accessed from Internet 28 February 
2007 
 
Anguilla Constitution Order 1982 <http://www.gov.ai/images%20 Const.pdf>, 
accessed from Internet 21 February 2007 
 
Autonomous Regions of China 
<http://www.paulnoll.com/China/Provinces/autonomous-regions.html>, accessed 
from Internet 21 May 2007 
 
Bano, Arsenio and Edward Rees, The Oecussi-Ambeno Enclave 
<http://www.serve.com/inside/edit71/Oecussi.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 May 
2007 
 
Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China 1993: Chapter I, Chapter II and Chapter IV, Various Articles 
<http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp>, accessed 
from Internet 4 May 2007 
 
BBC News, Regions and territories: Abkhazia 
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>, accessed from 
Internet 22 May 2006 
 
BBC News, Regions and territories: Ajaria 
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>, accessed from 
Internet 22 May 2007 
 
BBC News, Regions and territories: Guadeloupe 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/4252578.stm>, accessed 
from Internet 5 May 2008 
 
BBC News, Regions and territories: Martinique 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/4537753.stm>, accessed from 
Internet 6 May 2008 
 
Bermuda Constitution Order 1968 
<http://www.ubp.bm/downloads/BermudaConstitutionOrder 1968.pdf>, accessed 
from Internet 22 February 2007 
 
Bougainville Peace Process <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/>, 
accessed from Internet 24 April 2007 
179
  
180
180
 
CIA – The World Factbook 2007 and 2008 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> 
 
Constitution Finder <http://confinder.richmond.edu/> 
 
Constitution of Denmark, Part X, Section 88 <http: 
<www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/da00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 22 February  
2007 
 
Constitution of Estonia, Chapter XIV 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/en00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 2 May 
2008 
 
Constitution of Italy, Article 123 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html>, 
accessed from Internet 23 February 2007 
 
Constitution of Tajikistan 1994: Chapter 7, Articles 81-84, Chapter 6, Articles 53, 60 
and 63 and Chapter 10, Articles 98-99 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan003670.htm>, 
accessed from Internet 2 May 2007 
 
Constitution of Tanzania 1977 
<http://www.tanzania.go.tz/images/constitutioneng.pdf>, accessed from Internet 28 
February 2007 
 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Article VII, Section 1 
<http://welcome.topuertorico.org/constitu.shtml>, accessed from Internet 27 February 
2007 
 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor 2002 
<http://www.constitution.org/cons/east_timor/constitution-eng.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 27 February 2007 
 
Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Article 287 
<http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/cotisopng534/>, accessed from Internet 22 
February 2007 
 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 2005 
<http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html>, accessed from 
Internet 21 February 2007 
 
Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 
<http://www.vanuatugovernment.gov.vu/government/library/constitution.html>, 
accessed from Internet 5 May 2008 
 
180
  
181
181
Constitution of the Solomon Islands 
<http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/>, accessed from Internet 5 May 
2008 
 
Constitution of Turks and Caicos Islands 1998 
<http://www.turksandcaicosislands.gov.tc/OtherPages/THE%20CONSTITUTION.pd
f>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007 
 
Constitution of Ukraine 1996: Article 135 and Article 154 
<http://www.ukraineinfo.us/about/constitution.html>, accessed from Internet 22 
February 2007 
 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly: Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an 
additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta93/erec1201.htm>, 
retrieved 14 December, 2006 
 
EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/aceh>, accessed 
from Internet 22 May 2007 
 
Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006> 
 
Freedom of the World 2007 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year2007> 
 
Freedom in the Territories <http://www.mherrera.org/territories.htm/>, accessed from 
Internet 17 October 2007 
 
French Constitution of 1958 <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp>, 
accessed from Internet 22 February 2007 
 
fs/QCA Software Program 
<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml> 
 
Government of Wales Act 1998 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80038--
q.htm#151>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007 
 
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
<http://english.jeju.go.kr/contents/index.php?=0202>, accessed from Internet 6 March 
2008 
 
Laws of Fiji, Rotuma Act, Chapter 122 
<http://www.paclii.org/fj/legis/consol_act/ra103/>, accessed from Internet 21 May 
2007 
 
181
  
182
182
Macau Basic Law 1993, Chapter VIII, Article 144 
<http://www.umac/mo/basiclaw/english/ch8.html>, accessed from Internet 26 
February 2007 
 
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Section IX in the Constitution of Azerbaijan 
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_azerbaijan.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007 
 
National Assembly for Wales <http://www.wales.gov.uk/>, accessed from Internet 11 
May 2007 
 
Niue Constitution Act 1974, Part II, 35 
<http://www.legislation.co.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes>, accessed 
from Internet 27 February 2007 
 
Norfolk Island Act 1979 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ncet/NorfolkGov/NorfolkIsland79.pdf>, 
accessed from Internet 27 February 2007 
 
Northern Ireland Act 1998, Part I <http://www.statute.law.gov.uk/>, accessed from 
Internet 27 February 2007 
 
Northern Ireland Assembly <http://www.assembly.gov.uk/>, accessed from Internet 7 
May 2007 
 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 
18 (Rev. 1), Minority Rights, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs18.htm>, retrieved 14 
December 2006 
 
Portrait of the Regions 
<http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/lv_national.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 28 May 2008 
 
Portrait of the Regions 
<http://circa.europa.eu/irc/clsis/regportraits/info/data/en/lv002_geo.htm>, accessed 
from Internet 30 May 2008 
 
Republic Act No. 9054, Article XVII, Section 1-2 
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf>, accessed from Internet 
26 February 2007 
 
Revised Constitution of American Samoa 1967, Article V, Section 4 
<http://www.asbar.org/Newcode/rcas.htm>, accessed from Internet 15 February 2007 
 
Scotland Act 1998 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts1998/80046-a.htm#1>, accessed 
from Internet 28 February 2007 
 
182
  
183
183
Spain: The Canary Islands Special Zone 
<http://www.lowtax.net/html/offon/spain/spncan.html>, accessed from Internet 26 
April 2007 
 
Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146 and Section 147 (3) 
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet 15 February 
2007 
 
States of Guernsey, Constitution <http://www.gov.gg/ccm/navigation/about-
guernsey/constitution/?textonly=yes>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007 
 
Svenska Dagbladet 5 april 2007: “100 ja till Kosovo-plan” 
<http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/utrikes/did_14992590.asp>, accessed from Internet 4 
May 2007 
 
Statutory Instrument 1989 No. 2401, The Montserrat Constitution Order 1989 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19892401_en_4.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 16, 18 and 20 
<http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/a17.asp>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, Different Articles 
<http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hk00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 22 
November 2002 
 
The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, Article 159 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/content0208.htm>, accessed from Internet 
26 February 2007 
 
The British Antarctic Territory Order 1989 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19890842_en_l-htm>, accessed from 
Internet 22 February 2007 
 
The Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972 
<http://www.gov.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/CIGHOME/GOVERNMENT/CONSTIT
UTION/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTIONAMENDED2004ORDER.PDF>, 
accessed from Internet 22 February 2007 
 
The Commonwealth Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1-4 
<http://cnmilaw.org/constitution_article18.htm>, accessed from Internet 27 February 
2007 
 
The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda 
<http://www.ab.gov.ag/gov_v2/shared/constitution.html>, accessed from Internet 2 
May 2008 
 
183
  
184
184
The Constitution of France 1958, Articles 72-1, 72-4 and 74 
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20XII>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The Constitution of Isle of Man <http://www.gov.im/isleofman/constitution.xml>, 
accessed from Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The Constitution of Mauritius <http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/const.htm>, 
accessed from Internet 22 May 2007 
 
The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic 1995, Section IX, Article 134 and 
Section XI, Article 152 
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_azerbaijan.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The Constitution of the Cook Islands 
<http://www.paclii.org/ck/legis/num_act/cotci327/>, accessed from Internet 22 
February 2007 
 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002, Chapter 7, Article 123 
<http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/6165/grondwet_UK_6-02.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 21 February 2007 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 69-74, 98 and 107 
<http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html#Part%20Four>
, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007 
 
The Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006 
<http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/constitution/new_constitution/NewGibraltarConstitution
.pdf>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007 
 
The Pitcairn Islands Order 1970 
<http://www.government.pn/Laws/PitcairnLaws.html>, accessed from Internet 27 
February 2007 
 
The Regional Assembly <http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/assembly.htm>, 
accessed from Internet 22 May 2007 
 
The Republic of Karakalpakstan 
<http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Regions/Karakalpakstan/>, accessed from 
Internet 4 May 2007 
 
The Rodrigues Regional Assembly Act 2001 
<http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/rraact.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 May 
2007 
 
184
  
185
185
The Scottish Parliament 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/corporate/powers/index.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 8 May 2007 
 
The St. Helena Constitution Order 1988 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si1988/Uksi_19881842_en_l.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 28 February 2007 
 
The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 6 and 10 
<http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/> 
 
The Statute of Autonomy: The Foundations of the Balearic Autonomy 
<http://www.caib.es/kfcont.htm> 
 
The Virgin Islands (Constitution) Order 1976 (As Amended) 
<http://www.dpu.gov.vg/AboutUs/Constitution.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 
February 2007 
 
Tokelau Act 1948 <http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Government/lawl.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 28 February 2007 
 
TVE’s Earth Report: Where Families and Mountains Meet 
<http://www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=882>, accessed from Internet 2 
May 2007 
 
U.S. Code Title 48: Chapter 12, Subchapter III, §1574 and Chapter 12, Subchapter I, 
§1541 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?>, accessed from 
Internet 15 February 2007 
 
U.S. Code Title 48: Chapter 8A, Subchapter 1, §1421b 
<http://www.law/cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode48/usc_sup_01 _48_10_8A.html>, 
accessed from Internet 23 February 2007 
 
World Bank <http://go.worldbank.org/50KY0015VO> and 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>, 
accessed from Internet 31 March 2008 
 
Other Websites: 
 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnmark>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008 
 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_autonomous_areas_by_country>, accessed 
from Internet 4 November 2008 
 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_the_Netherlands>, accessed from Internet 
29 May 2008 
 
185
  
186
186
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Hungary>, accessed from Internet 29 
May 2008  
 
<http://ethnia.org/ethnia-fiche.php?ask=Th-06>, accessed from Internet 14 December 
2007 
 
<http://islands.unep/ch/IHD.htm#859>, accessed from Internet 13 December 2007 
 
<http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/history.html>, accessed from Internet 6 May 
2008 
 
<http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/political_parties.html>, accessed from Internet 7 
May 2008 
 
<http://thesea.org/coralreef/africa/MauritiusRodriguez.htm>, accessed from Internet 
14 December 2007 
 
<http://www.barbudaful.net/politics.html>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008 
 
<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9117392/Guadeloupe>, accessed from Internet 
7 May 2008. 
 
<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-6135/Reunion>, accessed from Internet 6 May 
2008 
 
<http://www.cgc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file0016/3427/Section_09_-_Chapter_4_-
_The_Norfolk_Island_Economy.pdf>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007 
 
<http://www.crimea_portal.gov.au/index.php?=4&tek=&par=&art=194&date=>, 
accessed from Internet 13 December 2007 
 
<http://www.demographia.com/db-intlppp.region.htm>, accessed from Internet 14 
December 2007 
 
<http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=sb>, retrieved 7 May, 2008 
 
<http://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/Reunion-Island.html>, retrieved 7 May, 2008 
 
<http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FToday2006_2007.doc>, accessed from Internet 2 
May 2008 
 
<http://www.finnmark.no/page.jsp?id=2&mid=1>, accessed from Internet 29 May 
2008 
 
<http://www.hktdc.com/emergingmarketguide/2-1.htm>, accessed from Internet 29 
May 2008 
 
186
  
187
187
<http://www.hungary-tourist-guide.com/southern-great-plain.html>, accessed 
from Internet 29 May 2008 
 
<http://www.imidea.uib.es/pressdbfiles/000218/02-03.pdf>, accessed from Internet 13 
December 2007 
 
<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107545.html>, retrieved 7 May, 2008 
 
<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008 
 
<http://www.latreg.lv/pub/default.php?lang=eng&lapa=82&oid=82>, accessed from 
Internet 30 May 2008. 
 
<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/shop_pickandmix/free_chapters/fiji-rotuma.pdf>, 
accessed from Internet 7 May 2008  
 
<http://www.magyarorszag.hu/english/abouthungary/data/country/administration.html
>, accessed from Internet 28 May 2008 
 
<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/Newsletters/Theme-in-Focus/4168/>, accessed from 
Internet 30 May 2008 
 
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Vanuatu-POLITICAL-
PARTIES.html>, retrieved 7 May, 2008  
 
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/S-o-Tom-and-Pr-
ncipe.html>, retrieved 7 May, 2008 
 
<http://www.pacificislandtravel.com/solomon_islands/about_destin/santaisabel.html>
, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008 
 
<http://www.rotuma.net/os/History.html>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008 
 
<http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195&Ite
mid=261>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008 
 
<http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207&Ite
mid=259>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008 
 
<http://www.ssb.no/kfvalgkand/tab-2007-06-26-01.html>, accessed from Internet 29 
May 2008  
 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2336.htm>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008 
 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008 
 
<http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/wfb.php3?CODEPAYS=MTN>, 
retrieved 7 May, 2008 
187
  
188
188
 
<http://www.theodora.com/wfb/guadeloupe_government.html>, retrieved 7 May, 
2008 
 
<http://www.toppensidor.com/om/danmark/default.asp?topic=Danmark>, accessed 
from Internet 29 May 2008 
 
<http://www.tzdac.or.tz/main/DPG%20subgroups/zanzibar>, accessed from Internet 
14 December 2007   
 
<http://www.vanuatuparadise.com/NewFiles/anglais/iles/mallicolo_ang.html>, 
retrieved 7 May, 2008  
 
<http://www.vanuatutourism.com/vanuatu/cms/en/vanuatu.html>, accessed from 
Internet 6 May 2008 
 
<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Martinique.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 May 
2008   
 
<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Reunion.htm>, retrieved 7 May, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188
  
189
189
Appendix: Territorial Autonomies in Alphabetic Order  
 
The territorial autonomies will be outlined according to table 1 pages 30-35. Starting 
with the Åland Islands and ending with Zanzibar ever autonomy is covered together 
with a short description of each territory. 
 
Åland Islands 
 
The Åland Islands are governed according to the Act on the Autonomy of the Åland 
Islands 1993. The Islands are also mentioned in the Finnish National Constitution. 
The powers are vested in a Legislative Assembly (Lagting) and an Executive 
Authority (Landskapsregering). The Legislative Assembly has 30 members, who are 
elected according to universal adult suffrage, for a four-year term. 
 
The Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands can only be amended by joint 
decisions of the Parliament of Finland and the Åland Parliament. In the Parliament of 
Finland, decisions are made according to the provisions specified in the amendment 
of the National Constitution; in the Åland Parliament decisions are ratified by having 
a two third majority of the votes cast.318     
 
American Samoa 
  
American Samoa is an unincorporated territory belonging to the USA. Under the 
terms of the 1967 constitution, executive power is exercised by a Governor who is 
directly elected for a four-year term. The Governor has the right to appoint heads of 
government departments, endorse the approvals of the assembly, and can veto 
legislation. The assembly, called the Fono, is a two-chamber body, comprised of an 
18-member Senate, elected, according to Samoan custom, from among the local male 
chiefs (matai) for four-year terms, and a 20-member House of Representatives, whose 
members are popularly elected every two years. Swain’s Island also sends one non-
                                                 
318 Act on Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1993 <http://www.lagtinget.aland.fi/eng/act.html>, accessed 
from Internet 28 February 2007. 
189
  
190
190
voting member to the House. The Fono convenes twice a year, in January and 
July, for a maximum of 45 days a year. American Samoa has, since 1981, also sent a 
non-voting delegate to the US House of Representatives, and this delegate is elected 
every two years.319 American Samoa controls its own internal affairs. 
 
To revise the constitution in American Samoa, the Governor appoints a new 
Constitutional Committee, five years after the effective date of the current 
Constitution to prepare amendments or a revised draft constitution to be submitted to 
the Governor. The Governor calls a constitutional convention to do the same, with the 
delegates to the convention being selected by their respective county councils. The 
number of delegates from each county is the number obtained by dividing the 
population of the county, as shown by the last preceding Federal census, by 400. Each 
county should therefore have at least one delegate and Swains Island is guaranteed 
one delegate selected in an open meeting by the permanent adult residents of the 
Island (the elders). When the constitutional convention has made a decision about a 
revision or draft constitution, this has to be submitted by the Governor to the voters 
eligible to vote for members of the House of Representatives at the next general 
election. If a majority of the voters approve the amendments or the proposed revised 
constitution, the Governor submits the amendments to the Secretary of Interior for his 
approval. The Secretary of the Interior is the final authority in this case.320   
 
American Virgin Islands 
 
The American Virgin Islands have been granted a measure of self-government under 
the constitution of 1936, which has been amended several times i.e. in 1954, 1970 and 
1973. Executive power is exercised by a directly elected Governor who serves a four-
year period. The Governor appoints, on the advice of the assembly, the heads of 
government departments and is required to approve any legislation. The assembly, 
called the Senate, is a single-chamber body, comprising 15 members, popularly 
                                                 
319 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999). Political Systems of the World. New Edition, 
Volume Two. Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd., p. 867. 
320 Revised Constitution of American Samoa 1967, Article V, Section 4 
<http://www.asbar.org/Newcode/rcas.htm>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
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elected for a two-year period, who represent two legislative districts. Since 1968, 
the US Virgin Islands have elected a non-voting delegate to the US House of 
Representatives. The Islands’ citizens are excluded from voting in US presidential 
elections.321  
 
The territory functions directly under US jurisdiction and is supervised by the 
Secretary of the Interior. The Congress of the United States has the ultimate power to 
annul any Act made by the legislature of the Virgin Islands.322 
 
The American Virgin Islands handle all internal matters and function as an 
unincorporated territory of the US. Proposals for increased autonomy have been 
rejected in referenda held in March 1979 and November 1981.323 
 
Andalusia 
 
Andalusia in Spain has been considered as one of the historical regions. Andalusia has 
an autonomy statute, which has been ratified by referendum. The Spanish Parliament 
can transfer legislative and executive functions without a reform of the statute of 
autonomy. The Spanish Constitution has established that each autonomous region 
should have a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage, a government 
headed by a president, and a high court of justice. The administrative organization is 
decided by each autonomous region.324 Some of the matters are shared with the 
central level, but Andalusia is considered to have full autonomous status. 
 
The government of Andalusia has established offices in Brussels with the legal status 
of limited trade companies.325 
 
                                                 
321 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 870. 
322 U.S. Code Title 48, Chapter 12, Subchapter III, §1574 and Chapter 12, Subchapter I, §1541 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
323 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 870. 
324 Francesc Morata (2001). ‘Spanish Regions in the European Community’ in Barry Jones and 
Michael Keating (eds.): The European Union and the Regions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
116. 
325 Ibid, p. 125. 
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The draft of the Statute of Autonomy is drawn up by an assembly of the members 
of the Provincial Council and respective members of Congress and elected Senators 
and then sent to the Cortes Generales to be drafted as an Act. 326 Amendments to the 
Statutes of Autonomy follow the procedure mentioned in the National Constitution 
and require approval of the Cortes Generales through an organic act.327  
 
Anguilla 
 
The 1982 constitution, which regulates Anguillan affairs, was amended in 1990. The 
British Crown is represented by an appointed Governor who is responsible for 
external affairs, defense, the judiciary, the ‘offshore’ banking sector, and internal 
security. The Governor presides over meetings of the Executive Council and the 
House of Assembly. The Executive Council, or cabinet, comprises a chief minister, 
with whom the Governor works closely and three other ministers selected from the 
House of Assembly, as well as ex officio members, the Attorney General and the 
Permanent Secretary for Finance. The House of Assembly consists of seven members 
directly elected for five-year terms, as well as two nominated and two ex officio 
representatives.328 
 
In Anguilla, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom reserves the right, 
together with Her Privy Council, to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Anguilla.329 This also applies to amendments to the Anguillan 
constitution. 
 
Aruba 
 
In Aruba there is a 21-member single chamber assembly, called the Island Council 
(Staten). The assembly is elected by universal adult suffrage for a four year period 
                                                 
326 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146 
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
327 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 147 (3) 
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
328 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 853. 
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and subject to dissolution during that time. Executive authority for internal affairs 
is exercised by an eight to ten member Council of Ministers, headed by a prime 
minister and responsible to the Staten. Dutch interests are overseen by a crown-
appointed Governor, who serves a six-year term as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Island’s armed forces and has executive authority in external matters. Any proposal 
for full independence needs approval in a referendum and the support of a two-thirds 
majority in the Staten.330  
 
Aruba has direct ties with the Dutch Kingdom. These ties are a manner of 
“Commonwealth” relationships between the different parts of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. Revisions and amendments are decided by an Act of Parliament. The 
Dutch Parliament has the ultimate right to change the island’s status together with the 
consent of the Island Council.331  
 
There has been some turbulence during recent years among the different parts of the 
Netherlands. The larger islands of the Netherland’s Antilles have been striving 
towards the same status as Aruba (status aparte since 1986). It seems feasible that 
Bonaire, Curaçao and Sint Maarten will secure a direct relationship (status aparte) 
with Amsterdam, and the two smallest islands will become municipalities of the 
Netherlands proper, leading to a fragmentation of the Netherland’s Antilles. The 
Dutch government is likely to only remain responsible for defense and foreign affairs, 
and each island will manage and be responsible for its own internal affairs.332 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
329 Anguilla Constitution Order 1982 <http://www.gov.ai/images%20 Const.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 21 February 2007. 
330 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 840. 
331 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002, Chapter 7, Article 123 
<http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/6156/grondwet_UK_6-02.pdf>, accessed from Internet 21 
February 2007. 
332 Maria Ackrén (2006). ‘The Faroe Island’s Options for Independence’, Island Studies Journal, 
Volume 1, No. 2, 2006, p. 232. See also G. Oostindie (2006). ‘Dependence and Autonomy in Sub-
National Island Jurisdictions: The Case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands’, The Round Table, Vol. 95, 
No. 386, pp. 609-626.  
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Azores 
 
The Azores have a legislative assembly which has competence to legislate in many 
internal matters ranging over administration of the islands, taxation, budget control, 
healthcare, social security, transport and education. The state of Portugal has control 
over defense, police, order, customs, immigration and some other jurisdictional 
areas.333 
 
The Azores have a Regional Legislative Assembly of elected members and a Regional 
Government. The president of the Regional Government and its ministers are 
appointed by a resident Minister of the Republic, who represents the Portuguese 
national government in the islands. The Azores also elect members to the parliament 
in Lisbon.334 
 
The Assembly of the Republic may revise the constitution of Portugal five years after 
the date of publication of the last ordinary revision law. There is also a possibility of 
revision when a four-fifths majority of all Members (in the Assembly) take 
extraordinary revision powers at any time in full exercise of their office. The Azores 
and Madeira are regulated under the constitution of Portugal even though the islands 
possess their own statutes.335  
 
Balearic Islands 
 
The Balearic Islands as well as Andalusia belong to the historical regions of Spain. 
Similar to Andalusia, the Balearic Islands have their own legislative assembly elected 
by universal suffrage, a government headed by a president, and a high court of 
                                                 
333 M. Carlos Cesar (2000). ‘Status of the Autonomous Region of the Azores’ in Quel Statut pour les 
Îles d’Europe? What Status for Europe’s Islands? Commission des Îles Conférence des Régions 
Périphiériques maritimes d’Europe: L’Harmattan, p. 340. 
334 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998). The Last Colonies, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 49. 
335 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 2005 
<http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html>, accessed from Internet 21 February 
2007. 
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justice.336 The president is elected by parliament from amongst its members. The 
parliament of the Balearic Islands approves all the laws of the Autonomous 
Community, including general budgetary legislation, and it supervises all acts of 
government. The government consists of the president, the vice-president (whenever 
appropriate) and the councilors. The government is responsible for controlling the 
Autonomous Community’s local administration and all public bodies, services and 
entities, which are dependent upon the latter. The government can also create 
regulations. Each councilor heads a specific department.337  
 
The draft of the Statutes of Autonomy in Spain are drawn up by an assembly of 
members of the Provincial Council or inter-island body of the provinces concerned, 
and respective Members of Congress and elected Senators and has to be sent to the 
Cortes Generales for drafting as an Act.338 Amendments of Statutes of Autonomy 
follow the procedure mentioned in the Spanish Constitution and require approval of 
the Cortes Generales through an organic act.339 All Spanish regions follow the same 
procedure as regards amendments. 
 
The Balearic Islands have two co-official languages, which denote that the two 
languages have official status on the Islands. One is the Community’s own native 
language, Catalan, which has been spoken since the 13th century, and the other is the 
official state language, Castilian. The educational system guarantees an adequate 
knowledge of both languages.340  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
336 Francesc Morata (2001). ‘Spanish Regions in the European Community’, op.cit., p. 116. 
337 The Statute of Autonomy: The Foundations of Balearic Autonomy (http://www.caib.es/kfcont.htm). 
338 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146 
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
339 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 147 (3)  
<http://www. senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007. 
340 The Statute of Autonomy: The Foundations of Balearic Autonomy 
<http://www.caib.es/kfcont.htm>. 
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Basque Country 
 
The Basque Country is also one of the cultural and historical regions of Spain that has 
its own legislative assembly and government. The amendment procedure follows the 
same pattern as for Andalusia and the Balearic Islands. 
 
The autonomous community of the Basque Country has sole jurisdiction in the 
following matters: delimitation of municipal territory, organization, regime and 
functioning of self-government; internal electoral legislation affecting the Basque 
Parliament and Provincial Councils, local government and local administration; and 
preservation, modification and development of traditional, regional and special civil 
law. Other matters included are procedural rules and those concerning administrative 
and economic procedures, public domain and property, woodland and forestry 
resources and services, agriculture and livestock farming, fishing, etc. All matters are 
listed in the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.341 
 
In the Basque Country, there are also two official languages, one being the language 
of the Basque People, ‘Euskera’, and the other being the official state language, 
Castilian. Both languages can be used and are guaranteed equal status in the 
Community.342  
 
Bermuda 
 
Bermuda is internally self-governing. The United Kingdom remains responsible for 
the Island’s external affairs, defense, and internal security, including the police. 
British interests are represented by an appointed governor. The Island’s assembly has 
two chambers: the 11-member Senate and the 40-member House of Assembly. Three 
of the Senate’s members are appointed by the governor, five by the prime minister 
and three by the leader of the opposition. The members of the House of Assembly are 
all directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a five year period, from 20 two-
                                                 
341 The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 10 <http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/>. 
342 The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 6 <http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/>. 
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member constituencies. As late as 1990, the minimum voting age was lowered 
from 21 years to 18 years. From the majority grouping in the House of Assembly, the 
governor appoints a prime minister to preside over a cabinet of approximately 14 
ministers of his or her own choosing. At least six cabinet ministers must be selected 
from the assembly. There is also a Governor’s Council for consultative purposes 
between the governor and the ministers.343 
 
In Bermuda, the appointed governor may make amendments at any time within a 
twelve month period after the commencement of the Bermuda Constitution Order. 
The Legislature in Bermuda has authority to amend, repeal or revoke any existing 
law.344 
 
Bougainville 
 
Bougainville is regulated according to the Constitution of the Independent State of 
Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville Constitution is included in the State’s 
Constitution. To amend this constitution, the Bougainville Executive has to give 
notification of any amendment to the Minister responsible for Bougainville matters. 
The National Government may consult the Bougainville Government in relation to 
any proposed amendment of the Constitution.345 
 
Bougainville as a territory has been in conflict with Papua New Guinea for a 
considerable length of time since the independence of PNG in 1975. The conflict was 
first concerned with decolonization and this was followed by discord over the mining 
industry. Ethnic tensions have also had a role, even though these have not been the 
essential cause of the conflict.346 The Bougainville factions first met to discuss a 
peace settlement in July 1997. The parties involved agreed on a permanent ceasefire 
                                                 
343 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp.854-855. 
344 Bermuda Constitution Order 1968  
<http://www.ubp.bm/downloads/BermudaConstitutionOrder 1968.pdf>, accessed from Internet 22 
February 2007. 
345 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Article 287 
<http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/cotisopng534/>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007. 
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agreement on the 30th April 1998. A comprehensive Bougainville Peace 
Agreement was signed in August 2001, which included a weapons disposal plan and 
provided for elections in order to establish an autonomous government in 
Bougainville. The Agreement also provided for a referendum after 10-15 years on the 
question of Bougainvillean independence. On 21st December 2004, an agreeded 
Constitution for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville was established by the PNG 
government. The Constitution allows for an assembly of 33 elected members, a 
president, a speaker, three representatives for women and three representatives for ex-
combatants.347 
 
British Virgin Islands 
 
Under the terms of the 1977 constitution, the British Crown is represented by an 
appointed governor who has sole responsibility for external affairs, defense, judicial, 
and internal security matters. The governor also serves as chairperson of a six-
member Executive Council and possesses reserve legislative powers. There is also a 
15-member Legislative Council which is comprised of nine members directly elected 
from single-member constituencies, four elected according to a single national 
constituency, one appointed as speaker and one as an ex officio member, the attorney 
general. From the majority grouping in the Legislative Council, a chief minister is 
chosen and three other ministers are selected and these members constitute the 
Executive Council together with the Governor and the Attorney General.348 
 
The British Virgin Islands are ruled by the British Crown, and Her Majesty the Queen 
has the right to amend any laws and constitutions relating to the Islands. In some 
circumstances, even the appointed Governor of the Islands has the right to amend 
laws.349 
                                                                                                                                            
346 Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan (2000). ‘Bougainville and the Dialectics of Ethnicity, Autonomy and 
Separation’, pp. 242-265 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
347 Bougainville Peace Process <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/>, accessed from 
Internet 26 April 2007. 
348 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 856. 
349 The Virgin Islands (Constitution) Order 1976 (As Amended) 
<http://www.dpu.gov.vg/AboutUs/Constitution.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007. 
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Canary Islands 
 
The Canary Islands have an elected legislature and residents also choose deputies to 
the Spanish parliament. The Islands have their own government and are composed of 
two provinces, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas. The Canaries have a 
considerable degree of self-government on such matters as finances, public works and 
day-to-day administration. Responsibility for other areas, such as international affairs 
and defense, remains with the national government.350  
 
The Canary Islands’ fiscal and economic system is different from the general Spanish 
one. The Canaries have some exceptions as part of the European Union in the fiscal 
and economic area. The Islands have a special tax regime, with low taxes and other 
incentives for business.351 
 
Catalonia 
 
Catalonia in Spain belongs to one of the cultural and historical regions. Catalonia’s 
first autonomy statute was already approved during the Second Spanish Republic 
1931-1939. This autonomy had an interval when Franco was in power. After Franco’s 
death, nationalist mobilization began throughout the state and this lead to a major 
reform which resulted in the 1978 National Constitution.352 
 
The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was approved in 1979, after a popular 
referendum in which 61 percent of those eligible voted, of whom 88 percent 
supported autonomy. Catalonia achieved an autonomous government (Generalitat) 
and its own parliament. The Statute declared Catalan as Catalonia’s own language, 
but it had to share the status of an official language with Castilian.353 
                                                 
350 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 51 and 270. 
351 Spain: The Canary Islands Special Zone 
<http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/spain/spncan.html>, accessed from Internet 26 April 2007. 
352 Daniele Conversi (2000). ‘Autonomous Communities and the Ethnic Settlement in Spain’, pp.123-
125 in Yash Ghai (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity, op.cit. 
353 Ibid, p. 130. 
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Cayman Islands 
 
The British Crown, represented by an appointed governor on the Islands, has sole 
responsibility for external affairs, defense, judicial, public service, and internal 
security matters. The governor also serves as the chairperson of the Executive Council 
which is comprised of three appointed ex officio members including a chief secretary, 
and five elected representatives drawn from the Legislative Council. The latter five 
serve as ministers. The Legislative Council consists of three official representatives 
and 15 members elected by universal adult suffrage, from six electoral districts, for a 
four year period.354 
 
The Cayman Islands are ruled under Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, who has the 
right to amend any laws and constitution relating to the Islands. In some 
circumstances even the appointed Governor from the Islands has the right to amend 
laws.355 
 
Cook Islands 
 
The Cook Islands have a 25-member Legislative Assembly which is elected for a 
five-year term by universal adult suffrage. Ten members represent the main island of 
Rarotonga, 14 represent constituencies on the other 14 islands, and one represents the 
Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand. The Assembly selects a prime minister who 
oversees an eight-member cabinet of his or her choosing and also holds a wide range 
of functional portfolios. Hereditary island chiefs are represented in a second assembly 
chamber, the House of Ariki, which has up to 15 members. This chamber has, 
however, no legislative powers. An appointed High Commissioner represents the 
                                                 
354 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 857. 
355 The Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972 
<http://www.gov.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/CIGHOME/GOVERNMENT/CONSTITUTION/CONSTIT
UTION/CONSTITUTIONAMENDED2004ORDER.PDF>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007. 
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British Crown as the Islands’ formal Head of State, and the New Zealand 
government has a representative on Rarotonga.356 
 
On the Cook Islands, the parliament has the possibility to amend its constitution, if the 
final vote receives the affirmative votes of no less than two-thirds of the total 
membership (including vacancies) of the parliament and there is an interval of not less 
than 90 days between the date on which the final vote was taken and the date on 
which the proceeding vote was taken. The decision should be accompanied by a 
certificate endorsed by the speaker, in order to take effect.357 
 
Corsica 
 
Corsica forms an integral part of France, which is called a collective territory. The 
Island has its own parliament with 51 members and it is directly elected. The 
parliament has the right to scrutinize bills passed by the National Assembly and to 
propose amendments applicable to the island. The ‘Joxe Plan’ autonomy bill approved 
by the National Assembly in 1992, gives the island still greater autonomy in the 
education, training, transport, and tourism sectors.358  
 
The French Parliament has the right to amend Corsica’s Special Statute, but it must be 
in consent with the population of Corsica. A referendum on the Island has to be held 
first and after that a debate in the Government should follow.359 
 
Crimea 
 
Crimea has an asymmetric institutional autonomy arrangement within the Ukraine. 
Crimea belongs to one of the Free Economic Zones in Ukraine with a special tax 
regime. It is the only region where the Russian population is in the majority, i.e. about 
                                                 
356 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 843. 
357 The Constitution of the Cook Islands <http://www.paclii.org/ck/legis/num_act/cotci327/>, accessed 
from Internet 22 February 2007. 
358 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 837. 
359 French Constitution of 1958 <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp>, accessed from 
Internet 22 February 2007. 
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60 percent, in relation to 23 percent of Ukrainians. There is also a segment of 
Crimean Tatars of about 10-12 percent and up to 100 smaller segments of 
nationalities.360 
 
Crimea is labeled as the ‘Autonomous Republic of Crimea’ and has its own 
government and elected assembly (Verkhovna Rada). The Crimean assembly only has 
the right to initiate legislation and pass normative acts rather than laws. The 
responsibilities of the assembly are limited, but there is some flexibility to modify and 
be granted more competences.361  
 
Crimea is directly under Ukrainian jurisdiction and this means that the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine has the ultimate power to amend the Constitution. The President of 
Ukraine or no less than one-third of the National Deputies of Ukraine need to support 
the amendments.362  
 
Falkland Islands   
 
The Falkland Islands are administered by a crown-appointed governor, who works 
with an advisory Executive Council composed of two non-voting ex officio members, 
a chief executive, a financial secretary and three representatives elected by the 
Legislature. The Falkland Islands’ Legislative Council is comprised of eight directly 
elected members and the two non-voting ex officio representatives.363 
 
The Commissioner (governor) may make laws, to be styled Ordinances, for the peace, 
order and good governance of the Falkland Islands. Her Majesty, through a Secretary 
of State, has the right to disallow any Ordinances made by the Commissioner.364  
 
                                                 
360 Gwendolyn Sasse (2001). ‘The ‘New’ Ukraine: A State of Regions’, Regional and Federal Studies, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 70, 74-75 and 86. 
361 Ibid, pp. 91-94. 
362 Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Article 135 and Article 154 
<http://www.ukraineinfo.us/about/constitution.html>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007. 
363 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp. 858-859. 
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Faroe Islands 
 
The Faroe Islands have an elected 32-member assembly (Logting). Twenty-seven of 
its seats are filled by direct election with universal adult suffrage, on the basis of 
proportional representation in seven multi-member constituencies. There are a further 
five supplementary seats, which are dependent upon the numbers of people voting. 
The parliamentary term is for four years. A six-member cabinet headed by a 
chairperson functions as the executive. This chamber has full authority over internal 
affairs. The Danish government is, however, represented by a High Commissioner, 
who has the responsibility over foreign affairs and some civic matters. The Islands 
elect two representatives to the Danish parliament (Folketing).365  
 
The Faroe Islands can amend its Home Rule Act through a referendum, or the 
National Parliament of Denmark can call for amendments according to the National 
Constitution.366 
 
French Polynesia 
 
The 1984 constitution as amended in 1990 and 1996 regulates French Polynesia. An 
appointed French high commissioner controls defense, foreign policy, justice and 
monetary affairs. The 57-member Territorial Assembly, which is directly elected for a 
five-year period, appoints, from its own ranks, a president and a six to 12-member 
Councils of Ministers (COM). The COM has considerable autonomy in internal 
policy matters. French Polynesia also elects two representatives to the French Senate 
and Economic and Social Council. The territory is also represented at the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg.367 
 
                                                                                                                                            
364 The British Antarctic Territory Order 1989 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19890842_en_l.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 February 
2007. 
365 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp. 819-820. 
366 Constitution of Denmark, Part X, Section 88 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/da00000_.html>, 
accessed from Internet 23 February 2007. 
367 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 832 and CIA World Factbook 2007. 
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The overseas territories in France are all ruled under the French Constitution and 
their own statutes. Amendments to the statutes can be made by a referendum in the 
regions by the registered voters. Another possibility is that the President of the 
Republic of France may, on a proposal from the Government, consult the voters in the 
overseas territories to amend its organization, status and the like. The amendments 
should be made after consultations with the overseas’ decision-making assemblies.368 
This applies also to Mayotte, New Caledonia, St Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and 
Futuna. 
 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia 
 
Friulia-Venezia Giulia belongs to the Special Regions in Italy. The region has its own 
Legislative Assembly and a Government (Junta). The government is comprised of a 
President for the region and ten members appointed by the Legislature. The 
Legislative Council is elected according to a direct, equal and secret ballot system. 
The number of representatives is decided according to one member per 20,000 
inhabitants or a fraction of over 10,000 inhabitants according to the latest population 
census. The Regional Council has a five-term period.369 The region has a fairly 
complex language system, since there are officially three linguistic minorities settled 
in the region: Slovenes (in the Provinces of Trieste and Gorizia), Friulians (in the 
Provinces of Udine and Pordenone) and German-speakers (in one or two villages in a 
remote valley, called Val Canale).370 
 
The Italian Special Statutes could be amended by the Regional Council by a law 
approved twice by a majority of its members. Votes should be taken within an interval 
of no less than two months. Within thirty days of its publication, the Central 
Government may challenge the constitutionality of the Regional Statute before the 
Constitutional Court. The Statute has to be submitted to a popular referendum, when, 
                                                 
368 The Constitution of France 1958, Articles 72-1, 72-4 and 74 <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20XII>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007. 
369 Maria Ackrén (2008). ‘Italiens regionalisering med fokus på Friulia-Venezia Giulia’, pp. 165-177 in 
Pontus Tallberg (red.): Regioner i Europa. Utgiven av Region Skåne, Västra Götalandsregionen och 
Regionplane- och trafikkontoret. 
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within three months of its publication, a request is made by one fiftieth of the 
electors of the region or by one fifth of the members of the Regional Council. The 
Statute submitted to a referendum may not be promulgated unless approved by a 
majority of valid votes.371 This also applies to the regions of Sardinia, Sicily, 
Trentino-alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta. 
 
Gagauzia 
 
Gagauzia is an Autonomous Territorial Unit of Moldova. The People’s Assembly of 
Gagauzia has power to deal with internal administration and organization, local 
elections and referenda, as well as political, economic and cultural development. The 
members of the assembly are elected for four-year terms. The Legislative Assembly 
consists of 35 deputies. The Governor, who is head of the Assembly, is also elected 
for four years. The Executive Council fulfills the functions of a government. Gagauzia 
has been approved to participate in Moldova’s external affairs in the form of 
participating in Moldovan delegations. Amendments to the Autonomy Statute require 
a three-fifths majority in the National Parliament.372  
  
Galicia 
 
Galicia is considered one of the historical and cultural regions in Spain. As in other 
regions in Spain, there is a Legislative Assembly which is elected by universal 
suffrage, a Government headed by a president, and a High Court of Justice. The 
regions enjoy financial autonomy within limits. Their revenue is derived from shared 
and assigned taxes, limited regional taxes and an equalization fund. All the main 
revenue sources are, however, controlled by the Central Government.373 Galicia has 
two official languages, Galician, and the official language of the state, Castilian. 
                                                                                                                                            
370 Francesco Palermo, Professor and Director of the Institute for Studies on Federalism and 
Regionalism, University of Verona, E-mail Contact at 21 April, 2007. 
371 Constitution of Italy, Article 123 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html>, accessed from 
Internet 23 February 2007. 
372 Claus Neukirch (2002), ’Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Gagauz Territorial Autonomy 
in the Republic of Moldova’ pp. 105-123 in Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. 
Budapest: LGI Books. 
373 Francesc Morata (2001). ‘Spanish Regions in the European Community’, op.cit., pp. 116-117. 
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The amendment of the Galician Autonomy Statute follows the same procedure as 
other regions in Spain, i.e., an amendment should be sent to the Cortes Generales for 
approval.374 
 
Gibraltar 
 
The 1969 constitution of Gibraltar regulates the area. British interests have been 
represented by an appointed governor, who is advised by the Gibraltar Council. The 
Gibraltar Council comprises four ex officio and five elected members of the House of 
Assembly. The United Kingdom is responsible for the territory’s defense and external 
affairs as well as matters of internal security. Since 1969, full control over residual 
internal affairs has been vested in the elected House of Assembly and the Council of 
Ministers, drawn from the majority grouping within the Assembly.375 
 
The House of Assembly consists of a speaker appointed by the governor; two ex 
officio representatives, the attorney general and the financial and development 
secretary; and 15 members who are popularly elected for a four-year period. The 
electoral system is unique. It allows each elector to vote for a maximum of eight 
candidates and the party with the largest share of the vote is restricted to a maximum 
of eight seats. The Council of Ministers, which constitutes the territory’s executive, 
has seven ministers and a chief minister drawn from the House of Assembly.376  
 
Gibraltar is directly ruled under Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom. Her 
Majesty has the right to amend Gibraltar’s Constitution.377  
 
 
 
                                                 
374 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146 
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet 15 February 2007. 
375 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 850. 
376 Ibid. 
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Gorno-Badakhshan 
 
Gorno-Badakhshan is a region belonging to Tajikistan. It is a very mountainous 
region with peaks up to 7,000 meters high. Since the end of major hostilities in 1993, 
the region has been making a reappearance.378  
 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region has its own parliament and it has the right to 
introduce draft legislation. The region is considered to be a component and an 
indivisible part of the Republic of Tajikistan. There is a clause requiring permission of 
the people’s deputies in the regional parliament to alter the borders of the territory. 
The people’s deputies are elected in accordance with established laws, regardless of 
the size of the population. Gorno-Badakhshan has also its own Court. The President 
of the Republic of Tajikistan appoints and dismisses the chairs of Gorno-Badakhshan. 
One of the assistants to the Chair of the National Parliament must be a people’s 
deputy from this region. The powers related to internal matters of the region are 
determined by constitutional law.379 
 
Gorno-Badakhshan is directly under the rule of Tajikistan. Amendments to the 
Constitution are introduced through general referendum. A referendum is held if two-
thirds of the people’s deputies vote for this solution. Proposals to amend or add to the 
Constitution are introduced by the President or on the petition of no less than one 
third of the people’s deputies of Tajikistan. The proposals are published in the press 
three months before the referendum.380 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
377 The Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006 
<http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/constitution/new_constitution/NewGibraltarConstitution.pdf>, accessed 
from Internet 23 February 2007. 
378 TVE’s Earth Report: Where Families and Mountains Meet, 
<http://www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=882>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2007.  
379 Constitution of Tajikistan 1994, Chapter 7, Articles 81-84 and Chapter 6, Articles 53, 60 and 63 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan003670.htm>, accessed from 
Internet 2 May 2007. 
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Greenland 
 
The 1979 Home Rule Act regulates the division of powers in Greenland. The 
Parliament of Greenland (Landsting) consists of 31 members, elected according to 
universal adult suffrage for four-year terms. A seven-member Government 
(Landsstyre) is drawn from the Landsting, being based on the strength of the parties, 
and is headed by a prime minister. Denmark is represented on the Island by a High 
Commissioner who has control over foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, and 
constitutional matters. Greenland also sends two representatives to the Danish 
Parliament.381 
 
The amendment of the Home Rule Act follows the same procedure as for the Faroe 
Islands. The Act can be amended through a referendum or by the Danish 
Parliament.382 
 
Guam 
 
Guam is regulated by the 1950 Guam Organic Act. Executive power is exercised by a 
governor who is directly elected for four-year terms. The legislature is comprised of a 
15-member parliament whose members are elected biennially. It has legislative 
powers over local affairs. A member, who may vote in committees but not otherwise, 
is elected to the US House of Representatives every two years. The residents of Guam 
are US citizens, but they cannot vote in US presidential elections.383  
 
Guam is directly under Title 48 of the US Code. The Congress of the United States 
has the ultimate power to amend Guam’s Organic Act.384 
 
                                                                                                                                            
380 Constitution of Tajikistan 1994, Chapter 10, Articles 98-99, op.cit. 
381 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 821. 
382 Constitution of Denmark, Part X, Section 88 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/da00000_.html>, 
accessed from Internet 23 February 2007. 
383 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 868. 
384 U.S. Code Collection, Title 48, Chapter 8A, Subchapter 1, §1421b 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode48/usc_sup_01_48_10_8A.html>, accessed from 
Internet 23 February 2007. 
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Guernsey 
 
The Bailiwick of Guernsey consists of three islands: Guernsey, Alderney and Sark. 
They all have their own legislative parliaments and courts but their competences 
differ. The legislative parliament of Guernsey is called the States of Deliberation, in 
Alderney it is called the States of Alderney, and in Sark it is the Chief of Pleas.385 In 
the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Crown is represented by a lieutenant governor who 
appoints the bailiff (president of the parliament). The government on the Islands is 
conducted by Committees appointed by the States of Deliberation. The States of 
Deliberation consists of 12 counselors, who are indirectly elected by the States of 
Election, a 108-member body comprising local political and judicial officers, for a 
six-year term, half retiring every three years; in addition there are 33 people’s 
deputies directly elected for a four-year term and ten Douzaine representatives, who 
are elected by their respective parishes, and two Alderney representatives. In 
Alderney, the parliament has 12 members directly elected for three years periods, and 
in Sark, the assembly consists of 12 popularly elected members plus 40 tenants 
nominated by the feudal suzerain of the Island, the seigneur.386 
 
Guernsey has its own right to amend its constitution. The lieutenant governor is Her 
Majesty’s personal representative and official channel of communication between the 
Crown, the UK Government and the Bailiwick of Guernsey.387 
 
Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region belonging to China since 1997. The 
region has considerable autonomy. Hong Kong has legislative powers and its own 
executive as well as judicial powers. The Chief Executive of the region is the Head of 
Hong Kong, and should be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years old and a 
                                                 
385 Sören Silverström (2004). De rättsliga ramarna för vissa autonomiers och mikrostaters förhållande 
till Europeiska unionen. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, 
Rättsvetenskapliga institutionen, Ser. A:543, Åbo 2004, p. 16.  
386 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 851. 
387 States of Guernsey, Constitution <http://www.gov.gg/ccm/navigation/about-
guernsey/constitution/?textonly=yes>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007. 
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permanent resident of the region. The Chief Executive is indirectly elected by a 
nominating committee and appointed by the Central People’s Government of China 
for a five-year term. The members of the Executive Council are appointed by the 
Chief Executive from among the principal officials of the executive authorities, 
members of the Legislative Council, and public figures. The Legislative Council has 
to be composed of Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the region and 
elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term.388  
 
The power to amend the Basic Law concerning Hong Kong lies in the hands of the 
National People’s Congress of China. The power to propose bills for amendments to 
this Law is vested in the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, the State 
Council and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Amendments from the 
Hong Kong Region should be submitted to the National People’s Congress by the 
delegation of the Region to the National People’s Congress, after obtaining the 
consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region, two-thirds of all members of the 
Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.389 
 
Isle of Man 
 
The Isle of Man is substantially self-governing and is represented by the Crown 
through an appointed lieutenant governor. The UK is responsible for defense and 
external relations. The Court of Tynwald functions as the legislative assembly and has 
two chambers: the Legislative Council or Upper House and the House of Keys as the 
Lower House. The Legislative Council consists of the Lieutenant Governor, a 
President, the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man, the Attorney General and eight 
members elected by the House of Keys. The House of Keys is comprised of 24 
members who are directly elected by universal adult suffrage for five-year terms. 
                                                 
388 The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, different Articles 
<http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law.icl/hk00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 22 November 2002. 
389 The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, Article 159 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/content0208.htm>, accessed from Internet 26 February 
2007. 
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Both chambers sit together as one body in the legislature but they vote separately. 
There is also a ten-member government headed by a Chief Minister.390  
 
The Isle of Man is a Crown Dependency under Her Majesty the Queen of UK. Her 
Majesty the Queen, or Lord of Man, is the Head of State. The Lieutenant Governor, 
who is appointed by the Crown, has, along with the Queen, the right to amend the 
Constitution of Isle of Man.391  
 
Jeju Island 
 
In February 2006, the Special Act on the Jeju Special Self-Governing province in 
South Korea was introduced. The Island has an autonomous status that differs from 
the other provinces in the state. There is a council consisting of 41 members and three 
members function as political advisory members to each standing committee. There 
are seven agencies functioning as various departments on the island. Tasks are being 
transferred to the region from the national level in stages. Jeju Island will have its own 
police force and its own fiscal system according to the free-market principle. The 
national parliament has the ultimate right to amend the Special Act.392 
 
Jersey 
 
The Bailiwick of Jersey is a Crown Dependency under Her Majesty the Queen of the 
UK, similar to the Isle of Man. In the Bailiwick, the Crown is represented by a Bailiff. 
On Jersey, the Legislative Assembly consists of 12 senators who are elected for six-
year terms, half of the senators retiring every three years. At the local and at-large 
levels, there are 12 constables and 29 deputies, directly elected for three-year terms.393 
 
Jersey has the same system as Isle of Man as regards amendments to the constitution. 
                                                 
390 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 852. 
391 The Constitution of Isle of Man <http://www.gov.im/isleofman/constitution.xml.>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007. 
392 Jeju Special Self-Governing Province <http://english.jeju.go.kr/contents/index.php+mid=0202>, 
accessed from Internet 6 March 2008. 
393 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 851.   
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Karakalpakstan 
 
Karakalpakstan is an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan. The region has its own 
constitution and parliament ruling the area. The government is headed by the Council 
of Ministers of Karakalpakstan. This autonomous republic possesses the largest oil 
and gas deposits of Uzbekistan.394 
 
The Republic of Karakalpakstan has independence as regards the determination of its 
administrative and territorial structure. The Head of Government of the Region should 
be an ex officio member of the Cabinet of Ministers in Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan 
also has its own judicial system.395 
 
The constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan is in accordance with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan has the right to secede 
from Uzbekistan on the basis of a nationwide referendum held by the people of 
Karakalpakstan. Amendments to the Constitution rest in the hands of the Parliament 
of Uzbekistan.396  
 
Kosovo 
 
Kosovo is a disputed territory at the moment. The status of Kosovo is under debate 
and a proposal for Kosovo’s status has been approved in the Kosovo parliament. This 
proposal states that Kosovo should receive “supervised independence”. The proposal 
has been outlined by the UN conciliator Martti Ahtisaari and has also been sent to the 
Security Council of the United Nations. The so-called Contact Group, which has been 
working with the Kosovo case since the peace process, will discuss this proposal 
                                                 
394 The Republic of Karakalpakstan <http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Regions/Karakalpakstan/>, 
accessed from Internet 4 May 2007. 
395 The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 73, 98 and 107 
<http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html#Part%20Four>, accessed from 
Internet 26 February 2007. 
396 The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 69-74, op.cit. 
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before it reaches a UN Resolution status. The Contact Group consists of the 
United Kingdom, the USA, Russia, Italy, Germany and France.397  
 
Macau 
 
Macau similar to Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region in China. The region 
exercises a high degree of autonomy and enjoys executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power. The Chief Executive is the head of the region and should 
be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years of age and a permanent resident of the 
region. The Chief Executive should be selected by election through consultations held 
locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government of China. The term of 
office is five years for this position. The Executive Council of Macau should assist the 
Chief Executive in policy making and is composed of seven to eleven members. The 
Legislative Council of Macau comprises permanent residents of the region and the 
majority of its members should be elected. The term of office is four years.398 
 
In Macau, the power of amendment is vested in the National People’s Congress of 
China. The power to propose bills for amendments to the Basic Law is vested in the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council and the 
Macau Special Administrative Region. Amendments from the Macau Region should 
be submitted to the National People’s Congress by the delegation of the Region, after 
obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region, two-thirds of all the 
members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the 
Region.399  
 
 
 
                                                 
397 100 ja till Kosovo-plan, Svenska Dagbladet 5 april, 2007 
<http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/utrikes/did_14992590.asp>, accessed from Internet 4 May 2007. 
398 Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 1993, 
Chapter I, Chapter II and Chapter IV, various Articles 
<http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp>, accessed from Internet 4 
May 2007.  
399 Macau Basic Law 1993, Chapter VIII, Article 144 
<http://www.umac/mo/basiclaw/english/ch8.html>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007. 
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Madeira 
 
Madeira has the same status as the Azores within the Portuguese system. The 
autonomous region has its own Legislative Assembly and Government. Residents also 
elect delegates to Portugal’s parliament, and a minister represents Lisbon in 
Madeira.400 The region has a high degree of autonomy in internal affairs. An 
amendment to the status of the region is in the hands of the Assembly of the Republic 
of Portugal.401 
 
Mayotte 
 
Mayotte is a Collective Territory, which is an intermediate level between an Overseas 
Department and an Overseas Territory. The Islands are administered by an appointed 
French government prefect who works with the assistance of an elected 19-member 
General Council. Mayotte also elects one member to the French National Assembly 
and one representative to the French Senate.402 
 
The overseas regions in France are all ruled by the French National Constitution and 
the statutes of these regions. Amendments to the Statutes can be made by a 
referendum in the regions by the registered voters. Another possibility is that the 
President of the Republic of France may, on a proposal from the Government, consult 
the voters in the overseas territories on the question of to amendments to the 
organization, the status and any other matters. The amendments should be made after 
consultations with the overseas’ decision-making assemblies. This rule is also applied 
to regions such as New Caledonia, St Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna.403 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
400 Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), The Last Colonies, op.cit., p. 270. 
401 See the section on the Azores for more details. 
402 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp. 829-830. 
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Mindanao 
 
Mindanao is an autonomous region in the Philippines. The President of the Republic 
of the Philippines exercises general supervision over the autonomous region. An 
organic act regulates the basic structure of government, consisting of the executive 
department and legislative assembly and special courts. The region has responsibility 
over an extensive part of internal matters.404  
 
The Organic Act of Mindanao can be amended or revised by the Congress of the 
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the House of Representatives 
and of a separate vote by the Senate. The Regional Assembly of Mindanao has the 
power to initiate proposals for amendment or revision. However, the amendment or 
revision also requires the approval of the Congress of the Philippines by a vote of 
two-thirds of the Members of the House of Representatives and of a separate vote by 
the Senate.405 
 
Montserrat 
 
The 1960 Constitution, which regulates the Island, was amended in 1977 and 1989. 
The British Crown is represented by an appointed governor who is responsible for 
defense, foreign affairs and internal security. The Governor also serves as president of 
a seven-member Executive Council, which also includes a Chief Minister, three other 
ministers drawn from among elected members of the legislature, and the Attorney 
General and a Financial Secretary. The Attorney General and the Secretary are both 
ex officio. The Legislative Council comprises 12 members for a five-year term. There 
are two official members, three nominated, including a speaker, and seven members 
                                                                                                                                            
403 The Constitution of France 1958, Articles 72-1, 72-4 and 74 <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20XII>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007. 
404 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 16, 18 and 20 
<http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/a17.asp>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007. 
405 Republic Act No. 9054, Article XVII, Section 1-2 
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf>, accessed from Internet 26 February 
2007. 
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directly elected. The Executive Council’s Chief Minister and other ministers are 
chosen from the Legislative Council.406 
 
Montserrat functions as a self-governing territory ruled under the Crown of the United 
Kingdom. It is Her Majesty and Secretary of State that have the right to amend the 
Constitution Order of Montserrat.407 
 
Nakhichevan 
 
Nakhichevan forms an Autonomous Republic in Azerbaijan. The legislative power in 
the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is executed by the Regional Parliament. The 
executive power should be implemented by the Cabinet of Ministers and the judicial 
power exercised by the courts of the region. The Chairman of the Ali Majlis (the 
parliament) is the highest official in the autonomous republic. The parliament should 
consist of 45 members for a five-year term.408 
 
Nakhichevan is directly ruled under the Constitution of Azerbaijan. This means that 
an amendment to the status of Nakhichevan follows the same procedure as the 
Constitution in this case. It is only possible to make changes via a referendum in 
Azerbaijan.409 
 
Netherland’s  Antilles 
 
The Dutch government is represented by a Crown-appointed Governor, who serves 
for a six-year period and functions as Head of State, having control over the Islands’ 
defense and external affairs. The Governor is assisted by an Advisory Council. The 
executive power for internal affairs rests with a ten-member Council of Ministers.  
                                                 
406 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 862. 
407 Statutory Instrument 1989 No. 2401, The Montserrat Constitution Order 1989 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19892401_en_4.htm>, accessed from Internet 26 February 
2007. 
408 Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Section IX in the Constitution of Azerbaijan 
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_azerbaijan.pdf>, accessed from Internet 26 February 
2007. 
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The elected assembly, the Staten, is comprised of 22 members for a four-year term 
and functions as the legislature. Each island group forms an electoral district for 
electoral purposes, Curaçao returning 14 members, Bonaire and St Maarten three 
each, and Saba and St Eustatius one member each. A proportional representation 
system is used.410 
 
The Netherland’s Antilles are directly ruled under the Dutch Kingdom and have the 
same relationship within the Kingdom as that of Aruba. The three parties are in a 
loose construction forming a kind of ‘confederation’. The Dutch Parliament has the 
ultimate right to change the Islands’ status in consent with the Parliament of the 
Netherland’s Antilles.411 
 
New Caledonia 
 
New Caledonia has received a considerable degree of autonomy. The French 
government is represented by a High Commissioner who has the control over defense, 
foreign policy, finance, external trade, secondary education and justice. New 
Caledonia is comprised of three provinces: North, South and the Loyalty Islands. 
Each province has the status of a self-governing territorial unit, and has its own 
directly elected assembly headed by a president. Assembly terms are up to six years. 
The three assemblies together constitute the Territorial Congress, which sit under the 
French High Commissioner. The Territorial Congress has responsibility over the 
budget, fiscal affairs, primary education and infrastructure. The provincial assemblies 
are responsible for cultural affairs, land reform and local economic development. New 
Caledonia elects two deputies to the French National Assembly, one Senator and one 
Economic and Social Councilor, and is also represented in the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg.412 See the section of Mayotte relating to amendment procedures. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
409 The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic 1995, Section IX, Article 134 and Section XI, Article 
152, op.cit. 
410 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 841. 
411 See the section on Aruba. 
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Niue 
 
Niue has an elected 20-member Legislative Assembly, constituting 14 village 
representatives and six members elected on a common roll. The government is in the 
hands of a cabinet of four, headed by a Prime Minister and drawn from the 
Assembly’s ranks. New Zealand is represented by a High Commissioner on the 
Island.413 
 
In Niue, it is possible for the Legislative Assembly itself to amend or modify its 
constitution. The amendment should pass two readings and achieve affirmative votes 
of no less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Assembly.414 
 
Norfolk Island 
 
Norfolk Island has both legislative and executive powers. The Legislative Assembly 
has nine members, from which a five-member ministerial Executive Council is drawn, 
headed by a president. In 1985 the powers of the Legislative Assembly were extended 
to include matters such as civil defense and public works and services. Elections are 
held every three years and are determined by an unusual ‘cumulative method of 
voting’ in which electors are allowed to cast as many votes as there are vacancies, 
subject to the provision that they may not give more than four votes to each candidate. 
The Australian government is represented on the Island by an administrator, 
appointed by the Governor General of Australia and responsible to the Minister for 
Territories.415  
 
Norfolk Island is ruled under Australia and therefore an amendment is only possible 
under the Act of the Senate and House of Representatives of Australia.416 
                                                                                                                                            
412 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 834. 
413 Ibid, p. 844. 
414 Niue Constitution Act 1974, Part II, 35 <http://www.legislation.co.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-
set=pal_statutes>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007. 
415 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 817. 
416 Norfolk Island Act 1979 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ncet/NorfolkGov/NorfolkIsland79.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 27 February 2007. 
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North Atlantic Autonomous Region and South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
 
The North Atlantic Autonomous Region and the South Atlantic Autonomous Region 
are two regions belonging to Nicaragua. Each region has a directly elected Regional 
Council with administrative powers. Each Council adopts resolutions and ordinances 
within its jurisdiction, electing a chief executive known as the Regional Coordinator. 
The Regional Coordinator prepares a draft budget for the region in conjunction with 
the national Ministry of Finance. All regional resolutions and ordinances are 
subordinate to the Nicaraguan constitution and national laws. Amendments to the 
Autonomy Statute may be requested by the two regional assemblies and adopted by 
the National Assembly according to its normal procedures.417 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
The Northern Ireland Assembly was established as part of the Belfast Agreement in 
1998. The Assembly was suspended, however, in October 2002, due to tensions 
between the Protestants and the Catholics in the area. New elections took place in 
March 2007 and now the restoration of the self-government in the territory is under 
discussions and promising progress has been made in cooperation with the different 
parties.418  
 
The status of Northern Ireland can be changed via a referendum, in which the 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland vote affirmatively. If the wish expressed by 
a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United 
Kingdom and form a part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State is obliged to send 
before the Parliament such a proposal. In order for this request to have effect it must 
                                                 
417 Hurst Hannum (1996). ‘The Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua’ pp. 203-225 in Hurst Hannum: Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accomodation of Conflicting Rights. Revised Edition. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
418 Northern Ireland Assembly <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2007. 
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also be agreed upon by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the 
Government of Ireland.419 
 
Northern Mariana Islands 
 
The Northern Mariana Islands are considered internally self-governing as a US 
‘Commonwealth Territory’. The Executive power is vested in a governor, who is 
directly elected for a four-year term, and the legislative power is within a bicameral 
assembly (the Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature) composed of a nine-
member Senate and an 18-member House of Representatives, elected biennially. The 
Islands’ inhabitants enjoy US citizenship. Northern Mariana Islands send a non-voting 
deputy to the US Congress who is elected every four years.420 
 
In Northern Mariana Islands, amendments may be proposed by constitutional 
convention, legislative initiative or popular initiative. All these procedures are 
described in more detail in Article XVII, Section 1-4 in the Commonwealth 
Constitution.421 
 
Oecussi Ambeno 
 
The Oecussi Ambeno enclave is an isolated district of East Timor. In June 2000, the 
International District Administration proposed that the enclave should be developed 
into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). This called for a soft border regime with 
Indonesia, reduced taxes and tariff rates. In July 2000, the District CNRT Congress 
called for a governmental arrangement in which Oecussi would become a province 
rather than a district.422 Oecussi Ambeno is recognized by the Constitution of East 
Timor as a special administrative and economic region. This means that amendments 
                                                 
419 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Part I <http://www.statute.law.gov.uk/>, accessed from Internet 27 
February 2007. 
420 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 871. 
421 The Commonwealth Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1-4, 
<http://cnmilaw.org/constitution_article18.htm>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007. 
422 Arsenio Bano and Edward Rees, The Oecussi-Ambeno Enclave 
<http://www.serve.com/inside/edit71/Oecussi.htm>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2007. 
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follow the National Constitution and it is the National Parliament that has the 
ultimate power to revise the Constitution.423  
 
Pitcairn Islands 
 
Pitcairn Islands are administered by the British High Commissioner in New Zealand. 
The High Commissioner governs in consultation with a ten-member Island Council, 
presided over by the Island Magistrate who is elected for a three-year term. The Island 
Council consists of an ex officio representative, two appointees, and three members 
elected by the elected deputies. Elections are held annually in December. There are no 
parties only independents are elected.424 
 
The Islands are ruled under the Governor appointed by Her Majesty, and as 
mentioned, who resides in New Zealand. It is the Governor who has the ultimate 
power to amend the Pitcairn Order.425 
 
Puerto Rico 
 
Puerto Rico is a self-governing ‘Commonwealth’ voluntarily associated with the 
United States. Both states share a common currency and market while the US is 
responsible for the Commonwealth’s defense. Puerto Rico’s inhabitants are US 
citizens, able to vote in national party primary elections, but they may not vote in 
presidential elections. The Island is represented in the US Congress only by a resident 
Commissioner elected every four years; he/she participates in House of 
Representatives’ debates but can only vote in committee. Executive power is 
exercised by a governor who must at least be 35 years old; he/she is directly elected 
for a four-year term and works in a cabinet of around 15 secretaries. Legislative 
power is held by a two-chamber Legislative Assembly which is comprised of a 28-
                                                 
423 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor 2002 
<http://www.constitution.org/cons/east_timor/constitution-eng.htm>, accessed from Internet 27 
February 2007. 
424 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 863. 
425 The Pitcairn Islands Order 1970 <http://www.government.pn/Laws/PitcairnLaws.html>, accessed 
from Internet 27 February 2007. 
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member Senate and a 54-member House of Representatives. Assembly members 
are elected every four years. Senators must be at least 30 years old and representatives 
at least 25 years old. The legislative process is similar to that in the United States.426   
 
The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico may propose amendments to this 
Constitution by a concurrent resolution approved by no less than two-thirds of the 
total members of each house. All proposed amendments are to be submitted to the 
qualified electors in a special referendum, but if the concurrent resolution is approved 
by no less than three-fourths of the total number of members of which the house is 
composed, the Legislative Assembly may require that the referendum be held at the 
same time as the next general election.427 
 
Rodrigues 
 
Rodrigues is a dependency belonging to Mauritius. The Island is mentioned in the 
National Constitution and has its own Regional Act. There is an established Regional 
Assembly with 18 members elected for a five-year term. The Assembly is empowered 
to make regulations and initiate legislation. The Island also has its own Executive 
Council comprising of a Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Chief Commissioner and 
not more than five other members of the Regional Assembly appointed by the 
President. The Regional Act can be dissolved by the President or the National 
Assembly.428 
  
Sardinia 
 
Sardinia, similar to Friulia-Venezia Giulia, is a special region in Italy. The region has 
its own legislature and executive authority. The region also has financial autonomy 
and implements its own taxes. Sardinia has two official languages, Sardinian and 
                                                 
426 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 872. 
427 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Article VII, Section 1 
<http://welcome.topuertorico.org/constitu.shtml>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007. 
428 The Rodrigues Regional Assembly Act 2001 <http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/rraact.htm>, 
The Constitution of Mauritius <http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/const.htm>, The Regional 
222
  
223
223
Italian.429 As regards amendments to the special statute, see the section on Friulia-
Venezia Giulia. 
 
Scotland 
 
Scotland is subject to the devolution system in the United Kingdom. Devolution is the 
delegation of power from a central government to local bodies. Scotland received its 
power of devolution by passing the Scotland Act of 1998. The region has its own 
parliament with devolved powers: matters such as education, health and prisons are 
decided in Scotland while reserved powers are directly ruled under the UK Parliament 
at Westminster. There is also a Scottish Executive functioning as the government 
branch.430  
 
Since Scotland is a part of the UK, it operates under the National Parliament’s 
supervision. An amendment of the Act should therefore be conducted in accordance 
with agreement between the Scottish Parliament, Her Majesty the Queen (by advice 
of Lords Spiritual and Temporal) and the House of Commons at Westminster.431 
 
Sicily 
 
Sicily has a high degree of autonomy similar to the other special regions in Italy. 
Some of the region’s competencies are shared between the central and the regional 
government. The amendment issue has been discussed in more detail in the section 
concerning Friulia-Venezia Giulia. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Assembly <http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/assembly.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 May 
2007. 
429 Maria Ackrén (2005), Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda 
områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut, p. 58. 
430 The Scottish Parliament <http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/corporate/powers/index.htm>, accessed 
from Internet 8 May 2007. 
431 Scotland Act 1998 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80046--a.htm#1>, accessed from Internet 
28 February 2007. 
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St Helena and Dependencies 
 
St Helena and Dependencies are administered by an appointed Governor who works 
with a Legislative Council and an advisory Executive Council. The Legislative 
Council consists of the Speaker and the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and 
the Attorney General as ex officio members, and 12 elected members. The Executive 
Council, presided over by the governor, includes three ex officio members noted 
above and five of the elected members of the Legislative Council. The task of the 
Legislative Council is to supervise the work of government departments. The 
dependencies of Ascension and Tristan da Cunha are governed by appointed 
administrators. Tristan da Cunha also has an advisory Council consisting of eight 
elected and three nominated members.432 
 
St Helena and Dependencies are directly ruled under Her Majesty the Queen; 
therefore it is the Queen, together with her appointed Governor, who has the power to 
amend the Constitution.433  
 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
 
The Islands are administered by an appointed French government Prefect who is 
assisted by a 19-member General Council. The General Council consists of 15 
members elected from St Pierre and four from Miquelon for a six-year term. The 
Islands also elect one member to the French National Assembly, one representative to 
the French Senate, and one to the Economic and Social Council.434 The amendment 
issue is described in more detail in the section on French Polynesia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
432 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 864. 
433 The St. Helena Constitution Order 1988 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si1988/Uksi_19881842_en_1.htm>, accessed from Internet 28 February 
2007. 
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Tokelau 
 
The Islands are governed directly by a resident administrator of the New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of the executive work is delegated to an official 
secretary based in Tokelau. At the local level, however, the Islands are substantially 
self-governing. Each atoll has a Council of Elders, consisting of Heads of family 
groups plus two members elected every three years by universal adult suffrage. The 
minimum voting age is 21 years. One of the elected members is the Faipule, the 
Commissioner, who presides over the Council and represents the atoll in dealings 
with the New Zealand administration, and the other is the Pulenuku, who is 
responsible for village affairs. Twice a year, 15 delegates from each atoll of the 
Council of Elders (Taupulega) convene in a General Fono, or meeting, chaired by one 
of the Islands’ three Faipules. The General Fono has limited, but increasing, 
legislative powers.435 The Governor-General appointed by New Zealand has the 
ultimate right to change the Tokelau Act.436 
 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
 
Trentino-Alto Adige is also called South Tyrol. The region has three official 
languages, Italian, German, and Ladin. The German minority forms the majority in 
the autonomous territory. South Tyrol has a high degree of autonomy with its own 
legislature and executive authority. All powers at each level are allocated in a system 
of continuous communication, mutual information and constitutional verification.437 
See details about the amendment issue in the section concerning Friulia-Venezia 
Giulia. 
     
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
434 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 831. 
435 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 845. 
436 Tokelau Act 1948 <http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Government/law1.htm>, accessed from Internet 28 
February 2007. 
437 Karl Rainer (2002), ‘The Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano-South Tyrol’, pp. 89-103 in 
Kinga Gál (ed.): Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: LGI Books. 
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Turks and Caicos Islands 
 
The executive power on the Islands is exercised by a crown-appointed Governor who 
is responsible for defense, external relations, internal security and official 
appointments. The Governor presides over an eight-member Executive Council, 
comprising three ex officio representatives and five, including a Chief Minister chosen 
from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council 
consists of seven appointed members and 13 deputies directly elected for a four-year 
term.438 
 
Turks and Caicos Islands are ruled by the Queen of the United Kingdom. The 
appointed Governor and the Legislative Council of the Islands have the right to 
amend the territory’s constitution.439 
 
Valle d’Aosta 
 
Valle d’Aosta is one of the special regions in Italy. There are two official languages: 
Italian and French. As well as other special regions, the region has its own legislative 
parliament and executive authority. Amendment of the Special Statute follows the 
same procedure as Friulia-Venezia Giulia. 
 
Wales 
 
The National Assembly for Wales is the representative body with legislative powers 
in devolved areas. It has 60 elected members. The Government is responsible for 
many issues, including health, education, economic development, culture, the 
environment and transport.440 
 
                                                 
438 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 865. 
439 Constitution of Turks and Caicos Islands 1998 
<http://www.turksandcaicosislands.gov.tc/OtherPages/THE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf>, accessed from 
Internet 28 February 2007. 
440 National Assembly for Wales <http://www.wales.gov.uk/>, accessed from Internet 11 May 2007. 
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Wales is a part of the United Kingdom. It is the Secretary of State who has the 
ultimate power to amend Government of Wales Act 1998.441 
 
Wallis and Futuna 
 
The Islands are administered by an appointed French Chief Administrator who is 
assisted by a 20-member Territorial Assembly. This Assembly is directly elected for 
five-year terms on a common roll and has its own president. The Territory elects one 
member to the French National Assembly and one representative to the Senate. The 
three traditional kingdoms, one on Wallis and two on Futuna, retain a number of 
limited powers and have their own Council of Ministers. The three Kings and their 
own Council of Ministers, along with three appointed members of the Territorial 
Assembly, form a six-member Council of the Territory which advises the Chief 
Administrator. The Islands are also represented at the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg.442 For the amendment issue, see the section on French Polynesia. 
 
Zanzibar 
 
The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is an executive government which has 
authority over matters related to Zanzibar. There is a President, who presides over the 
Government, and there is also a Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. 
The President appoints and assigns responsibilities to Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. The President should be elected by the 
people in Zanzibar. The Revolutionary Council is the principal organ for advising the 
President. The House of Representatives in Zanzibar is a two-chamber assembly. One 
chamber consists of members who are elected or appointed and are referred to as 
Representatives. The other chamber consists of the President.443  
 
                                                 
441 Government of Wales Act 1998 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80038--q.htm#151>, 
accessed from the Internet 28 February 2007. 
442 J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 836. 
443 Constitution of Tanzania 1977 <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/images/constitutioneng.pdf>, accessed 
from the Internet 28 February 2007. 
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Zanzibar has an own Constitution which is included in the National Constitution. 
Amendments are made by the Revolutionary Government in Zanzibar in accordance 
with the Constitution of Tanzania.444  
 
 
                                                 
444 Ibid. 
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Conditions for Different Autonomy
Regimes in the World
A Fuzzy-Set Application
The investigation can be seen as an inductive, empirical 
and more theory building study within the field of auton-
omy. First, it highlights the mapping of territorial autono-
mies in the world. Second, it shows how “good practice” 
of fuzzy-set QCA should be used within comparative 
research with not so small N. 
The study answers the questions of what conditions that 
explain the occurrence of territorial autonomy and what 
kind of different degrees of autonomy that exist within 
the group of territorial autonomies as such. These ques-
tions are answered through a stepwise application of using 
fuzzy-set QCA as the methodological technique. First, 
an application of necessary conditions is conducted only 
with the set of territorial autonomies in hand. Second, an 
elaboration of sufficient conditions is outlined with both 
the set of territorial autonomies and a set of non-autono-
mous entities as a control group.
Results show that there are two paths leading to the estab-
lishment of territorial autonomy. One path is the combina-
tion of ethnic distinctiveness and small population size and 
the other path is the combination of historical strategic 
importance and geographical distance. The underlying 
necessary condition for both paths is democracy. Without 
a democratic environment it would be harder for a territo-
rial autonomy to see the light.
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